Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Surina Esterhuyse, Senior Lecturer Centre for Environmental Management, University of the Free State

The Namibian and Botswana governments may be risking their water resources for oil and gas revenue. They have licensed a Canadian firm, ReconAfrica, to prospect for oil in the Cubango Okavango River Basin, in an area covering 34,000km².

In total, the river basin covers 700,000km², encompassing a network of river systems across Angola, Namibia and Botswana. The Cubango and Cuito rivers, which originate from the Angolan highlands, join the Okavango River at the border between Angola and Namibia, and flow into the Okavango Delta in Botswana.

The Okavango River sustains over half a million people in Namibia and Botswana. The main livelihood activities in the basin are arable farming, livestock farming, fishing and tourism.

The Okavango Delta, a World Heritage Site, contributes significantly to tourism in Botswana. It is one of the largest freshwater wetlands in southern Africa and home to over 1,000 plant species. Over 480 bird species, 130 species of mammals, and numerous species of reptiles and fish can be found in the area.

Our team, with expertise in groundwater resource assessment and protection, has assessed the vulnerability of the Okavango River and Delta to oil and gas drilling. We conclude that possible impacts on water resources are of particular concern in this sensitive area.

Reasons to worry

It is worrying that oil and gas extraction is being considered in this area. The current exploration licence in Namibia allows the company to drill exploratory stratigraphic wells. Drilling near the Omatako River in Namibia already endangers the groundwater since the drilling waste fluids have been discarded in unlined pits. Most people in this arid region rely on groundwater, which can easily be contaminated when the water table is shallow, as it is here.

ReconAfrica estimates that the area has large volumes of oil and gas resources, though it has not yet fully assessed whether recovering them would be economical. The resources are in a site about the size of the Eagle Ford shale field in Texas, a very large oil and gas deposit.

Several geologists have noted, however, that the resources are unlikely, in their view, to be economically viable, based on the geological information of the region.

Meanwhile, the Namibian government granted Recon exploration licences without following due procedure for its environmental impact assessment. This is despite the fact that the lease area includes parts of the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Park and the Okavango River.

What we found

Our study illustrates the possible grim impact of the potential oil and gas extraction operations. This includes possible contamination of:

• the water resources around the Omatako River

• the Okavango River

• the Okavango Delta.

We used publicly accessible borehole data from the Namibian Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Land Reform, and the Botswana Department of Water Utilities. We obtained geological structure data from Namibia’s Geological Survey and the Botswana Geoscience Information Centre.

We found that contamination could infiltrate the aquifer system and contaminate the groundwater near the Omatako River. Contaminated groundwater could take three to 23.5 years to reach the Okavango River system via the shallow, sandy aquifer.

Contaminated groundwater from proposed drill sites could reach the Okavango Delta even faster along another route: certain geological structures underground. These structures – grabens and dykes – have associated faulting and fractures respectively, along which groundwater can travel.

The geological structures in the area are associated with parts of the Earth’s crust that are tectonically active: they might change. This makes it more complicated to assess the Okavango Delta’s vulnerability. Existing permeable structures can serve as pathways for groundwater contamination. Tectonic stresses can create new permeable structures or modify ones that were previously impermeable.

Initial calculations, using publicly accessible data, indicate that contamination from drilling activities that travels via geological structures could reach the Okavango Delta within just four days.

Our results should be verified with localised field studies.

Need to revisit clearance certificate

A ReconAfrica environmental impact assessment did not identify any serious risks that could follow from oil drilling in the area. The Namibian government then awarded an updated environmental clearance certificate to the company.

Even though there wasn’t enough data to determine the possible groundwater impact, the environmental impact assessment deemed contamination to be negligible.

Our study highlights the possible dire consequences of allowing oil and gas extraction activities in the Cubango Okavango River Basin.

Based on our results, we recommend that all oil and gas extraction activities in the Okavango region be halted until there’s a proper understanding of the groundwater sources, pathways and receptors.

Future environmental impact assessments must make an honest effort to obtain all relevant information so that all possible risks to water resources are identified. This would allow for the proper protection of natural resources.

– Oil drilling threatens the Okavango River Basin, putting water in Namibia and Botswana at risk
– https://theconversation.com/oil-drilling-threatens-the-okavango-river-basin-putting-water-in-namibia-and-botswana-at-risk-209887

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anthony Diala, Director, Centre for Legal Integration in Africa, University of the Western Cape

South Africa is changing its marriage law to recognise all types of intimate partnerships – irrespective of gender, sexual orientation, or religious, cultural and other beliefs.

The Department of Home Affairs has invited public comment on the Draft Marriage Bill 2022. The bill amends some marriage laws, and prescribes what’s required for marriages to be considered valid, forms of registration, and the property consequences of marriage. As the preamble shows, it seeks to promote liberal values of equality, nondiscrimination, human dignity and freedom of thought.

While it is innovative for bringing all forms of intimate partnerships under one piece of legislation, the bill raises thorny questions. Liberalism – or openness to different behaviour, opinions or new ideas – is a strange beast. It pushes accepted conduct to its limits.

For instance, if the bill truly seeks equity, why does it not recognise intimate partnerships such as cohabitation? Why does section 22(6) criminalise marriage between people who are related to each other by adoption or by blood (to certain degrees)?

I have researched these issues, notably as a member of the Advisory Committee on Matrimonial Property of the South African Law Reform Commission.

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Read more: Understanding the relevance of African customary law in modern times

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I believe that even though the bill promotes important constitutional values, it does not sufficiently reflect changing social and economic conditions. Specifically, it ignores polyandry – marriage of a woman to more than one man – and unmarried partnerships. This is significant because other laws recognise civil unions, which include formalised marriage-like partnerships of same-sex couples.

The thorny issues

Firstly, radical socioeconomic changes require society to reevaluate traditional assumptions about accepted forms of relationships. Due to urbanisation and the interaction of different cultures, relationships such as cohabitation and polyandry are rising. A couple could live together for reasons such as exorbitant rent, distance to workplaces, and prohibitively high bridewealth (ilobolo).

The bill doesn’t recognise such intimate partnerships, which the Constitutional Court has accorded the same legal status as formal marriages. As the court has acknowledged, unmarried partnerships have serious implications for finances, human dignity, property ownership and child custody.

Secondly, the Marriage Bill defines ilobolo as

property in cash or in kind … which a prospective husband or the head of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage.

This implies that only (traditionally male) family heads can receive it. The definition does not anticipate a role for women, as happens among the Galole Orma people of northeastern Kenya.

Also, the position of family head could be disputed where the mother is divorced and raised the bride alone. As far back as 1997, the Transvaal High Court ruled that the bride’s mother could negotiate and receive ilobolo. The bill should therefore redefine bridewealth as “money, property, or anything of value given by the groom or his family to the bride’s family in consideration of marriage and/or to symbolise a union between the groom and bride’s families”.

This definition is consistent with the decreasing role of the extended family in the education or raising of the bride. Uncles and aunts should not benefit from bridewealth if they did not assist in raising the bride.

Thirdly, the bill is silent on the coexistence of a civil law marriage with a customary or religious marriage. For reasons like legal certainty and communal respect, double marriage is common. Previously, if a couple in a civil marriage subsequently concluded a customary or religious marriage, the state regarded the latter marriage as invalid.

The bill creates ambiguity because it does not stipulate the fate of a subsequent customary or religious marriage. This could affect inheritance, property and child custody because legal systems may govern these issues differently.

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Read more: South Africa’s courts and lawmakers have failed the ideal of cultural diversity

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Furthermore, the bill defines polygamous marriage as “a marriage in which a male spouse has more than one spouse at the same time”. This patriarchal definition does not promote equality. It implies that a woman should not marry more than one man.

Finally, the bill imposes an omnibus standard for divorce on all marriages. This standard may complicate divorce under Islamic and customary law, where the standard is relaxed. Also, section 21(1) of the bill states that a marriage may be dissolved by the “continuous unconsciousness of one of the spouses,” without specifying how long a spouse must be unconscious following an injury, for example.

If the thorny issues in the bill are not addressed, the eventual legislation could be challenged as discriminatory. Its amendment would then drain the public purse.

A balancing act

Significantly, the bill emerged from the 2022 White Paper on marriages and life partnerships. The advisory committee that worked on the Single Marriage Statute (Project 144) proposed two options for regulating life partnerships in its discussion paper.

These are a Protected Relationships Bill and a Recognition and Registration of Marriages and Life Partnerships Bill. It appears Home Affairs did not add life partnerships to the bill because it is controversial. But legislative avoidance is unhelpful because it postpones inevitable problems. The Constitutional Court recognises the right of a woman in a life partnership to inherit or claim maintenance from her deceased partner’s estate.

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Read more: LGBTQ+ rights: African Union watchdog goes back on its own word

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Ultimately, new forms of relationships demand legislative recognition. Law reform should be carefully handled to ensure that non-discriminatory cultural and religious practices are respected. The bill should strike a balance between preserving these practices, promoting liberal values, and recognising the evolving realities of contemporary relationships.

– South Africa’s new Marriage Bill raises many thorny issues – a balancing act is needed
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-marriage-bill-raises-many-thorny-issues-a-balancing-act-is-needed-210343

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gibson Ncube, Lecturer, Stellenbosch University

The ruling elite in Zimbabwe has always tried to silence opposing political voices and erase histories it does not wish to have aired. Although “democratic” elections have been held since 1980, the country has become what the scholar Eldred Masunungure calls a state of “militarised, electoral authoritarianism”.

As Zimbabwe heads to the polls again in 2023, it’s worth considering the role that writers have played in engendering political resistance. Their voices have been important in challenging oppression, exposing social injustices and advocating for political change.

The liberation struggle

Literature was vital for raising awareness about the harshness of colonial rule. It was used to mobilise resistance against the white minority regime and garner international support for the liberation struggle.

Texts like Ndabaningi Sithole’s foundational 1955 novel Umvekela wamaNdebele (The Revolution of the Ndebele) and Dambudzo Marechera’s 1978 magnum opus The House of Hunger were instrumental. Many others like Charles Mungoshi, Tsitsi Dangarembga and Chenjerai Hove produced texts that encouraged resistance against colonial rule.

These works showcased the resilience of Zimbabweans in the face of adversity, inspiring the population to continue their fight for freedom.

Independence

Since independence in Zimbabwe, there has remained little space for dissenting voices – first under the leadership of Robert Mugabe and then Emmerson Mnangagwa.

The Gukurahundi genocide, which novelist Novuyo Rosa Tshuma called the country’s “original sin”, marked the first instance in which the state quashed opposing voices. Between 1982 and 1987, the government sent a North Korean-trained brigade to quell dissenters in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands. An estimated 20,000 civilians were killed.

Interestingly, despite the shrinking of the civic and political space in Zimbabwe, literary production has thrived in providing political resistance.

My research as a scholar of African literature has demonstrated that literature in Zimbabwe has highlighted diverse forms of state sponsored violence. Through their works, writers have raised awareness, sparked dialogue, and inspired readers to engage in opposition and activism.

The turbulent ‘lost decade’ (2000-2010)

From around 2000, Zimbabwe experienced economic meltdown, coupled with an increased shrinking of the civic space. The rise of a formidable opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change, in 1999 was met with violence by the state.

This period also saw a flourishing in literary production. Fresh voices emerged, among them Brian Chikwava, NoViolet Bulawayo, Petina Gappah, John Eppel, Christopher Mlalazi and Lawrence Hoba.

Literature from this period captured the socioeconomic realities of the country. Gappah’s debut collection of short stories in 2009, An Elegy for Easterly, depicts the emotions experienced by Zimbabweans in the face of diverse challenges. Some characters express disillusionment and despair, while others maintain optimism and resilience, representing a complex reality.

Bulawayo’s award-winning 2013 novel We Need New Names depicts the political situation through the perspective of its teenage protagonist, Darling. The story delves into the effects of political turmoil, economic challenges and societal changes on regular lives. Her 2022 novel Glory parodies a dictatorship, protesting the irrationality of a police state.

White Zimbabwean writers have also criticised autocracy in books like Catherine Buckle’s African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions (2000) and Graham Lang’s Place of Birth (2006).

These novels portray the emotional effects of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme on many white Zimbabweans, who found themselves dispossessed of their farms and their sources of income.

Writers from the 2000s have offered multifaceted portrayals, highlighting the interconnectedness of personal lives and political realities. The stories illuminate the human cost of political decisions and the resilience of ordinary people in the face of hardships.

Literature in the Second Republic

Literature after the demise of Mugabe and his four-decade regime – a period referred to as the Second Republic – has continued to grapple with Zimbabwe’s prevailing sociopolitical environment. In the book The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe, my colleagues and I contend that today’s Zimbabwe is similar to the Mugabe years in many ways.

Batsirai Chigama’s collection of poems Gather the Children captures the vicissitudes of contemporary life in Zimbabwe. In his analysis of this collection, literary scholar Tinashe Mushakavanhu explains:

Zimbabwe’s political crisis has been a different kind of catastrophe, one that has occurred in slow motion: its mechanisms abstract and impersonal, although the economic, physical, and psychological consequences have been very real and devastating. These strictures insinuate themselves into the ambience of everyday life and language, something that Chigama observes with careful attention.

In her poem Zimbabwe, Chigama writes:

Like eating olives

we have acquired the taste of discomfort

over the longest time

it has gently settled on our tongues

Her poems highlight how Zimbabweans have normalised the abnormal.

Other writers from the post-Mugabe period like Panashe Chigumadzi and Novuyo Rosa Tshuma grapple with similar issues and themes. Writer and academic Siphiwe Ndlovu explains that in contemporary Zimbabwean fiction

there is anger, outrage, disappointment, disillusionment, hope (and the loss of it), but most importantly, there is a call for reckoning and change that the politics of the country have failed to successfully address.

The power (and limits) of literature

Despite its power, reading remains a luxury that many Zimbabweans cannot afford. Books are extremely expensive and few people have disposable income to read for pleasure.

It’s for this reason that, since independence, the state has not banned the many novels which are critical of the situation in the country. Writer Stanley Nyamfukudza explains: “It has been suggested that one of the best ways to hide information in Zimbabwe is to publish it in a book.”

Literature can achieve greater effects if there is a robust culture of critical thinking and reading.

However, despite the continued oppression and the lack of a robust reading culture, Zimbabwean writers have been unrelenting in telling the world what is really happening in Zimbabwe. They have always spoken truth to power.

– Zimbabwe’s rulers won’t tolerate opposing voices – but its writers refuse to be silenced
– https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-rulers-wont-tolerate-opposing-voices-but-its-writers-refuse-to-be-silenced-210199

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ibrahim Z. Bahreldin, Associate Professor of Urban & Environmental Design, King Abdulaziz University

Sudan is rich in cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The country’s 48 million people come from 56 ethnic groups, with over 595 sub-ethnic groups, speaking more than 115 languages.

This plurality has shaped urban development patterns and the country’s socio-political landscape.

Take, for instance, Khartoum. The Sudanese capital historically drew traders from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Each placed a distinctive stamp on the cityscape.

These range from Ottoman-style Islamic architecture to the narrow alleys, small windows and colourful clothes peculiar to African ethnic groups. The city symbolises Sudan’s cultural mosaic in architecture and urban planning.

However, Khartoum is also a domain of ethnic and cultural division.

This dates back to the period of the Mahdist state (Mahdiyya), which ruled Sudan from 1881 to 1898 and challenged the colonial ambitions of Britain and Egypt. The Mahdist state made Omdurman (Umm Durman) its new capital on the western side of the River Nile, and developed the city around the ethnic structure of its army.

A colonial plan for Khartoum followed in 1910, triggered by the governor-general of Sudan, Horatio Kitchener. It had three segregated zones to accommodate Europeans, elites and ordinary locals.

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Read more: Khartoum: the creation and the destruction of a modern African city

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These decades of interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan fostered vibrant cityscapes. But spatial segregation has continued, creating socio-cultural divisions and uneven urban growth.

Drawing on my experiences as an educator, researcher and practitioner in urbanism in Sudan, I argue that failure to use urban planning to manage diversity has worsened ethnic and racial divisions. It has fanned conflict and discontent in Sudanese society.

Embracing diversity

Urban planning is supposed to improve residents’ quality of life. It strategically organises physical spaces and land use. It optimises resources and livelihoods, and promotes social equity.

It holds immense potential to manage diversity and reconstruct a resilient and prosperous Sudan.

This isn’t to say urban planning can single-handedly resolve Sudan’s conflict. Peace requires a shared commitment to silence the guns and build political stability and security.

Yet the way diversity is managed makes it either a virtue or a curse.

In my view, there are three avenues through which urban planning can positively manage diversity to help prevent conflict:

• by celebrating multiculturalism.

• by boosting regional integration and resource management.

• by ensuring effective governance and public participation in urban spaces.

What Sudan got wrong

Colonial and post-independence planning practices in Sudan attempted to forge a national identity. However, this was done by suppressing ethnic diversity, and disintegrating cultural values and their spatial footprints.

After independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, Sudan’s ruling elites rejected the demand from southern Sudan for a federal system. This would have created a united Sudan but allowed different regions to maintain their integrity, culture and traditions. The ruling elite instead adopted an “Arab Islamic” identity to create a homogeneous society.

This was among the reasons for the eruption of the first civil war in southern Sudan in 1955.

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Read more: Darfur: tracing the origins of the region’s strife and suffering

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And in Darfur, infringements of communal land ownership rights fuelled violent conflict. This extended to southern Sudan and Khartoum.

The Khartoum Public Order Act of 1996 (repealed in 2019) was another misjudgement. It discriminated against citizens based on their cultural and gender identities. The public order rules were vague and open-ended, leaving them open to exploitation for social control.

Rebuilding a post-war Sudan

Urban planning should follow the principles of economic, social and physical integration.

• Economic integration ensures equal access to employment, education and resources.

• Social integration provides affordable housing, diverse neighbourhoods and accessible social infrastructure.

• Physical integration encourages social interaction and breaks down barriers.

These principles help create vibrant, harmonious cities that cater to the needs of diverse populations and future generations. They can be put into practice through three avenues.

1. Celebrating multiculturalism and diversity

This requires rethinking urban spaces to embrace inclusivity, particularly where ethnocultural ties transcend national boundaries. Inclusive neighbourhoods, mixed-use developments and accessible public spaces promote interaction and foster belonging. Such developments help build understanding, empathy and trust among different communities, preventing community fracturing that leads to unrest.

2. Regional integration and resource management

Sudan has experienced unequal urban growth and the depopulation of rural areas. To address this, the country’s long-term development visions and plans should aim for equitable development. These plans should take into account marginalised regions which may have ethnic populations that extend beyond national borders. A planning vision that transcends the scope of a single nation and seeks a regional approach is indispensable. Regional integration can restructure urban spaces, mobility systems and production patterns. This would foster self-sufficiency and integration.

Urban planning can also address resource management concerns – such as land ownership and economic opportunities – that trigger tension and conflict. Transparent mechanisms for resource allocation can help mitigate conflict arising from scarce resources. In Sudan, this would have helped improve regional employment prospects, reducing a reliance on paramilitary activities for income.

3. Effective governance and public participation

Participatory urban planning improves governance. It empowers historically marginalised groups like young people, women, rural communities, informal settlers and minorities through public engagement. This enables them to address their grievances and secure opportunities for meaningful dialogue. The process generates enthusiasm for shaping, financing and managing urban spaces.

Public engagement harnesses local knowledge and culture. It advocates for policy transformation to address systematic inequalities and safeguard rights. Transparent and accountable governance complements these arrangements, promoting equality and preventing tension.

– Sudan needs to accept its cultural diversity: urban planning can help rebuild the country and prevent future conflict
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-needs-to-accept-its-cultural-diversity-urban-planning-can-help-rebuild-the-country-and-prevent-future-conflict-210293

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Simone Datzberger, Associate professor, UCL

Every day of the northern hemisphere’s summer in 2023 seems to bring a calamitous headline about the climate: heatwaves, wildfires, massive hailstorms.

Such scenes are set to become our global reality in the coming years. Scientists paint a grim picture of how human-induced climate change, combined with wider environmental degradation, will affect us all.

That, of course, includes children. However, research is still in its early stages on how, precisely, both climate change and environmental degradation relate to violence against children.

It is crucial to explore these potential intersections to spur academic and political movement in this area. Findings from such reviews, and further research that may emerge from it, could help to inform policies and interventions that can protect and support children, particularly those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and environmental shocks.

Our study

We conducted an extensive scoping review of the literature on the intersections of climate change, environmental degradation and violence against children, to see what’s known so far and what needs attention.

We explored both direct violence – physical, sexual and emotional – and structural violence; that is, rooted in inequitable and unjust systems and institutions. This approach allowed for a nuanced understanding of the implications for children in all countries. It also meant we could explore the causes and effects of climate change and environmental degradation in relation to systems, institutions, structures, norms and interactions.

The study identified five themes: hazards and disaster risk reduction; gender; climate-induced mobility or immobility; child labour; and health. What emerges clearly is that violence against children is not solely a phenomenon that intensifies during environmental shocks. It is deeply rooted in historical injustices, global systems and structures. That means it disproportionately affects those living in poverty.

1. Hazards and disaster risk reduction

Natural hazards, combined with large-scale humanitarian crises, pose immediate risks to health, life, property and the environment.

Studies have uncovered how increasing social, economic and emotional pressures in these situations expose children to higher risks of violence. This may occur in their homes or in relief shelters. It may be perpetrated by their peers, or by caregivers forcing them into labour because of the sudden need to rebuild or help make ends meet.

More knowledge is needed to inform integrated and culturally sensitive plans to protect children better from environmental hazards.

2. Gender

The effects of climate change and environmental degradation are not gender neutral. They can affect girls and boys differently. There is a growing body of work on gender-based violence and violence against women and girls in relation to climate change.

But this work tends to be centred on issues affecting female adults, conflating the term “gender” with “women”, without sufficient attention to the gendered effects of climate change on female and male children.

Existing research suggests that climate change can potentially exacerbate known drivers of child marriage in low- and lower-middle-income countries. But findings vary significantly by region. For example, there is an observed increase in child marriage motivated by the receipt of a bride price payment in sub-Saharan Africa during sudden periods of drought. In India, though, droughts have led to a decrease in child marriage to delay dowry payments.

Nuanced data about boys’ exposure to various forms of violence in the context of climate change is missing. That’s because studies tend to focus on males as perpetrators but not as victims of violence.

3. Mobility and immobility

The number of climate migrants is rising.

Research we reviewed on migration, displacement and relocation due to climate change, natural or human-induced hazards points to increased risks of violence against children within migrating families and higher exposure to it in camps and shelters. Also, separation from families or caregivers renders children and young people extremely vulnerable to violence.

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Read more: Climate change, migration and urbanisation: patterns in sub-Saharan Africa

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Meanwhile, immobility – when people cannot or do not want to move – has been associated in some studies with child abuse, injuries and overcrowding in slum areas.

Fear of violence in shelters can lead women to remain at home after natural hazards, increasing children’s risk of harm from the hazard or other forms of violence.

4. Child labour

Existing research indicates that child labour increases after natural hazards due to families’ reliance on child work and the absence of strategies to eliminate child labour entirely. Child labour is also prevalent in industries associated with climate change, such as agriculture, fisheries, mining, fashion and tourism.

The extent of child labour in this context, and its link to violence, remains inadequately explored in research, however, due to the hidden nature and contextual specificity of this issue.

5. Health

Children’s physical and mental health is affected by climate change. Natural hazards have been linked to poor health outcomes and increased mortality among children, particularly those younger than five.

There is emerging evidence that mental health issues, stemming from climate and environmental shocks, can lead to increased perpetration of violence against children, including domestic violence. Rising eco-anxiety among children and youth, caused by awareness of climate change and environmental degradation and fears of its consequences, adds to mental health problems.

Ways forward

By shedding light on the magnitude and pathways of these relationships, we want to underscore the urgent need for context-specific approaches and further research.

Understanding these interlinkages is essential for informing policies and interventions that can protect and support children, particularly those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and environmental shocks. By addressing the root causes of violence and prioritising the wellbeing of children in these crises, we can strive towards a safer and more sustainable future.

– Climate change contributes to violence against children – here’s how
– https://theconversation.com/climate-change-contributes-to-violence-against-children-heres-how-210027

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape

The African National Congress (ANC), which governs South Africa, finally held its postponed Western Cape provincial elective congress in June. This was after painstaking years of electing branch and regional executives. The new executive is the first elected ANC Western Cape provincial executive in six years.

These are among the first essential steps the ANC needed to take to be on a better footing to make gains in this province – the only one of nine it doesn’t control.

But, the odds are stacked against the party making serious inroads in the province, let alone winning it.

By history and demography, the ANC in the Western Cape faces tougher challenges than anywhere else in the country. In all other provinces, black Africans constitute the majority of voters. But in the Western Cape the majority are coloured voters. “Coloured” in South African history means people who are of biracial or multiracial descent, or whose ancestors were Khoisan, not Bantu-speaking Africans. The country’s other population categories are white and Indian.

The mass support in the Western Cape for the United Democratic Front, a loose coalition of anti-apartheid organisations allied to the then-banned ANC, between 1983 and 1990, misleadingly suggested support for the unbanned ANC after 1990. In fact, the ANC in that province faced devastating defeats in all the elections from 1994 onwards.

The ANC started by winning only 33% (rounded off) of the votes in the first democratic 1994 election, rising to 42% in 1999 and peaking at 45% in 2004. After that it declined to 32% of the votes in 2009 and 2014, dropping further to 29% in 2019. It attracted still fewer votes in local government elections, getting for example only 21% of the votes in 2021. The Democratic Alliance (DA) has run the province with an absolute majority for over a decade.

The effect of the ANC’s governance and poor performance in the eight provinces and most municipalities it runs is the main factor in the ANC’s nationally declining vote in the four general elections held since 1994. In media, commentariat, and auditor-general reports, the DA is judged to do a much better job of running the Western Cape province and Cape Town metro.

One factor for its declining vote is demography. Though all major South African parties commit to a vision of a non-racial society, it is estimated that less than 2% of white voters vote for the ANC, and less than 6% of African voters vote for the Democratic Alliance. A majority of coloured voters vote against the ANC, and in the Western Cape coloured voters constitute a majority of the electorate.

This is in spite of the fact that the ANC over the years chose several coloured and Indian leaders for the province, such as Allan Boesak, Chris Nissen, Dullah Omar, Ebrahim Rasool, and Marius Fransman. This showed that the ANC was no longer limited to Africans, but sought to represent a “rainbow nation”, in Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s phrase.

But the old joke that in Africa election results are an ethnic census is too simplistic. The coloured majority of the Western Cape electorate has ensured that the ANC has never won an absolute majority in that province. But coloured voters are almost a majority of Northern Cape province voters, where the ANC comfortably wins every election. It is clear that many coloured voters in that province do vote for the ANC.

Also, there is a striking difference between Cape Town and the rest of the Western Cape. In the city, the DA scores sensational majorities from 92% in white voting districts to 80% in coloured townships. Elsewhere in the province, the DA seesaws between 45% and 55% of the local votes.

Challenges and own goals

What can explain such a spectacular divide? As a political scientist and historian, I suggest that one factor is that in Cape Town, the DA of 2023 is based upon the old network of its historical predecessor the Progressive Party (Prog) branches, and the current DA politicians were mentored into politics by Helen Zille, the party’s federal chair, and other old Prog leaders. These were liberal activists and veterans committed to nonracialism.

But in the rural Western Cape, today’s DA branches are based upon the renamed National Party branches of the 20th century. National Party politicians, responsible for driving the apartheid programme, were late converts to non-racialism, and often tone deaf to what black voters will take as priority issues, or insults. The DA is made up of the former Progs and National Party adherents.

Another factor in the ANC’s declining vote is the declining moral standards of ANC leadership. The first ANC Western Cape chair after 1994 was the respected Chris Nissen, a trilingual clergyman (speaking isiXhosa, English and Afrikaans) from the Presbyterian church. This enabled him to speak to all voters in their mother tongue.

By 2016 the chair was Marius Fransman, a career politician, who had to step down from all posts after complaints of being a sex pest were lodged against him. The ANC judged that these complaints also merited suspending his membership for five years.

After that, the ANC Western Cape was unable to elect anyone at all as its chair for six years, due to factionalism and branches, zonal, and regional structures becoming defunct. Simultaneously, nationwide, the ANC Youth League was disbanded, and the ANC Women’s League very little in evidence. The plight of the ANC in this province was evident to all.

Bottoming out?

The new popular leader, Vuyisa JJ Tyhalisisu, was elected chair by 311-282 votes. Its leader in the Western Cape provincial parliament, Cameron Dugmore, is a veteran of four decades of service to the ANC, and nationally the only white person in such an ANC position.

The newly elected Western Cape provincial executive committee balances Africans such as Tyhalisisu and Ayanda Bam with coloureds such as Neville Delport, Sharon Davids and Derek Appel.

A significant number of ANC branches have been revived. This coincides with a start in reviving the ANC Youth League and the Women’s League. Next year’s general elections will show how far these measures have changed ANC fortunes in the Western Cape.

– South Africa’s ANC controls eight of nine provinces – why the Western Cape will remain elusive in the 2024 elections
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-controls-eight-of-nine-provinces-why-the-western-cape-will-remain-elusive-in-the-2024-elections-210013

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

At an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. He had been held by the military since 19 July.

The regional bloc gave the military in Niger a one-week ultimatum to comply and warned it would take all measures necessary – including force – to restore constitutional order.

On 28 July, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, declared himself head of state after the military seized power.

Beyond warning against any regional and foreign interventions, the military leaders in Niger have given no indications of ways forward.

This coup d’etat will have a significant impact on peace and stability in Niger and the entire Sahel region.

Although Niger has recently enjoyed its longest democratic rule since independence, there has been a constant threat of coups. When Bazoum was elected president in 2021, there was a coup attempt about 48 hours before his inauguration. It failed as presidential guards fought off the coup plotters.

As I explained then, the coup attempt pointed to deep fissures in the country. It suggested that the military had not fully embraced democracy.

The current coup plotters have blamed rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth. They stated that the intervention was necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country. I believe, however, there are other issues that precipitated the latest coup d’etat. These are: ethnicity; the presence of foreign forces; and the weakness of regional bodies.

Factors that led to the coup

There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and declining economic prospects contributed to fragility in the country.

Despite the increase in foreign forces, especially from the US and France, and military bases in Niger, the leadership has been unable to stop insurgent attacks. There are several insurgent groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, as well as Boko Haram operating in the country.

These attacks have resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements in the last decade. Hundreds of youths in the capital, Niamey, gathered to celebrate the July coup, waving Russian flags and chanting “Wagner”. This suggests that some people in Niger believe the military, supported by Russia and the private military contractor, Wagner group, would do a better job of fighting insurgents.

In addition to insecurity and economic stagnation, three other issues help explain the recent coup d’etat.

First, the debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of Bazoum was an issue during the last election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority and has always been labelled as having foreign origins.

This did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups – even though Bazoum got about 56% of the vote and is from the same party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou.

There is a lot of emphasis on ethnic military composition in the country; understanding this helped Issoufou complete two terms as president. Appointments in the military are made along ethnic lines.

Second, the large number of foreign military troops and bases in the country has not been well received by the military. They believe this undermines them. Niger is a key ally of western countries in the fight against insurgency in the region. France’s huge investments in Niger’s mining sector are another reason for its interest in security.

In 2019, the US opened a drone base in Niger despite protests. As I have pointed out before, the drone base could make Niger a target for terrorists and increase instability.

In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger. The Nigerien military leadership and some influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces.

Third, I suggest the failure of regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union to take a firm stance against military power seizures in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali emboldened the Nigerien military. ECOWAS leaders have now threathened to use force to restore Bazoum if the coup plotters do not reinstate him.

In the last four years, there have been seven coup d’etats in the region. Three were successful. Leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have threatened sanctions on these three countries, but nothing much has been done to deter other opportunistic military leaders.

In a round table organised by the think tank Chatham House London on the impact of military intervention in west Africa, one of the leaders from the region stated that they kept avenues of communication open with the three military presidents as a courtesy. This creates an impression that there is no deterrence for military takeovers.

Implications for Niger and the region

The latest coup d’etat has severe consequences for Niger and the entire Sahel region. Niger is a strong ally of western nations, especially France, the US and the European Union in fighting insurgency and curbing illegal migration to Europe.

Efforts to address these issues will be affected. And the new military leaders will want to use these issues as leverage in negotiations and to force acceptance of the new regime.

The new leaders in Niger might also engage with the Wagner group to combat the Islamist insurgency. The leader of the group has already praised them for seizing power. The influence of Russia and Wagner in the region could grow.

Yet Wagner has been unable to halt terrorist advancement in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Finally, a successful military takeover in Niger would be a major drawback for democracy in the region and Africa as a whole. The military regimes of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso already plan to form a “military alliance”, supposedly to combat insecurity.

African leaders need to do more to prove that they are working for the masses.

– What caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors
– https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wim Naudé, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Economics, University of Johannesburg

The notion of “degrowth” is gaining traction among some politicians in Europe. It was given a platform recently at the European Parliament’s “Beyond Growth” conference.

Jason Hickel, an economic anthropologist and one of the main advocates of degrowth, defines it as

a planned reduction of energy and resource use designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequality and improves human wellbeing.

The degrowth movement’s belief is that other approaches to the ecological crisis, such as green growth and the sustainable development goals, are futile. That’s because these approaches are rooted in democratic capitalism, which is obsessed with economic growth. Therefore the movement calls for a “radical political project” that would displace capitalism and “de-grow” the west. The global south is exempt.

So far, the economic mainstream has been dismissive of degrowth, considering it perhaps not even worth engaging with. Critical analyses by Nobel laureate Ted Nordhaus and other leading economists such as Branko Milanovic and Andrew MacAfee remains confined to blog-style pieces.

The degrowth movement does, however, raise very valid criticisms against economic growth and the Green Growth paradigm that underpins the current mainstream approach to tackling the ecological crisis. But do they offer valid solutions? Are the only two options facing us either ecological collapse or degrowth? Will degrowth save the world as Jason Hickel confidently proclaims?

In several recent scholarly papers, published by the IZA Institute of Labor Economics, I argue that the proposal for degrowth is not a solution for the ecological crisis or for the shortcomings of democratic capitalism.

Degrowth would be ineffective and might be even worse for the environment. Degrowth in industrialised countries would hit developing countries hard because of economic interdependencies.

The west has been experiencing degrowth conditions (the “great stagnation”) for decades. This experiment has resulted in many social and political ills. The degrowth movement itself is a reaction against degrowth.

Flaws in the argument

Proponents of degrowth argue that reducing the gross domestic product (GDP) of advanced economies would cut carbon emissions enough to avoid an ecological overshoot.

But my argument is that merely reducing the GDP of developed countries would have no significant impact on the world’s overall material footprint.

Most current carbon emissions (63%) come from developing countries where emissions will continue to increase. China, for example, is building the equivalent of two new coal-fired power plants every week.

Many of the world’s major carbon pollutors – fossil fuel companies – are located in the global south. They include Saudi Aramco, National Iranian Oil, Petroleos Mexicanos, PetroChina, Petroleos de Venezuela and Kuwait Petroleum. They are also government owned or controlled, which makes it rather strange that Jason Hickel is advocating nationalisation of fossil fuel companies as a degrowth-solution…

Degrowth considers the global south to be exempt from degrowth. This is an implicit acknowledgement that degrowth can do harm. The movement has also argued that developed countries should compensate the global south. This implies giving a free pass to global south polluters whose fossil fuel rich governments will get trillions in reparation money to further invest in their polluting industries.

Degrowth would also be ineffective. Most of its key proposals are likely to stimulate economic growth and consumption, not curtail it. For example, the degrowth movement calls for energy sufficiency, basic income grants and four-day working weeks. It proposes banning advertising. All of these may be subject to rebound effects – they would actually stimulate economic growth and materialisation of the economy.

But degrowth might not only be ineffective in reducing ecological overshoot. It might turn out to be dirty.

First, redistribution towards less developed countries, as degrowth proposes, would stimulate economic growth and aggregate consumption growth in developing countries. Strangely, although degrowthers reject neoclassical economic growth theory, they seem to adhere to its tenet that redistribution has no effect on economic growth.

Second, with reduced income, developed countries would have fewer resources to invest in climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies. Degrowthers may counter that countries could just reallocate their expenditure away from conspicuous consumption towards such green investment. But that would be inconsistent with the fact that the most innovative countries are not Jason Hickel’s poster-children such as Sri Lanka or Cuba, but those with the highest GDP, such as the USA and Switzerland. Innovation costs money. Kate Raworth is therefore mistaken when she claims that “boundaries unleash creativity.”

With resources and innovation under degrowth pressure, firms might simply replace expensive cleaner production techniques with cheaper, but more polluting ones. And without future growth, debt would contract, starving risky but necessary investment projects.

The upshot is that degrowth would leave the world more vulnerable to the impacts of ecological deterioration.

Degrowth might also harm developing countries because of the intertwined nature of the global economy. This might disproportionately hurt the poorest of the poor – and make global inequality worse.

The COVID-19 crisis emphasised this inter-dependency. Poverty rose more sharply in the global south than in the global north. The impact of the pandemic indicated how difficult it would be for the south to decouple from the north.

Degrowth and dictatorship

Because of these shortcomings, degrowth is politically unfeasible. Democracy and degrowth are inherently uncomfortable bedfellows. The only example in history of a sustainable and thriving stationary (non-growing) society was Japan during the Edo (Tokugawa) period (1603-1868). It was, however, a “brutal dictatorship”.

Given that a democracy is unlikely to choose degrowth voluntarily, the degrowth movement may set the west on a dangerous path towards rejecting democracy and reverting to an authoritarian collective.

The degrowth movement thinks that material use and carbon emissions cannot be decoupled from economic growth, but that innovation, creativity, happiness and social progress can. This ignores how much social progress has accompanied the last two centuries of economic growth.

The physicist Tom Murphy, who has stressed the limits to economic growth, has warned that

In times of plenty, we can afford to be kind to those who are different. We are less threatened when we are comfortable. If our 21st Century standard of living peaks […] then we may not have the luxury of viewing our social progress as an irreversible ratchet. Hard times revive old tribal instincts: different is not welcome.

– Degrowth: slowing down rich economies to deal with climate change is a flawed idea
– https://theconversation.com/degrowth-slowing-down-rich-economies-to-deal-with-climate-change-is-a-flawed-idea-209434

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nnenna Ifeanyi-Ajufo, Professor of Technology Law, University of Bradford

_Several African countries are pursuing digital transformation ambitions – applying new technologies to enhance the development of society. But concerns exist over the absence of appropriate policies across the continent to create a resilient and secure cyber environment.

Nnenna Ifeanyi-Ajufo, a technology law expert, explains the current cyber governance situation in Africa.

What is cyber governance and why is it so important?

Cyber governance is an important aspect of the international cybersecurity strategy for preventing and mitigating cyber threats. It features oversight processes, decision-making hierarchies and international cooperation. It also includes systems for accountability and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. In recent years, cyber governance has been prominent in diplomatic and political agendas when regions or countries need to work together.

To promote digital transformation, cyberspace must be made secure and stable, using appropriate governance standards.

Digital transformation offers Africa tremendous opportunities. These include the economic empowerment of citizens, transparent governance and less corruption. But digital transformation can only happen on the continent if its digital spaces are trusted, secure and resilient.

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Read more: It’s time for governments to help their citizens deal with cybersecurity

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How are African governments doing on this front?

Not very well. In 2014, the African Union Commission adopted the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection. It is also known as the Malabo Convention. It is supposed to provide principles and guidelines to ensure cybersecurity and stability in the region.

Only 15 out of the 55 AU member states have ratified the convention. These include Ghana, Mauritius, Togo and Rwanda.

Cyber governance has political dimensions. African countries are rooted in historical and cultural contexts that have an impact on politics and governance. Governance mechanisms in the region are further affected by political instability and conflicts.

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Read more: Five things South Africa must do to combat cybercrime

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The borderless nature of cyberspace presents particular challenges. This is especially so for African states that are accustomed to controlling activities in their territory.

The result of this has been a misunderstanding of cyber governance. This has manifested in internet shutdowns and restrictions of online activities for citizens. We have seen recent examples of this in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Nigeria.

African leaders’ views on regulating the digital space vary. This is clear from their reluctance to ratify the Malabo Convention.

Often, international standards collide with the realities of developing states. This is true for states in Africa that are on the wrong side of the digital divide. This means they lack the capacity, skills and infrastructure to govern cyberspace to international standards. Overall, this limited institutional and technical capacity implies that effective cyber governance may not exist in practice for Africa.

There are some good stories, though. Ghana has ratified the Malabo Convention and the Convention on Cybercrime of 2001. It also passed a Cybercrime Act into law in 2020 and has developed a robust cybersecurity strategy.

What needs to happen to bring all countries in line?

Preserving cyber stability is a collaborative effort. African countries need to find ways to work together to foster appropriate policies or strategies. Adopting the Malabo Convention would show that countries see the importance of cooperation in governing the digital environment.

Greater coordination is also necessary at a regional level. For example, the Southern African Development Community has adopted a model law on cybercrime. The Economic Community of West African States has developed a directive on fighting cybercrime. Regional organisations have a key role to play in formulating policies and delivering outcomes.

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Read more: Senegal’s internet shutdowns are another sign of a democracy in peril

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Beyond ratifying the Malabo Convention, African states must also rethink best practices and the value of strategic regional partnerships. These partnerships are important because they create shared responsibility in a borderless space.

Africa must approach diplomacy strategically in this space and seek increased representation at global dialogues. The African Union remains largely absent from the evolving UN processes on cyber governance development. This implies that African interests, realities and domestic capabilities won’t get enough attention in the processes. There is also a need to bridge the institutional and technical gaps that have prevented African states from participating fully.

Committing to the Malabo Convention would provide a framework for united cyber governance norms and standards across the continent. As the international community continues to define these standards, Africa should be included.

– Cyber governance in Africa is weak. Taking the Malabo Convention seriously would be a good start
– https://theconversation.com/cyber-governance-in-africa-is-weak-taking-the-malabo-convention-seriously-would-be-a-good-start-209384