Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

During its 16th annual summit in Kazan, Russia, Brics – a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions – invited Nigeria and eight other countries to join it as “partner” countries. Nigeria formally accepted the invitation in January 2025. That invitation has generated questions about how Nigeria stands to benefit, especially when US president Donald Trump is threatening to sanction members of the group if they replace the US dollar as reserve currency. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa joined in 2010 and the bloc added four new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates) in 2023. In this interview, development economist Stephen Onyeiwu argues that Nigeria stands to gain from a Brics partnership, but would have to carefully balance its domestic interests with those of its western allies and Brics.

What does it mean to be a Brics ‘partner’ country?

The introduction of Brics partnership is an expansion mechanism designed to bring in more participants without giving them full membership. It is akin to “observer” status.

Brics partners can participate in special sessions of summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, as well as other high-level events. Partners can also contribute to the organisation’s official documents and policy statements.

But partners cannot host annual Brics summits or determine the venue. Neither can they select new members and partners.

How beneficial is Brics partnership to Nigeria?

The main benefit would be access to finance offered by Brics’ New Development Bank.

The New Development Bank was established as an alternative to western-dominated international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These institutions are sometimes used by the leading western countries to keep developing countries in line on global issues.

Some developing countries are reluctant to criticise western countries for fear of losing access to funding by western-backed international financial institutions.

Nigeria has been running a budget deficit of about 5% of GDP since 2019, and it needs funding to pay for the deficits. The New Development Bank could be an important source of funding for investment in Nigeria’s infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, and so on.

New Development Bank loans are also available in member countries’ local currencies. They don’t have to earn foreign exchange to repay the loans. This fosters exchange rate stability and promotes economic growth. The New Development Bank raises funds in member countries’ local currencies, and lends them to member countries.

Nigeria could use its Brics partnership to garner the group’s support in matters that affect Nigeria globally. For instance, there have been requests for African countries to be included as permanent members (without veto power) of the UN security council. South Africa and Nigeria have been touted as potential candidates. Should this issue be raised at the UN, Nigeria can count on the support of its Brics allies, which includes two permanent members (China and Russia) of the security council.

Mutual understanding and cooperation with other Brics members and partners might spill over into economic, trade and investment agreements. Friendly countries are more likely to trade with each other and invest in each other’s economy.

How can Nigeria maximise its status as a Brics partner?

Nigeria should use it to attract foreign direct investment in strategic sectors of the economy, such as infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and technology.

Some Brics members, like China, India, and the UAE, have investors that are seeking investment outlets abroad. Nigeria could use the bloc’s annual summits to showcase investment opportunities.

The global economy is transitioning into “frontier industries and technologies”, such as big data, artificial intelligence, solar, drones, gene editing, 3D printing, blockchains, Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, robotics and nanotechnology. China, India and Brazil are already well advanced in these technologies.

Nigeria should use its partnership with these countries to build capabilities in frontier industries and technologies. It could get favourable terms in the transfer of these technologies.

Nigeria seeks to diversify its economy from reliance on the export of hydrocarbons. But Nigerian producers have had a hard time accessing global markets. The country should negotiate trade deals that provide access to Brics markets, especially agricultural and agro-processed products, arts and crafts.

But Nigeria has to promote economic growth and structural transformation at home. If the Nigerian economy falters, it is unlikely the country will be invited to become a full member of Brics.

Would adding new members and partners reduce western dominance?

Brics has so far not been able to significantly change the dynamics of the international political economy. Adding new members and partners, while symbolic, will not act as an effective counterweight to the influence of the G7 and G20 groups of nations.

Most of the countries and partners in Brics are either allies of western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to western interests.

Egypt and the UAE, for instance, receive military aid from the United States. Ethiopia and Nigeria are top recipients of foreign aid in Africa, much of it from western-backed financial institutions.

The only outlier in the mix is Iran, whose membership was promoted by Russia. But Iran has no leverage to influence others in the bloc.

On balance, therefore, Brics will not be a threat to western countries.

Brics aspires to weaken the dominance of the US dollar for international transactions. Close to 90% of international trade transactions are conducted with the US dollar.

Brics countries plan to reduce dollar dominance by encouraging member countries to settle their trade and financial transactions using their domestic currencies. For instance, South African businesses could purchase Chinese goods using the South African rand, while the Chinese could do the same for South African goods using the Chinese yuan. The more members you have in Brics swapping their currencies, the less important the US dollar will be.

It is unlikely, however, that an increase in the number of Brics members and partners will weaken the dollar. Most will continue to have significant economic relationships with the west, including trade and foreign aid.

They will also continue to conduct business with many non-Brics countries, which also have economic relationships with the west. They will need the US dollar to transact with many other countries.

So increasing the number of Brics members and partners does not pose a threat to dollar dominance.

– Nigeria’s Brics partnership: economist outlines potential benefits
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-brics-partnership-economist-outlines-potential-benefits-248943

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mamokete Modiba, Researcher, Gauteng City-Region Observatory

The South African government declared a national disaster towards the end of 2024 in response to an outbreak of food-borne illnesses. The outbreak had led to the tragic deaths of over 20 children and hospitalisation of hundreds.

Investigations by the National Institute for Communicable Diseases attributed the outbreak to hazardous pesticides such as Terbufos and Aldicarb. The pesticides, used in agriculture, have infiltrated the informal market as unregulated “street pesticides” for rat control, resulting in food contamination.

In response, the government announced several measures. One was that all food handling outlets, including informal retailers known as spaza shops, had to register with their respective municipalities. It also introduced widespread inspection of these outlets for compliance with regulations and health standards.

The measures are a step in the right direction. However, based on our research work at the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) over the past decades, they fall short of what is required. In addition, certain aspects, such as mandatory registration and mass inspection of food outlets, may prove difficult to implement effectively.

The Gauteng City Region is a cluster of cities, towns and urban nodes that make up the economic heartland of South Africa. The Gauteng City-Region Observatory is a partnership between the Gauteng provincial government, the University of the Witwatersrand, the University of Johannesburg and Gauteng South African Local Government Association. It has been researching the development dynamics of the region since 2008, providing data-driven insights and strategic guidance to support sustainable development.

The government response to the outbreak of food-borne illnesses addresses the immediate crisis but does not address underlying factors affecting low-income settlements.

Research by GCRO has identified the underlying factors as poor infrastructure and services. Rat infestations stem from poor waste management. This is caused by inadequate public services, failing infrastructure and irregular waste collection.

Dumping, littering and burning waste worsen the public health and environmental risks, including disease transmission and pest infestations.

Based on this evidence, we conclude that the government’s response does not adequately address some of the root causes of the outbreak, due to insufficient understanding of the context. Addressing these systemic failures is not just a public health matter. It also highlights the challenges faced by these communities and emphasises the importance of supporting local economies.

Survey findings

The GCRO’s flagship Quality of Life Survey, conducted every two years since 2009, is one of South Africa’s largest social surveys. It measures various aspects such as Gauteng residents’ socio-economic dynamics, service delivery experiences, and satisfaction with government. It provides longitudinally comparable data to inform decision-making.

The survey covers various topics that have a bearing on the food-borne illnesses outbreak, like basic services, income sources and food security. According to the latest survey (2023/24), access to refuse removal and satisfaction with service delivery has declined in Gauteng.

In the 2023/24 survey, 74% of respondents reported weekly refuse removal, down from 83% in the 2020/21 period. Satisfaction with services dropped from 75% to 64% over the same period – a worrying trend since 2017/18. The survey also shows that over half (57%) of businesses in Gauteng are informal.

Household hunger has increased across ten years of the survey. More than one in ten households experience severe food insecurity: hunger, poor access to food and insufficient spending on nutritious food.

Measures to address the crisis

We now turn to the three government interventions:

Registration of spaza shops

All food handling outlets, including spaza shops, are required to register with their municipalities between November 2024 and February 2025. This is a step in the right direction, towards regulatory compliance and monitoring of the safety of goods being sold to the public. However, it might not be achievable, especially within the specified period.

There are minimum requirements for the registration of spaza shops. These include (re)zoning certificates or consent use, certificates of acceptability (health standards), approved building plans, registration with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, and tax clearance. However, many of these businesses operate informally and therefore lack the required documentation.

Any spaza shop that fails to register in time will be closed. This will affect livelihoods and food security, especially in low-income communities where these shops play a vital role.

Spaza shops are a way for many people to make an income, and they supply essential food items to local communities. Households buy from them for a variety of reasons: they are nearby and affordable, open for long hours and offer credit.

Inspection of food outlets

A campaign to inspect all food handling outlets, focusing on spaza shops and informal traders, is underway. Law enforcement is important to remove contaminated food from the market and prevent future outbreaks. But municipalities have limited capacity to conduct such widespread inspections and ensure compliance with health regulations and standards.

The outbreak was partly a result of municipalities’ inability to enforce the rules. If inspections had been regular and thorough, food contamination issues would have been picked up before the current crisis.

The focus on punitive measures, such as closing businesses and prosecuting owners, does not help them to register, reopen and comply. It might harm the informal economy, reflecting a broader trend of criminalising the poor.

Joint fund to support township and rural businesses

Government has set aside R500 million (US$26 million) to support township and rural enterprises, including spaza shops. The fund is intended to improve business infrastructure and build capacity.

But in our view, its eligibility criteria require reconsideration. To qualify, a business owner must be a South African citizen, their business must be registered in the municipality and they must have have valid tax registration. The majority of businesses in these settlements are informal and would not meet the requirements, so the criteria exclude many that need support.

Next steps

The government’s response to the food-borne illness outbreak focuses on the immediate crisis and related symptoms. It overlooks underlying structural factors. The formalisation and compliance of informal businesses may contribute to the solution but will not tackle the root causes.

These include essential infrastructure and services such as water, sanitation and waste management facilities.

– South Africa’s food poisoning crisis: the government’s response isn’t dealing with the real issues
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-food-poisoning-crisis-the-governments-response-isnt-dealing-with-the-real-issues-245951

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brandon Marc Finn, Research Scientist at the School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan

Lubumbashi is a city in the mineral-rich Katanga region in the south of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Many people might not have heard of it, but Lubumbashi and its surrounding region have been at the centre of global geopolitics since the start of the 20th century. The area provided immense sources of copper, a metal that helped electrify the planet in the 1900s. It was also the source of all the uranium for the atom bombs used in the second world war.

The global demand for these minerals came at a great price. Lubumbashi grew as a divided city where housing and labour were spatially and racially segregated. Congolese workers were exploited, abused and taxed as urban and mining strategies were used to reshape society.

History is repeating itself. Neocolonialism now shapes the extraction of DRC resources.

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Read more: DRC is the world’s largest producer of cobalt – how control by local elites can shape the global battery industry

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Today, the southern DRC produces over 70% of the world’s cobalt. Cobalt is a mineral essential to decarbonisation – a strategy to reduce harmful carbon dioxide emissions. Cobalt is present in batteries in electric vehicles, mobile phones, laptop computers and renewable energy storage systems.

Like copper and uranium before it, cobalt mining has been linked to widescale exploitation and child labour. Corruption and elite capture remain defining features of mining in the DRC.

We are academics who research urbanisation, mining and sustainability as well as urban planning and environmental management. Our recent paper addresses the fact that African cities like Lubumbashi are at the heart of events that have shaped the modern world, yet they are woefully neglected in global urban theory (thinking about how cities form and develop) and urban geography.

Focusing on the global north and neglecting the south leads to major data gaps and contributes to mismatched and outdated urban policy.

We also argue that the human rights abuses and perils of today’s cobalt mining are new forms of old colonial practices. They strip the land and people of resources without proper pay. They offer green minerals to the global north at the cost of lives in the global south.

Sustainable cities and global decarbonisation are essential if we are to reduce cities’ carbon footprints and decarbonise economies in the face of the climate crisis.

Lubumbashi’s history, therefore, can offer a fuller understanding of the human and historical costs of minerals that shape cities – and the world.

A brief history of Lubumbashi

Lubumbashi was originally called Elisabethville. It was established by colonial Belgium in 1910 precisely to extract copper for global markets. This was done through a company named Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK).

Concessionary companies made enormous profits in the Congo Free State between 1885 and 1908. The entire country stood under the private ownership of King Leopold II of Belgium. These companies were given the right to extract minerals and rubber through taxes imposed on local people.

The Belgian Compagnie du Katanga (which later founded UMHK) had the task of establishing the physical and economic infrastructure of the region. In exchange for laying the groundwork for the extractive industries, soon to be headquartered in Elisabethville, the company was given a third of all unoccupied land in Katanga. The Belgians established a copper smelter and constructed roads. Temporary headquarters were established to supervise Elisabethville’s expansion.

One initial method of controlling the local rural people was a “hut tax” that had to be paid to live in Lubumbashi. Later, a “head tax” was introduced to raise funds for colonial management. It forced people into labour as the only means to pay off their newly acquired debt to the colonial state.

Elisabethville served as the device to assert effective occupation. It also staved off the possibility of British occupation of the territory. The Belgians planned Elisabethville by reproducing the urban forms and racial segregation of Bulawayo’s grid in Southern Rhodesia (part of today’s Zimbabwe) and Johannesburg in South Africa.

UMHK dominated the colonial economy as demand for copper increased worldwide. UMHK also stipulated which seeds would be planted where for agriculture. It dissolved local markets and whipped labourers.

Copper was in such high demand because it is a non-corrosive material that conducts electricity well. It lined telegraph and electrical transmission cables across the globe.

Copper mining acted as a springboard from which UMHK could spread its influence. It developed railways, cities, labour camps and mining sites throughout Katanga.

This allowed UMHK access to the extraction of another resource that would shape the global geopolitical landscape: uranium – extracted from the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga.

It was the Belgian colonial presence that allowed the US to have access to uranium deposits as they sought to beat Germany in the race to build atomic weapons. All the uranium used in the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from Katanga.

This highlights the global significance of, but a neglected focus on, the impacts of mineral supply chains in the global south. Control over Lubumbashi’s minerals cannot be underplayed in this global historical event.

Katanga seceded from the Congo for three years, 11 days after the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960. The fight to gain control over Katanga’s resources led to the US and Belgian-backed assassination of the first independence leader, Patrice Lumumba. He was intent on reunifying Congo.

Mobutu Sese Seko became president of Zaire (today’s DRC) after a coup in 1965. He nationalised UMHK a year later. Mobutu served as president for almost 32 years, and his regime was characterised by autocratic corruption and economic exploitation.

Cobalt and global decarbonisation

The growth of modern technology relies, at least in part, on the extraction of cobalt in the DRC before it is shipped, mainly to China.

Cobalt is extracted as a byproduct of copper mining. Artisanal and small-scale mining and child labour remain a salient feature of cobalt extraction in the DRC. These miners receive little to no support and reflect the historical structural marginalisation created in the region.

Lubumbashi serves as the mining headquarters of the southern DRC, and other cities, like Kolwezi, have grown rapidly in response to the surge in cobalt demand. Spatial and labour-related inequalities from the past are being replicated and expanded on in the present.

The DRC’s impoverishment continues apace as South African, Kazakh, Swiss and, with increasing influence, Chinese mining companies maintain their practice of exclusionary extraction, social displacement and political corruption.

Why this matters

Our research shows the importance of understanding the history of extraction and urban settlement in the region to shed light on new forms of old practices associated with decarbonisation. We see this as a continuing form of colonial power – as neocolonialism.

Contemporary debates around global inequalities associated with decarbonisation highlight how African populations must endure poor living conditions while the global north transitions to low-carbon technologies. We must find ways to move away from carbon-based economies that do not reproduce colonial inequalities.

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Read more: Patrice Lumumba’s tooth represents plunder, resilience and reparation

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Lubumbashi demonstrates the importance of African cities and resources in understanding critical global developmental and geopolitical issues.

For decarbonisation to be socially and environmentally just, it must contend with the people, places, and environments on which the future of low-carbon technology is based. Lubumbashi’s history shows how challenging this task will be.

– DRC: history is repeating itself in Lubumbashi as the world scrambles for minerals to go green
– https://theconversation.com/drc-history-is-repeating-itself-in-lubumbashi-as-the-world-scrambles-for-minerals-to-go-green-248571

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Liezille Jacobs, Associate Professor, Rhodes University

When apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa underwent significant social and political transformation. A key aspect of this shift was the push for greater inclusion and representation of Black South Africans across all sectors – including psychology.

Dr Liezille Jacobs was part of a pioneering generation of Black psychologists who started their training in 1995. Now she has written a book, Rocklands: On becoming the first generation of Black psychologists in post-apartheid South Africa. In it she explores the barriers she and her colleagues faced and unpacks misconceptions around what psychology is and does. She also argues that critical (and African) psychology can both “address the legacies of apartheid and heal the relational traumas caused by systemic oppression”. The Conversation Africa asked her about the book and her work.

What is the book about?

I wrote Rocklands to address the widespread misconceptions that both first-year psychology students and the general public often hold about what it truly means to be a psychologist. It’s common for people to oversimplify the profession. They view it merely as talking to people or offering quick-fix solutions to problems. The reality is far more complex.

I wanted to challenge these superficial ideas and provide a more layered and accurate representation of the field. The process of becoming a psychologist is not just about acquiring theoretical knowledge. It’s also about developing emotional intelligence, critical thinking, and a strong ethical foundation. Psychologists must balance empathy with objectivity, personal insight with professional boundaries, all while navigating the vast complexities of human emotions, relationships, and societal influences.

The goal of the book is to make psychological knowledge and expertise more accessible to the public.

Rocklands is also an account of resilience and personal growth in the face of adversity. The first chapter reflects on my early experiences growing up in Rocklands, Mitchell’s Plain. Rocklands was established during apartheid as part of a government plan to segregate communities. Non-white South Africans were moved to areas like Mitchell’s Plain under the Group Areas Act. Over time, Rocklands grew into a working-class neighborhood, shaped by its apartheid-era history.

The ensuing chapters provide a detailed account of my unique and often difficult journey. I’ve traversed a path less travelled but it’s ultimately led to personal and professional fulfilment.

Why did you decide to study psychology?

I initially dreamed of becoming a journalist. However, my parents encouraged me to explore other career options. The results of a career assessment suggested I should consider social work, occupational therapy or psychology.

Psychology truly caught my attention. As someone with an introverted personality I was drawn to the idea of understanding human behaviour and thought processes on a deeper level. At the time, I envisioned myself working as a clinical psychologist, helping individuals one-on-one.

Everything shifted when I began my formal studies in 1995. I quickly realised that the field of psychology in South Africa – especially in the context of its history – had much more work to do. I saw the gaps in the system and became acutely aware of how psychology had, in many ways, been complicit in perpetuating social injustices. In 1995, as a first year psychology student, I was made aware of the field’s struggle with its apartheid legacy and psychology’s unfinished business.

Hendrik Verwoerd was the architect of the racist policies and segregation system that became known worldwide as “grand apartheid”. He was also a psychologist by training.

Psychology in South Africa has made efforts to adapt to a diverse society. But there are still challenges. These include a disconnect between academic training and professional practice, and the lingering effects of apartheid-era inequalities.

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Read more: Being black in the world: a tribute to pioneering South African psychologist Chabani Manganyi

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South Africa desperately needed (and still does today) Critical Psychologists. Critical psychology challenges traditional psychological theories by examining the social, political, and historical contexts that shape psychological issues. It critiques mainstream psychology for overlooking power structures. And it aims to use psychology as a tool for social change and addressing inequalities.

Critical psychologists challenge the dominant narratives of the past, address the legacies of apartheid, and have access to the tools to heal the relational traumas caused by systemic oppression. I knew I wanted to contribute to the transformation of the profession – to make it more inclusive, socially responsible, and oriented towards healing the wounds left by historical injustices. This shift in perspective has shaped my entire career. It’s guided my studies, research and teaching practice.

Have South Africa’s universities changed how they teach psychology?

The academic transformation project continues and universities are striving to adapt to a more diverse student body. But the pace and extent of this change can vary between institutions.

There has been a growing recognition globally that psychology, as a discipline, needs to move beyond its traditional western-centric, individualistic frameworks. It must engage more deeply with local contexts and diverse ways of knowing and experiencing the world.

I was the head of the Psychology Department at Rhodes University in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province from 2022 to 2024. The department has incorporated indigenous knowledge systems such as African philosophical perspectives and non-western psychological practices into our teaching.

For example, community-based service-learning strategies are emphasised in the undergraduate courses I teach. Community-based service-learning combines community service with academic learning. This gives students the opportunity to engage in real-world problems and contribute to the community while applying psychological theories, concepts and methods. Students learn how to become engaged citizens.

We also use a variety of teaching materials – case studies, texts by African scholars, multimedia – that resonate with students’ lived experiences.

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Read more: Decolonising psychology creates possibilities for social change

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In a society as culturally and racially diverse as South Africa it is crucial for people to see themselves reflected in the professionals they turn to for help. This can play a role in lowering barriers to mental health services.

South Africa has a legacy of collective struggle and community resilience. Psychology stands to gain from a greater understanding of collective identities, community dynamics and social justice. Psychologists from diverse backgrounds can offer more nuanced, holistic interventions that address systemic issues rather than focusing solely on individual pathology.

– Psychology in democratic South Africa: new book explores a post-apartheid journey
– https://theconversation.com/psychology-in-democratic-south-africa-new-book-explores-a-post-apartheid-journey-247699

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Raúl Sanchez de la Sierra, Assistant Professor, University of Chicago

Commuting in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, presents challenges for its 17 million residents. Massive traffic jams and unsafe driving cause chaos on the roads, leading to long delays.

The chaos has become a pressing concern for residents. Reaching Gombe, Kinshasa’s central business district, for instance, can take up to five hours from surrounding neighbourhoods.

When he came to power in January 2019, President Felix Tshisekedi promised to combat Kinshasa’s traffic chaos by targeting road infrastructure. This included constructing an interchange and flyover. One-way traffic was introduced on certain streets. These have had little effect. Kinshasa’s traffic issues persist.

While congestion in the capital is usually blamed on poor infrastructure, there are some harder-to-see causes. As social science researchers, we set out to understand what institutional factors might be behind the city’s gridlock.

In a recent paper, we analysed an illegal revenue-generating scheme inside Kinshasa’s traffic police agency involving a coalition of traffic police agents, their managers and judicial officers. We studied the role this scheme plays in the city’s traffic conditions.

Under the scheme, known as the quota system, station managers (police commanders) assign street agents a daily quota of drivers to escort to the station, often based on fabricated allegations.

Our findings and analysis provide insights into how the quota system causes traffic jams and accidents, undermining the police agency’s mandate of traffic regulation. We also detail how corruption operates as a coordinated system rather than as isolated acts of individual misconduct.

The problem

Like many traffic police agencies worldwide, Kinshasa’s traffic police are tasked with managing key intersections and enforcing traffic rules.

Similar to many other civil servants in the Democratic Republic of Congo, police officers earn meagre salaries – around US$70 monthly. Anecdotal observation suggests that the police service lacks funds for basic necessities such as fuel or communication costs. Low resources have contributed to police officers extracting funds from drivers, partly for personal profit, partly to cover the costs for their police work.

A major way in which this is done is through a specific scheme involving traffic police agents. We found that station managers assign different street agents a daily quota of drivers to bring to the station.

To meet this quota, agents often use brute force and have the discretion to invent infractions that they report at the police station. The dilapidated state of most cars in Kinshasa helps police officers with this task.

At the station, agents pass the allegations to judicial officers, who have the power to issue charges – or demand bribes so drivers avoid formal penalties. Many drivers try to avoid this extortion by developing relationships with influential protectors. These are people who can intervene on a driver’s behalf and are often high-placed security officers or politicians.

Our research

After three years of qualitative fieldwork, we built trust with a large number of individuals inside and around the traffic police agency. This enabled us to design data collection systems in 2015 to study the traffic police agency’s practices.

We relied on the cooperation of 160 individuals and generated the following data:

• direct observations of over 13,000 interactions between officers and drivers at intersections

• station records of 1,255 escorted vehicles, including bribe negotiations and outcomes

• traffic flow and accident data from 6,399 hourly observations.

To quantify the cost of this scheme on public service, we added an experiment: we collaborated with police commanders to reduce the daily quotas for some teams and days.

We encouraged commanders to temporarily cut their teams’ quotas in half. Reducing quotas could be expected to lower corruption demands on agents, reducing corruption overall. It would also enable agents to focus more of their time on managing traffic – an outcome later confirmed by our findings.

To ensure this approach worked, we compensated commanders for the private income losses they would experience due to the quota reduction, which we carefully estimated before implementing the study. This compensation is not unlike traditional anti-corruption incentives routinely used across the world, except that rather than it being targeted at street-level agents, it targeted the node of this particular scheme: the police commanders.

What we found

1. The scheme generates large illicit revenue. The traffic police agency’s real revenue is five times larger than its official income from fines. We found that 68% of the illicit revenue generated through the quota scheme came from bribes paid by drivers after they’d been escorted to the station. The rest of the illicit revenue comes from street-level bribes outside of this quota scheme.

2. The revenue raised relies on extortion at police stations. Judicial police officers had the power to threaten to issue arbitrary charges. We found that, first, 82% of the allegations were unverifiable by third parties. Second, the amount raised in station bribes was strongly linked to whether a driver was able to call a powerful “protector”.

3. Extortion in police stations relies on the street agents’ power to arbitrarily escort drivers. These agents use their discretion to fabricate allegations and/or physical force to bring drivers to the station. When a driver was not seen making an infraction, force was more likely to be used.

Overall, this means that the scheme hinged on a coalition of managers, agents and judicial officers.

Through the reduction in the quota scheme levels, our scheme also revealed some social costs of this scheme. We found two important results.

Worse traffic: the quota scheme was accountable for a significant share of traffic jams and accidents observed at street intersections from where the agents operate. Partly through their induced absence and partly through their behaviour, the police officers also create numerous traffic jams and accidents. While this is suggestive rather than conclusive, our estimates suggest that 40% of traffic jams at the main intersections of the city are due to the scheme.

Diluted incentives to respect the law: the scheme made it less likely that drivers would respect the law. They could be escorted to a police station regardless of whether they complied with the traffic code.

Why the findings matter

Our study, which provides rare, detailed evidence of how corruption operates, has three policy implications.

1. Target officials’ managers, rather than the officials themselves. Visible corruption is only the tip of the iceberg, and hinges on relationships of power and coalitions inside the state.

2. Limit the discretion of judicial officers to charge the public, or that of agents to escort drivers to police stations arbitrarily.

3. Incentivise “good” corruption. Encouraging station officials to take a significant share of fines for genuine infractions could give agents an incentive to escort drivers who actually break traffic rules. However, the trade-offs between traffic flow, safety and compliance must be carefully weighed, as quotas tied to fines could worsen congestion.

– Kinshasa’s traffic cops run an extortion scheme generating five times more revenue than fines
– https://theconversation.com/kinshasas-traffic-cops-run-an-extortion-scheme-generating-five-times-more-revenue-than-fines-246786

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

Sudan’s civil war has devastated the country and strained relations with neighbouring South Sudan. Events in January 2025 have stirred up xenophobic feelings in Sudan and outrage in its southern neighbour, heightening the risk of regional instability.

Early in the year, the Sudanese Armed Forces captured Wad Madani, a town in Sudan’s central Al Gazira state. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces had seized control of the town at the start of Sudan’s civil war in April 2023.

In the days following the army’s takeover of Wad Madani, various images and videos surfaced online. They showed brutal reprisals from the soldiers, including systemic killings and torture. Some of these acts were ethnically targeted against South Sudanese workers employed in the region’s agricultural schemes.

These images sparked outrage in South Sudan. This led to anti-Sudanese riots in the capital Juba and other cities on 16 January 2025, resulting in fatalities, injuries and widespread looting.

The Sudanese army formed a committee to investigate the attacks in Wad Madani. The credibility of these investigation is questionable, however, given that the committee is composed of army loyalists.

Further hurting the investigation’s credibility was a statement a few days later from the army’s second-in-command, Mohamed al-Atta, alleging that South Sudanese fighters constitute 65% of the Rapid Support Forces.

These events have strained relations between Sudan and South Sudan, compounding an already volatile association.

They also highlight a war strategy the Sudanese army is pursuing to gain domestic support: that the Rapid Support Forces is primarily composed of foreigners, in this case, South Sudanese fighters.

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Read more: War in Sudan puts South Sudan in danger too: the world’s youngest nation needs a stable neighbour

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This rhetoric has been fuelled by historical tensions between Sudan and South Sudan arising from the liberation war and the latter’s subsequent independence. South Sudan’s independence resulted in the loss of valuable oil resources for Sudan.

Further, the narrative that the Rapid Support Forces largely comprises foreign fighters – helpfully for the army – feeds and taps into nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments in Sudan. These sentiments date back to the post-independence efforts of the ruling elite to establish an Islamic and Arab state. This marginalised smaller ethnic groups.

The army’s rhetoric is further supported by the overlap of tribal and ethnic affiliations across Sudan’s borders, including South Sudan and Chad. There are also the numerous reports of the paramilitary group receiving support from foreign players like the United Arab Emirates.

I have studied transition processes and conflict dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan for more than 15 years. In my view, the army has used the narrative that the Rapid Support Forces is a foreign one to rally domestic support – and distract attention from its own actions and failures.

The strategy

The leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces has frequently emphasised the Rizeigat origins of the paramilitary forces’ leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti.

The Rizeigat tribe spans both the Darfur and Chad border. This has supported claims that the Rapid Support Forces includes Chadians. Reports of the paramilitary group recruiting in Chad and the presence of Chadian militants in Khartoum have further reinforced this portrayal.

When it comes to South Sudanese involvement, there is documented evidence of South Sudanese fighters participating in the Sudan conflict. However, the scale of their involvement is grossly overstated. Even the highest estimates from my research contacts suggest fewer than 5,000 South Sudanese fighters have been involved. This is a mere fraction of the Rapid Support Forces’ estimated 100,000-strong militia.

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Read more: Sudan is burning and foreign powers are benefiting – what’s in it for the UAE

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Another contributing factor to the narrative around South Sudanese involvement is the South Sudan People’s Movement/Army. This is an opposition group that operates along the Sudan-South Sudan border. It targets South Sudanese government forces, sometimes using Sudan as a base of operations.

Since the onset of the war, I have learned in the course of my work that some South Sudan People’s Movement/Army troops have aligned with the Rapid Support Forces and participated in battles across Khartoum. Others have used their time in Sudan to acquire weapons and supplies for operations in South Sudan.

However, these opposition fighters are primarily motivated by pragmatic considerations. These include access to resources and political leverage, rather than any ideological alignment with the paramilitary group’s broader goals. These goals include reshaping the power dynamics in Sudan.

The South Sudanese group’s leader Stephen Buay has formally denied any links with the Rapid Support Forces. However, he has occasionally praised the paramilitary troops’ push against the Sudanese army.

Buay is participating in peace talks in Nairobi, where he has collaborated with other South Sudanese opposition figures to form a new joint force. This underscores his focus on South Sudan rather than Sudan.

The implications

Against this background, al-Atta’s claim that South Sudanese fighters make up most of the Rapid Support Forces is best understood as part of a broader strategy to justify the army’s actions and rally nationalist sentiment.

This strategy, however, worsens ethnic and regional tensions. It scapegoats South Sudanese fighters and further entrenches divisions between the two nations.

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Read more: How militia groups capture states and ruin countries: the case of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces

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This rhetoric aligns with the Sudanese army regime’s broader propaganda efforts, which frequently vilify perceived outsiders or adversaries to consolidate power and justify its actions on the battlefield.

This approach risks perpetuating the cycle of violence, mistrust and regional instability.

– Sudan war: ethnic divisions are being used to cover up army failures – peace scholar
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-war-ethnic-divisions-are-being-used-to-cover-up-army-failures-peace-scholar-248325

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristina Pikovskaia, Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh

Education, especially higher education, is a step towards adulthood and a foundation for the future.

But what happens when education loses its value as a way to climb the social ladder? What if a degree is no guarantee of getting stable work, being able to provide for one’s family, or owning a house or car?

This devaluing of higher education as a path to social mobility is a grim reality for young Zimbabweans. Over the past two decades the southern African country has been beset by economic, financial, political and social challenges.

These crises have severely undermined the premises and promises of education, especially at a tertiary level. A recent survey by independent research organisation Afrobarometer found that 90% of young Zimbabweans had secondary and post-secondary education compared to 83% of those aged between 36 and 55. But 41% of the youth were unemployed and looking for a job as opposed to 26% of the older generation.

The situation is so dire that it’s become a recurring theme in Zimdancehall, a popular music genre produced and consumed by young Zimbabweans. “Hustling” (attempts to create income-generating opportunities), informal livelihoods and young people’s collapsed dreams are recurrent topics in songs like Winky D’s Twenty Five, Junior Tatenda’s Kusvikira Rinhi and She Calaz’s Kurarama.

I study the way people experience the informal economy in Zimbabwe and Zambia. In a recent study I explored the loss of education’s value as a social mobility tool in the Zimbabwean context.

My research revealed how recent school and university graduates think about the role of education in their lives. My respondents felt let down by the fact that education no longer provided social mobility. They were disappointed that there was no longer a direct association between education and employment.

However, the graduates I interviewed were not giving up. Some were working towards new qualifications, hoping and preparing for economic improvements. They also thought deeply about how the educational system could be improved. Many young people got involved in protests. These included actions by the Coalition of Unemployed Graduates and the #ThisGown protests, which addressed graduate unemployment issues. Some also took part in #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka protests, which had wider socio-economic and political agendas.

Understanding history

To understand the current status and state of education in Zimbabwe it’s important to look to the country’s history.

Zimbabwe was colonised by the British from the late 19th century. The colonial education system was racialised. Education for white students was academic. For Black students, it was mostly practice-oriented, to create a pool of semi-skilled workers.

In the 1930s education was instrumental in the formation of Zimbabwe’s Black middle class. A small number of Black graduates entered white collar jobs, using education as a social mobility tool. The educational system also opened up somewhat for women.

Despite some university reforms during the 1950s, the system remained deeply racialised until the 1980s. That’s when the post-colonial government democratised the education system. Primary school enrolment went up by 242%, and 915% more students entered secondary school. In the 1990s nine more state universities were opened.

However, worsening economic conditions throughout the 1990s put pressure on the system. A presidential commission in 1999 noted that secondary schools were producing graduates with non-marketable skills – they were too academic and focused on examinations. Students’ experiences, including at the university level, have worsened since then.

The decline has been driven by systemic and institutional problems in primary and secondary education, like reduced government spending, teachers’ poor working conditions, political interference and brain drain. This, coupled with the collapse of the formal economic sector and a sharp drop in formal employment opportunities, severely undermined education’s social mobility function.

‘A key, but no door to open’

My recent article was based on my wider doctoral research. For this, I studied economic informalisation in Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. It involved more than 120 interviews during eight months of in-country research.

This particular paper builds on seven core interviews with recent school and university graduates in the informal sector, as well as former student leaders.

Some noted that education had lost part of its value as it related to one’s progression in society. As one of my respondents, Ashlegh Pfunye (former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students Union), described it, young people were told that education was a key to success – but there was no door to open.

Some of my respondents were working in the informal sector, as vendors and small-scale producers. Some could not use their degrees to secure jobs, while others gave up their dreams of obtaining a university degree. Lisa, for example, was very upset about giving up on her dream to pursue post-secondary education and tried to re-adjust to her current circumstances:

I used to dream that I will have my own office, now I dream that one day I’ll have my own shop.

Those who had university qualifications stressed that, despite being unable to apply their degrees in the current circumstances, they kept going to school and getting more certification. This prepared them for future opportunities in the event of what everyone hoped for: economic improvement.

Historical tensions

Some of my interviewees, especially recent university graduates and activists, were looking for possible solutions – like changing the curriculum and approach to education that trains workers rather than producers and entrepreneurs. As Makomborero Haruzivishe, former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union, said: “Our educational system was created to train human robots who would follow the instructions.”

Entrepreneurship education is a popular approach in many countries to changing the structure of classic education. In the absence of employment opportunities for skilled graduates, it is supposed to provide them with the tools to create such opportunities for themselves and others.

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Read more: Nigeria’s universities need to revamp their entrepreneurship courses — they’re not meeting student needs

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In 2018, the government introduced what it calls the education 5.0 framework. It has a strong entrepreneurship component. It’s too soon to say whether it will bear fruit. And it may be held back by history.

For example, the introduction of the Education-with-Production model in the 1980s, which included practical subjects and vocational training, was met with resistance because it was seen as a return to the dual system.

Because of Zimbabwe’s historically racialised education system, many students and parents favour the UK-designed Cambridge curriculum and traditional academic educational programmes. Zimbabwe has the highest number of entrants into the Cambridge International exam in Africa.

Feeling let down

The link between education and employment in Zimbabwe has many tensions: modernity and survival, academic pursuits and practicality, promises and reality. It’s clear from my study that graduates feel let down because the modernist promises of education have failed them.

– Education in Zimbabwe has lost its value: study asks young people how they feel about that
– https://theconversation.com/education-in-zimbabwe-has-lost-its-value-study-asks-young-people-how-they-feel-about-that-244661

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Robert Botha, Research Fellow at the Impumelelo Economic Growth Lab. The Impumelelo Economic Growth Lab is a unit of the Bureau for Economic Research (BER), Stellenbosch University

South Africa’s fiscal trajectory paints a concerning picture. Public expenditure exceeds revenue. As a result sovereign debt is building up and interest on this debt is increasing.

This raises concerns over the South African government’s financial sustainability. The debt-to-GDP ratio has skyrocketed from 23.6% in 2008/09 to a projected 74.7% in 2024/25. The International Monetary Fund has recommended that, over the long term, South Africa should reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% of GDP, in line with that of peers.

Arguably more important than the debt level is how quickly debt has accumulated. Debt servicing costs, which consist of the interest on government debt and other costs directly associated with borrowing, have been the fastest-growing line item in the national budget. Rising interest payments have been crowding out critical expenditures on services such as health, education and infrastructure.

As I argue in a recently published report titled “A fiscal anchor for South Africa: Avoiding the mistakes of the past”, establishing a credible fiscal anchor (or fiscal rule) could be step towards avoiding a debt spiral and regaining fiscal sustainability and credibility.

Fiscal rules are constraints on fiscal policy, designed to impose numerical limits. For example, a limit on the allowable debt-to-GDP ratio, or the allowable balance after accounting for government expenditure and revenue. Fiscal rules are widely used – 105 countries have adopted them so far.

Failing to address the country’s fiscal challenges risks plunging South Africa into a debt trap. This happens when a country finds it difficult to escape a cycle of debt and has to borrow more to pay off old debt. If debt-servicing costs continue to rise, essential public services will come under even greater strain.

Several emerging markets have experienced the severe consequences of unchecked debt accumulation and debt servicing costs. Argentina is one example. Without a credible plan to stabilise and reduce debt and debt servicing costs, the risk of economic stagnation and financial instability grows quickly.

Fiscal erosion and credibility concerns

The roots of South Africa’s current predicament lie in years of mistakes. These include:

• spending beyond its means

• questionable political decisions like bailing out state-owned entities

• poor governance and oversight at municipal and local government level, which led to inefficient public spending.

These factors were underpinned by an underperforming economy, unrealised forecasts and arguably weak institutional checks.

For the last 15 years South Africa’s National Treasury has undertaken to stabilise the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. This would have required keeping the ratio constant. But these commitments have consistently been deferred. Debt stabilisation targets have been revised upwards 13 times, from 40% in 2015/16 to the current 75.5%. The stabilisation year has been pushed back 10 times, from the initial year of 2015/16 to the current target of 2025/26. This has created a perception of inconsistent policy.

Over-optimistic macroeconomic forecasting has undermined credibility. Over the last ten years, GDP growth projections have routinely overshot actual performance by an average of 0.5 percentage points in the first year of forecasts and even more in subsequent years. In defence of the National Treasury, the South African economy has performed worse than more forecasters expected in recent years.

Adding to the fiscal strain are rising social expenditures, the public sector wage bill and repeated bailouts of state-owned enterprises. This spending relieves short-term political and social pressures, but undermines the country’s long-term fiscal health.

Without credible mechanisms to constrain spending, South Africa’s fiscal framework lacks the discipline needed to ensure sustainability, and to restore credibility.

Why fiscal rules matter

Fiscal rules are there to promote discipline, ensure that debt can be paid and enhance credibility. The experience in the 105 countries that have adopted them suggests that strong, well-designed rules can signal a government’s commitment to fiscal prudence.

It’s difficult to establish whether there is a causal relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal performance. But there’s at least a correlation. As a practical example of enforcing fiscal rules, in November 2023, the German constitutional court overruled a budget that was passed in the Bundestag but breached Germany’s fiscal rules.

However, fiscal rules are not a panacea. Poorly designed or inadequately enforced rules can make the problems worse. For South Africa, this risk is acute.

Political commitment and strong institutional frameworks are needed too. Also, a shift in how fiscal policy is conceived and implemented.

Designing new rules

Drawing lessons from global best practices, South Africa’s fiscal rules must be enforceable, flexible and simple. A well-designed rule should:

• stabilise and eventually reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio

• target government spending as a share of GDP, emphasising consumption spending like salaries and goods and services, rather than capital expenditure

• have political buy-in

• be overseen independently

• be legally binding and enforceable.

Context

South Africa’s low economic growth rate is a complication. Average interest rates on government debt are higher than the nominal GDP growth rate. But reining in spending too much could stifle growth, creating a vicious cycle.

That’s why stabilising debt first would make more sense than aiming to reduce debt too rapidly.

South Africa’s fiscal rules must also have some flexibility. For instance, they could allow for shocks such as natural disasters or global economic crises.

Fiscal rules could follow a phased approach to initially focus on stabilising debt, and then to move towards reducing debt. Both of these phases would entail expenditure rules to guide annual budget processes and to place limits on spending.

The benefits

Credible fiscal rules could have a number of benefits.

Firstly, they could improve South Africa’s credibility by signalling to markets and international institutions that South Africa is committed to fiscal discipline.

Secondly, fiscal credibility is associated with reduced sovereign risk premiums, which translates into lower debt-servicing costs. In turn this would free up resources for critical development priorities.

Third, they can foster a more stable economic environment for investment and growth.

Fourth, they would help coordinate policies. South Africa enjoys rule-based monetary policy in the form of inflation targeting but lacks the same for fiscal policy. This can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. For example, the central bank can keep interest rates too high, not necessarily because it thinks the treasury’s policies are inflationary, but because it cannot predict the treasury’s actions.

The way forward

Adopting fiscal rules in South Africa comes with risks. Weak institutional capacity, especially in oversight bodies like the Parliamentary Budget Office, could undermine rule enforcement.

To shield against these risks, South Africa should have stronger institutions. It could create an independent statutory fiscal council, possibly falling under Parliament, the National Treasury or as an independent constitutional advisory body.

Oversight bodies would also need to build their capacity.

– South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-debt-has-skyrocketed-new-rules-are-needed-to-manage-it-248355

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lindy Heinecken, Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology., Stellenbosch University

The death of South African soldiers on a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has sparked fierce debate about the deployment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers there. Some, including political parties, have questioned whether the soldiers were adequately trained, equipped and supported. Lindy Heinecken has spent decades researching the South African military in peacekeeping operations and has interviewed hundreds of soldiers about their experiences and the challenges during deployment. We asked her for her insights.

What is South Africa doing in the DRC?

The country is part of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), which includes troops from Malawi and Tanzania. This deployment followed approval by the Southern African Development Community in May 2023, in response to the deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC. The South African National Defence Force is leading the mission.

Their mandate is to support the DRC government, a member of the 16-member SADC group, in restoring peace, security and stability. The fact that the mandate states that it is to support the DRC government in combating armed groups that threaten peace and security in the eastern DRC implies that this is not a peacekeeping mission.

The legal basis for the deployment lies in the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, (2003), which states that

Any armed attack perpetrated against one of the States Parties shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and shall be met with immediate collective action.

The mandate gives them the responsibility to protect civilians, disarm armed groups, and help implement the August 2024 ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, brokered by Angola as part of the Luanda Process. This agreement aimed to provide a more secure environment, and protect critical infrastructure to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. This is in line with the United Nations’ responsibility to protect victims of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Read more: South Africa to lead new military force in the DRC: an expert on what it’s up against

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The M23 rebel group, which is supported by Rwanda, has committed a wide range of atrocities in the eastern DRC which can be traced back to the 1994 genocide.

The impact on civilians has been devastating. While pinning down an exact number is difficult, it’s clear that the rebel forces operating in the eastern DRC, particularly the M23, pose a significant challenge to the stability of the region, and the safety and security of civilians.

The rebels are implicated in mass killings of civilians, rape and other forms of sexual violence and attacks on camps for internally displaced persons. The M23’s atrocities have been condemned by the international community. The United Nations and human rights bodies have called for an end to the violence. They also demand accountability for the perpetrators.

In sum, South African soldiers – alongside Malawians and Tanzanians – are in the DRC to assist the Congolese army in combating the armed groups and to protect civilians from violence and human rights abuses.

Are the soldiers adequately prepared and equipped?

Many questions have been asked about whether South African troops on the mission forces are adequately trained and equipped. Critics claim this deployment is suicidal.

South African soldiers are well-trained and have served in numerous peace operations. Their extensive deployment means that they have accumulated valuable experience. They have been part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo, Monusco, almost since inception in 1999.

Monusco forces are still present in the DRC, but in the process of withdrawing. Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi requested they leave because of their perceived ineffectiveness.

Nonetheless, there are some valid concerns about the South Africans’ current level of preparedness for the DRC mission. Not least given the complex political situation. There are over 100 diverse armed groups involved. And the terrain is difficult.

The combination of budget cuts, resource limitations, and the complex nature of the conflict raises questions about the South African National Defence Force’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives, and ensure the safety of its personnel.

The force takes its own equipment on missions to ensure it is self-sufficient and can meet its specialised needs. The problem is that this equipment is old, leading to shortages due to maintenance problems. This affects the force’s ability to carry out its duties.

Budget cuts for defence over the years, to less than 1% of GDP compared to the global average of 2%, have severely affected the military’s ability to maintain equipment, conduct training exercises and modernise its force. This has led to a decline in overall readiness.

South African troops in the DRC lack essential resources, including adequate air support, attack helicopters and modern equipment. This limits their ability to respond quickly to threats and provide close air support for ground troops.

Despite having one of the most capable air forces in Africa, it is unable to deploy its Gripen and Rooivalk helicopters because they have not been serviced and lack spare parts.

The use of older equipment has also been less effective against the well-equipped M23.

Besides being outgunned, the regional mission is also out-manned.

The SADC mission in the DRC was authorised to have 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania. The actual deployment has fallen far short of this number. As of late January 2025, only about 1,300 troops had been deployed.

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Read more: Rwanda’s role in eastern DRC conflict: why international law is failing to end the fighting

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Where to from here?

There are concerns in the DRC about the presence of multiple foreign forces, given the relative ineffectiveness of these interventions.

There are also questions about the legitimacy of the mission. Rwanda has opposed the deployment, saying that the SAMIDRC, and specifically South Africa’s involvement, undermines regional unity and cooperation.

The best approach to peace and stability in the DRC requires a concerted effort by regional actors – the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and the Southern African Development Community – to address the underlying causes of the conflict. This requires political dialogue with the regional actors, the UN, the international community and, most importantly, the Congolese people.

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Read more: DRC conflict risks spreading: African leaders must push for solutions beyond military intervention

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As for South Africa, it is time for some critical reflection on the future roles of its military. The equipment shortages and challenges it faces raise serious concerns about the defence force’s ability to carry out its core mandate of protecting South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the constitution.

The tragedy in the DRC highlights the dire need for the South African National Defence Force to be redesigned, modernised and funded to become more effective and capable, ready to meet the immediate challenges it faces (like ageing equipment) and ensure the security of South Africa.

– South African troops are dying in the DRC: why they’re there and what’s going wrong
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-troops-are-dying-in-the-drc-why-theyre-there-and-whats-going-wrong-248696

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nikolaos Kargopoulos, Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Cape Town

Giraffes are among the world’s most recognisable animals. With their elongated necks and long legs, their gracious movements and unique coat patterns, they have inspired people’s imaginations for centuries.

But is a giraffe just a giraffe? Or is there more variety between the animals at a genetic level than is evident just from looking at them?

For more than a decade many researchers have compared the DNA of giraffes from all parts of Africa. These studies have revealed that there are four distinct giraffe species: the southern (Giraffa giraffa), Masai (Giraffa tippelskirchi), reticulated (Giraffa reticulata), and northern (Giraffa camelopardalis) giraffe.

Different giraffe species face different risks. Some are among the most threatened large mammals in the world. While the southern and the Masai giraffe are relatively numerous and their populations estimated at approximately 45,000 and 50,000 individuals respectively, the situation does not look quite as rosy for the reticulated and the northern giraffe. Based on the latest estimates from the Giraffe Conservation Foundation (GCF), only 16,000 and 6,000 individuals respectively remain in the wild.

Therefore, it is critical to verify whether there are indeed different species of giraffe or not so that direct conservation efforts for the most threatened species can be increased before it’s too late.

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Read more: How many giraffe species are there? Understanding this is key to their protection

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The concept of species is fundamental in biology – but there is no consensus on its definition. There are many different approaches depending on individual scientists’ points of view. The best possible way to clarify the taxonomy (the system that organises living entities into groups) of organisms is through multiple approaches.

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Read more: Giraffes could go extinct – the 5 biggest threats they face

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There have been several studies of giraffe species based on their DNA, as well as on their ecology, behaviour, health and coat patterns.

But there haven’t been many based on their skulls. That’s where our new study comes in. By examining the skulls of more than 500 giraffes from across the African continent, we were able to show that there are significant differences in the skull shapes of the different types of giraffe – and confirm that there are four species.

These new findings are crucial for giraffe taxonomy and, ultimately, their conservation.

How the study was done

Giraffe skulls are important to the animals’ reproduction and evolution. That’s because of their ossicones, the horn-like structures that are longer and wider in males than in females.

The size and shape of the ossicones is important in the dominance of males and their mating success with female giraffe. While some preliminary data already suggested some potential differences in the ossicone morphology between the giraffe species, limitations on the available specimens and the methodologies at the time reduced the validity of the results.

For our research we used state-of-the-art equipment and methodologies, and we studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa. The skulls were directly sampled in the field from across their natural range in Africa, as well as museum collections, wildlife authority offices, and taxidermists in different countries in Africa, Europe and the US.

This extensive study required help from many different partners. While the project was initiated and guided by the Giraffe Conservation Foundation and the University of Cape Town, many colleagues in Africa, Europe and North America contributed.

We used a handheld 3D scanner to capture the skulls’ shape in 3D. Then we used 3D geometric morphometrics methods to compare the shape of the giraffe skulls and find out if we could group them and find any significant differences. We chose so-called landmarks – specific points on the skulls – and captured their coordinates in space (their 3D distance from the centre of mass of the skull).

Finally, specialised software was used to compare the differences in the coordinates of landmarks between our specimens and to conduct statistical analyses to show if these differences were significant or not.

Skull variations

These rigorous analyses allowed us to show skull variations between four species.

These differences mostly concerned the ossicones. But there were also minor differences in their face, eye sockets, the region around the teeth, and the back part of the skull.

The most striking difference concerned the median ossicone of the males. This is a smaller third ossicone situated in the midline of the skull above their eyes. We determined that there is a general trend in the size and shape of this ossicone that follows geography and taxonomy. In southern giraffe, the third ossicone is practically a small protrusion; in northern giraffe it is large and pointed; the Masai and reticulated giraffe have ossicones that are somewhere between those two forms.

Such differences are likely important in the way individuals of a species recognise each other, thus affecting their reproductive success. Males with more developed ossicones intimidate their rivals to gain access to territory and females.

Attention for individual species

Our study is confirmation of what scientists have known for almost a decade and supports the taxonomic split of the giraffe.

Similar discussions over two decades finally resulted in the African elephant being split into two distinct species in 2021.

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – which, it must be pointed out, is not a taxonomic authority – still only recognises one species of giraffe. It lumps all giraffes into one broad, threatened Red List category.

We strongly believe that the IUCN needs to stand tall for these animals and reassess their status. It is time for each giraffe species to get separate and enhanced attention, both locally and internationally, in particular when it comes to their conservation. Giraffes and their wild habitats must be protected before it’s too late.

– We studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa – and confirmed there are 4 distinct species
– https://theconversation.com/we-studied-more-than-500-giraffe-skulls-from-all-over-africa-and-confirmed-there-are-4-distinct-species-247466