Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de València

On the night of 13 January 1963, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away.

But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups.

First came Mali, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span.

In April 2021, Chad followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was Guinea’s turn. A month later, it was Sudan. In Burkina Faso, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022.

More recently, a coup was launched in Niger, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger.

All together, that’s more than 100 million people being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.

Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel.

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Read more: Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely

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But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.

My research explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government.

This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.

Citizen discontent

I carried out a quantitative analysis using Afrobarometer survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule.

Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.

The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries analysed, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest Afrobarometer data shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.

Support for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the Freedom House index.)

But there were some exceptions. In South Africa, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.

Reasons to support military rule

The analysis points to three conclusions:

• In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.

• In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.

• Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.

The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.

If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics.

If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.

– Civilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter
– https://theconversation.com/civilian-support-for-military-coups-is-rising-in-parts-of-africa-why-the-reasons-matter-185448

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Shüné Oliver, Medical scientist, National Institute for Communicable Diseases

It’s been 126 years since British medical doctor Sir Ronald Ross discovered that mosquitoes in the Anopheles family are primarily responsible for transmitting malaria parasites between vertebrate hosts.

Since his discovery, mosquitoes have been found to carry and transmit many other diseases that pose a major threat to public health. Among them are yellow fever, dengue and Zika.

Currently, malaria is the most lethal mosquito-transmitted disease. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported an estimated 247 million cases of malaria worldwide in 2021 and 619,000 deaths. Almost all cases and deaths were in African countries.

Other diseases transmitted by mosquitoes are also a source of immense human suffering. It is estimated that dengue infects about 390 million people annually. And thousands are affected by Zika, chikungunya and yellow fever.

Insects that transmit diseases to humans are known as vectors and the diseases they transmit are referred to as vector-borne diseases. These diseases are very difficult to control. They generally have complex life cycles, involving both the insect and the human host.

Conventional methods to control vector-borne diseases have targeted the vectors, focusing on reducing their opportunities to come into contact with humans.

This is particularly true for malaria. Insecticide-treated nets serve a dual function by acting as a physical barrier between the mosquito vector and humans, and exposing the mosquito to a lethal dose of insecticide when it lands on the net. In another common control method, mosquitoes are exposed to a lethal dose of insecticide through indoor residual spraying.

Both nets and indoor spraying have played a major role in reducing African countries’ malaria burden. But their sustained efficacy is under threat. Many vector populations have become resistant to the insecticides used in these methods. They have also changed their behaviours to reduce their contact with those insecticides.

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Read more: Fresh signs of mosquito insecticide resistance in South Africa

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Scientists are working to address these issues. But other methods that don’t rely on insecticides are needed in the fight against mosquito-borne diseases.

That’s where genetic modification comes in. We are researchers focused on finding novel ways to advance malaria elimination efforts and are excited about recent advances in genomic research that make genetic modification a realistic option for malaria control in particular. As with other approaches to controlling or eventually eradicating the disease, this won’t be a complete solution. But it’s got the potential to strengthen the global fight against malaria.

Genetic modification for malaria control

Mosquitoes can be genetically modified through two different technologies. The first method, paratransgenesis, involves infecting mosquitoes with bacteria that prevent them from transmitting malaria. This doesn’t harm the mosquito. It is important not to eliminate or harm mosquitoes because they pollinate many plants and are food for animals like bats, birds and reptiles.

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Read more: Curious Kids: What would happen if all the mosquitoes in the world disappeared?

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Scientists are excited about this method following the recent discovery of a bacterium that occurs naturally in mosquitoes’ guts and appears to prevent the malaria parasite from developing inside the mosquito.

The second method involves genetically modifying the mosquitoes themselves. This approach centres on gene drives: genetic systems that ensure genes of interest are inherited by all offspring in every generation. There are two types of gene drive. One aims to reduce the vector population size and is known as population suppression. The other aims to prevent the mosquito from transmitting malaria; it is known as population modification.

Gene drives focusing on population suppression have shown great promise in laboratory studies. They’ve yet to be tested in the field, though.

Population modification potentially has fewer environmental effects and is less prone to developing mutations. But it has proved more challenging to achieve and has not progressed as far as the suppression approach.

Addressing scepticism

It will be a while before this technology is routinely used by malaria control programmes. But preparation is under way.

Over the past decade, malaria control programmes have expressed a willingness to use genetic modification if and when such techniques are shown to be safe and acceptable to the affected communities. This has prompted the WHO to provide guidance on the use of genetically modified mosquitoes to control malaria and other vector-borne diseases.

In its guidance, the WHO acknowledges how crucial community engagement will be to the success of any future gene drive interventions.

This is important in an environment where there is marked scepticism about science, and particularly about genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In 2003, community resistance resulted in the rejection of genetically modified golden rice in Zambia, despite the country experiencing a pronounced food shortage.

More recently, there was backlash against the COVID-19 mRNA vaccines, which some people suspected of being capable of altering human DNA (it isn’t).

It is critical that the concerns of communities where genetically modified mosquitoes are to be released are addressed prior to any release. This will help promote acceptance and understanding of the new technology.

Considerable investment

However, community acceptance is not the only challenge. There is an urgent need for research on the relevant local malaria mosquito species so that the required genetically modified mosquitoes can be developed. Once the genetically modified lines are established, impact in the field must be demonstrated and systems established to ensure suitable numbers of mosquitoes can be reared and safely transported to the intervention sites.

All this requires considerable human resources and funding, suggesting that it will be some time before gene drive systems have real-world impact on malaria transmission.

Still, as the globe marks World Mosquito Day on 20 August, in honour of Sir Ronald Ross’s discovery almost 130 years ago, we believe there is reason for optimism: novel technologies like genetic modification have the potential to play a major role in the fight against malaria.

– How genetically modifying mosquitoes could strengthen the world’s war on malaria
– https://theconversation.com/how-genetically-modifying-mosquitoes-could-strengthen-the-worlds-war-on-malaria-211703

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)

Gabon’s president Ali Bongo Ondimba (2009-present) recently announced his intention to stand for re-election in the country’s presidential poll scheduled for 26 August. He is, to state the obvious, expected to win.

Ali Bongo, son of former president Omar Bongo who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009), has the backing of the ruling Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG), founded by his father. The party has monopolised power in the oil-rich central African country for more than half a century.

The Bongo family has held onto power for 56 years. It has done so through single-party government, corruption in the mining and oil sectors, and political kinship. According to some estimates Ali Bongo personally controls US$1 billion in assets, much of that secreted overseas, making him the richest man in Gabon.

In addition, the constitution has been changed several times in the past decades to ensure the Bongos’ continued rule.

First, term limits were removed from the constitution in 2003, ensuring that Bongo could serve as president for life.

Second, traditional two-round ballots were changed into single-round ballots, also in 2003. This was to ensure that Bongo’s opponents could not rally around a single challenger in a run-off.

Third, instead of requiring that the winner obtain a majority, all that is needed for Bongo to be re-elected is a plurality. This means a majority could be less than 50%, as long as the winner has the most votes. Had he been required to win a majority of votes, Ali Bongo, with 49.8% in the 2016 election, would not be president today.

Fourth, in April 2023, the presidential term was reduced from seven to five years, ensuring the presidential elections would occur at the same time as legislative and local elections.

In the past, after presidential elections, opposition parties would organise against Bongo’s ruling party to capture seats in the legislative and local elections. The change makes it much more likely that all the institutions of government power will be taken by Bongo and his party in one single election.

The ruling PDG has increased its seats in the national assembly, holding 63 out of 120 seats in 1990 and most recently 98 out of 143 in 2018. The ruling party has also increased its seats in the senate from 52 out of 92 in 1997, to 46 out of 67 in 2021.

The continuous rule by the Bongos has not been good for a country of just 2.3 million people. Gabon is a resource-rich country and was once heralded as the “Kuwait of Africa”. Because of its small population and large oil reserves, per capita income is at least US$13,949.16. In neighbouring Cameroon, per capita income is only US$3,733

But Gabon’s “average” is belied by a population where a third of the citizens live below the poverty line and unemployment stands at about 37% among young people.

Dynastic republic

Gabon is not a monarchy but a “dynastic republic”.

In dynastic republics, presidents have concentrated power in their hands and established systems of personal rule. They transmit state power through nepotism to their family and kin. This includes sons and daughters, wives and ex-wives, brothers and sisters, half-siblings and step-siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, in-laws, illegitimate children and so on.

Under this system, the classical ideal of a legal-rational state – where position and rank are distributed based on merit in the name of the rational (efficient and effective) functioning of government -– is corrupted.

In all dynastic republics around the world – including Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Turkmenistan and most recently Cambodia –- an institutionalisation of traditional family power through the modern vehicle of a single ruling party has been critical.

In Gabon, this is the Parti Démocratique Gabonais. The party holds the presidential palace and has a majority in the national assembly (98/143 seats) and in the senate (46/67 seats). It also controls the courts, and the regional and municipal governments.

It is critical to understand that no man rules alone. Only with a large party apparatus can a man and his family rule a republic with millions of people.

But why has the rule by one man and his family been tolerated?

The answer is the political elite need him to keep their own positions.

The economist Gordon Tullock hypothesised back in 1987 that dynastic succession appeals to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle. In 2007, professor of government Jason Brownlee tested this theory by looking at 258 non-monarchical autocrats. He found that

in the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent when the incumbent had arisen from a party and his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation.

Political scientists Bruno Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue that

essential supporters have a much greater chance of retaining their privileged position when power passes within a family from father to son, from king to prince, than when power passes to an outsider.

Omar Bongo founded the PDG in 1967 as a de jure one-party system. After constitutional reforms in 1990, he permitted the existence of opposition parties. But because he never held free or fair elections, the democratic opposition has never managed to wrest power from either the Bongos or their ruling party.

Elections in Gabon are followed by protests, which are followed by security force crackdowns and ultimately silence.

The opposition

A total of 19 candidates have registered as candidates for the presidency. Among these are former prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima, former vice president Pierre-Claver Maganga Moussavou, head of the Union Nationale coalition of opposition parties Paulette Missambo, and former minister of mines Hughes Alexandre Barro Chambrier.

For the past year, Chambrier has done everything he could to rally the other opposition leaders to support a single candidate. But his efforts have not been successful.

Chambrier may be the one best positioned to rally the most votes against Bongo, but the Gabonese opposition is, once again, divided.

So it seems like the Bongo dynasty will remain in power, as will the PDG, after the 2023 elections. Though Ali Bongo’s government has denied such claims, it seems as if preparations are already underway for Bongo’s eldest son Noureddine to inherit the throne.

– Gabon elections: how the Bongo family’s 56-year rule has hurt the country and divided the opposition
– https://theconversation.com/gabon-elections-how-the-bongo-familys-56-year-rule-has-hurt-the-country-and-divided-the-opposition-211537

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kathryn Steventon Roberts, Researcher – Global Health, University of Oxford

Imagine the weight of responsibility for caring for a child when you are not yet fully grown yourself, and the fear of being shamed by parents, fellow learners, and even strangers within the community?

Vast numbers of adolescent mothers, many of them very vulnerable, exist across Africa, but there remains little research on their challenges and what can be done to support them and their children.

Policies and programmes are often small scale, poorly implemented, or not inclusive of adolescent parents.

Detailing findings from the largest adolescent mother cohort study in sub-Saharan Africa, this article sheds light on some of the challenges they face, potential entry points for interventions and programmes, and opportunities to support adolescent mothers and their children.

Some adolescent mothers from sub-Saharan Africa say they did not realise they could get pregnant or how to prevent pregnancies, pointing to the challenges to provide youth with comprehensive sex education and the possible cultural obstacles to communication about sexunderlying early pregnancy.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic sparked an education crisis, nearly one in five girls aged between 15 and 19 globally were not in school, employment or training.

Many adolescent mothers have a history of poor school performance, and a pregnancy can act as a catalyst for early dropout.

The HEY BABY (Helping Empower Youth Brought up in Adversity with their Babies and Young children) research study was conceptualised to better understand adolescent mothers’ needs.

The study aimed to identify the hurdles young mothers face and how to overcome them. Between 2017 and 2019, HEY BABY collected data from over 1,000 adolescent mothers and their children living in rural and urban areas of South Africa’s Eastern Cape.

Addressing mothers’ obstacles and identified points of intervention

Prior research, using older samples, from South Africa indicates that only between 30%and 50% of young mothers manage to continue their education, highlighting a continued need to understand better why this is the case.

Our most recent study showed that almost 70% of young mothers indicate having returned to school after birth. These mothers showed lower poverty rates, fewer repeated grades preceding the pregnancy, continued schooling during pregnancy, higher daycare/crèche use, more family childcare support, and lower engagement in exclusive breastfeeding within six months of birth.

Examining the relationship between poverty and school enrolment within this population, we identified two distinct routes towards a return to school:

Route one: Lower household poverty drives schooling throughout pregnancy which, in turn, drives higher school return rates post-birth;

Route two: Lower household poverty drives the use of daycare/crèche services which, in turn, drives higher school return rates post-birth.

The large proportion of mothers – 30% in our sample – who do not return to school might require substantial targeted support to re-engage with education.

Our results suggest that financial support alone might not be sufficient to support adolescent mothers. But when combined with other resources, such as affordable daycare and services that support school retention during pregnancy, they could prove effective.

This evidence aligns with the growing interest in cash-plus programmes which provide cash payments in addition to complementary interventions to strengthen outcomes. This type of intervention might help adolescent mothers to continue their education.

Further research from the HEY BABY team provides valuable insights into maternal education and its potential drivers and consequences:

1. Better maternal education is associated with increased child cognitive development.

2. Withdrawal from school during pregnancy is associated with more poverty, higher grade repetitions and greater lack of information about the pregnancy.

3. Some adolescent mothers face compound risks. For example adolescent motherhood and HIV-infection double the chances of dropping out of school.

4. Food security is associated with both education and lowered HIV behaviours, including age-disparate sex and sex on substances.

5. Access to formal childcare services has a substantial positive impact for adolescent mothers such as engagement with education and employment, optimism about the future, and improved parenting) and showed better child development over time.

Evidence to improve the implementation of school policies

Progressive laws and school policies, and their effective implementation, are essential to increase school access for pregnant girls and adolescent mothers.

In South Africa, a national policy assigns the responsibility for managing the care and support for adolescent mothers to individual schools. These schools need to know how to provide effective and targeted help, and which community networks to tap into.

Establishing and promoting education, health, and social systems that are responsive to the rights and needs of pregnant girls and adolescent mothers will require that the policy implementation is grounded in robust evidence.

Only then can we effectively improve the lives of adolescent mothers and our future generations.

– Teen mums in South Africa: largest ever study explores what it takes to go back to school
– https://theconversation.com/teen-mums-in-south-africa-largest-ever-study-explores-what-it-takes-to-go-back-to-school-210563

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The threat of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.

It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours.

There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. Growing support for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the Economic Community of West African States, Ecowas.

In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one protest held close to a French military base in Niamey.

The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on 17 and 18 August will discuss intervention options.

Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is divided over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. Protesters took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger.

For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have opposed the use of force.

As a scholar of politics and international relations, I believe that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely, as I have previously stated. However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war.

The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted.

The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe.

The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes.

Counting the cost of war

Nigerien soldiers, through the G5-Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force, are involved in the fight against Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources.

Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.

The example of Syria and how ISIS quickly emerged in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen.

Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.

A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe.

Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to curb mass migration through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.

Agadez in central Niger used to be a major hub for illegal migration but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies.

Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country.

Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has continued to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.

If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own warning against military intervention.

While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the Wagner Group, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a presence in neighbouring Mali.

Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been strengthening their relationship with Russia.

Limited options

Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its seven-day ultimatum to step down.

Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down.

I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.

– Niger: Ecowas military intervention could trigger 3 bad outcomes
– https://theconversation.com/niger-ecowas-military-intervention-could-trigger-3-bad-outcomes-211549

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ogochukwu Udenigwe, Doctoral Candidate, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Nigeria is a patriarchal society. Authority is vested in men, who tend to exert power and control over women in various spheres of life. This has an impact on women’s health and decisions about their healthcare.

Women’s health is affected not only by medical conditions and childbearing, but also by cultural behaviour and traditions. Social factors such as gendered access to healthcare or employment also affect people’s capacity to lead healthy lives.

The Nigerian feminist scholar Obioma Nnaemeka has described feminism in an African context as a matter of negotiation and compromise. She calls it “negofeminism”. It involves “give and take” instead of confrontational exchanges.

This concept helped me, as a global health researcher, to understand what rural Nigerian women said about seeking healthcare during and after pregnancy.

For our study, my colleagues and I interviewed women and their spouses in two rural communities in southern Nigeria.

Our findings describe ways in which women negotiate authority by ascribing the role of decision-maker to their men spouses while maintaining influence over their pregnancy healthcare decisions and actions. Negofeminism’s concepts of alliance, community and connectedness were highlighted through men’s constructive involvement in maternal health.

We found women were not passive victims. Instead, they navigated patriarchal environments to yield the best possible maternal health outcomes by gaining control of their healthcare decisions.

Recognising this form of agency can help in formulating policies and programmes that acknowledge how women’s wider social environments influence their health.

Maternal health in Nigeria

In Nigeria, limited access to quality healthcare contributes to 556 pregnancy-related deaths per 100,000 live births.. UNICEF reports that Nigeria contributes 10% of the global pregnancy-related death burden.

Some scholars have argued that women are only able to seek healthcare if they can make independent decisions. But this approach often ignores women’s realities, such as the fact that their social network (mothers, grandmothers, spouses and community members) influences their use of healthcare services.

Nevertheless, as our study shows, social dimensions don’t necessarily impede women’s autonomy.

Therefore, I believe that discussions of maternal health in an African context need to consider women’s experiences of being “African” and “women”.

The study

We studied two predominantly rural communities in Esan South-East and Etsako West, local government areas of Edo State in southern Nigeria. We conducted five women-only focus group discussions with a total of 39 women, and three men-only focus group discussions with 25 men. Participants were chosen from a database of women participating in maternal health interventions.

We asked them who women first consulted for pregnancy care, and who made the decisions about seeking maternal healthcare. We also asked about their experiences of men’s involvement in maternal and child health.

We categorised their responses as negotiation, collaboration and manoeuvring.

It appeared that men were considered the decision-makers at the household level. Participants said a woman’s spouse should be the first to know of her pregnancy. Both men and women said men should make all the decisions about healthcare during pregnancy, even though it was clear that women sometimes influenced decisions.

Describing her experience, one woman said:

In the aspect of care, I will tell my husband, so he will decide. After my husband knows, I will go to the hospital to tell the doctor so he can tell me what to do.

Similarly, men noted that women “cannot just go to healthcare facilities without the husband’s decision”.

But they also made comments like:

My wife will tell me, ‘take me to go and see the nurse’. When I am not around, she can go see the doctor on her own. It is a normal thing in our community.

Both men and women said it was important to get skilled care, especially for complications.

The act of the women telling the men can be thought of as a form of negotiation by women to influence decisions on access to maternal healthcare. First, she recognises the patriarchal environment and assigns the decision-making authority to men. But she is also using her agency in that environment.

Notions of men’s responsibility and collective action on maternal health were evident in the study. In these communities, men’s duties as expectant fathers were mainly of financial support to cover costs associated with pregnancy, including clinic visits, cost of delivery, essential medicines and feeding.

It can be argued that in ascribing decision-making authority to men, women benefit from men’s duty and responsibility to be providers. Women said they could not afford the high cost of maternal healthcare on their own. There was “give and take”.

Some women showed their resistance to men’s involvement in their pregnancy. They reported secretly seeking maternal healthcare without informing their partners. In this they were indicating control over their lives.

Why this matters

Our findings show that it’s important to involve women’s communities and spouses in maternal health programmes.

We show that patriarchy affords men power over decision-making or financial resources. Women are not passive in these situations, they actively find ways around it to ensure they have access to skilled healthcare during pregnancy.

This study shows that maternal health is not always an individual responsibility – it can be one for the woman’s community and the nation. Ignoring this can undermine programmes and policies aimed at improving women’s health.

– Nigerian women ensure they get the best possible healthcare by managing unequal power relations with men
– https://theconversation.com/nigerian-women-ensure-they-get-the-best-possible-healthcare-by-managing-unequal-power-relations-with-men-210592

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Many people may be tempted to view the World Bank’s recent announcement that it will freeze new loans to Uganda because of the country’s vicious anti-LGBTIQ+ law as a harbinger of the Bank taking a more progressive approach to human rights issues.

While the announcement is welcome, based on my many years studying the Bank and on my research for my forthcoming book, The Law of the International Financial Institutions, I think there are good reasons to be cautious about its significance.

The World Bank, which has been operating for over 75 years, has 189 member states as shareholders. It funds development projects and programmes in member states that have annual per capita incomes below about US$12,535. The member states elect a Board of Executive Directors that oversees the Bank’s operations and approves all its loans.

The Bank’s Articles of Agreement stipulate that it cannot base its decisions on political grounds. The articles state that the Bank “shall not interfere in the political affairs” of its member states. Nor should its decisions be influenced by the “political character” of these states.

Moreover, the Bank is instructed that it should only pay attention “to considerations of economy and efficiency”. And that it should not be affected by “political or other non-economic influences or considerations.”

The articles don’t define these key terms. They also don’t identify the criteria the Bank should consider when deciding if a particular issue should be excluded from consideration because it is “political” rather than “economic”.

This means that this decision is within the exclusive discretion of the Bank’s decision makers.

Division of labour

The Articles were drafted and agreed in 1944. At the time, the division of responsibilities between those who made the “political” decisions and those who made the “economic” ones seemed relatively clear. It was assumed that each Bank member state, as an exercise of its sovereignty, would decide for itself how to deal with the social, environmental, and cultural impacts and consequences of the particular transaction for which it was seeking the Bank’s support.

The Bank, on the other hand, would take the state’s decisions on these issues as given. It would merely consider if the particular loan request was technically sound and economically and financially feasible.

This division of responsibility, of course, was unrealistic. The Bank’s Board of Executive Directors must approve each loan. They represent its member states. It is inevitable that officials elected or appointed by – and ultimately accountable to states – will pay close attention to the political implications of their decisions. And that these considerations may trump the technical merits of the transaction.

Thus, inevitably, political considerations, including human rights, have always been, at least implicitly, a factor in Bank operations.

The futility of the Bank’s attempt to exclude political, including human rights, considerations from its operations can be seen at two levels. Firstly, at the level of the Bank’s relations with its member states. Secondly, at the level of individual transactions.

A good example of the Bank’s failed efforts to exclude political factors at the country level was its decision in the 1960s to lend to Portugal and South Africa to fund the construction of the Cahora Basa dam in Mozambique. The Bank decided to make this loan despite a UN General Assembly effort to impose sanctions on these countries because of their colonial and apartheid policies.

Many African states, supported by a majority of UN member countries, argued that the loan should have been denied. Their case was that the policies of the borrowers violated the human rights of their subjects. They were also a threat to regional peace and security.

The Bank’s General Counsel defended the decision on the basis of the political prohibition in the Bank’s articles and on the technical merits of the project.

Despite its ostensible non-political position, the Bank did not make any further loans to South Africa until it became a democratic state.

At the individual transaction level, the Bank funds projects and programmes that have profound social and environmental impacts. Consequently, it is forced to pay attention to some of the political, including human rights, implications of these projects and programmes.

For example, if it finances a road or a renewable energy project, the project will require land. The current occupants of the land may need to be moved to make way for the project.

Alternatively, the project may have social and environmental effects that hurt people. It could, for example, affect the surrounding community’s ability to grow food, or place the community at higher risk of accidents or exposes more young girls and women to the risk of gender-based violence.

If the affected community belong to minority groups in the country, with their own language, culture, and geographic attachments, they may qualify as indigenous people under international law and the Bank’s policies. In this case, the project may require their free, prior informed consent.

However, there are disagreements among states and between the Bank and some of its member states about which communities qualify as indigenous and what is required to ensure that their rights are respected.

For example, some states and Bank stakeholders contend that it is enough to seek the consent of the community’s leadership. But others maintain that the consent can only be established if particular vulnerable groups within the communities, such as women, youth, LGBTIQ+, or disabled people, are given specific opportunities to express their consent.

Some states may argue that giving such attention to these vulnerable groups is inconsistent with local practices and customs and that the Bank, pursuant to its own Articles, should not be interfering with these internal “political” matters.

In all these cases, the Bank has to exercise judgement. This means, for example, that in the Uganda case the Bank could decide that it should not extend any new credit to Uganda because of its new anti-LGBTQI+ legislation.

However, it is also easy to see that in another context the Bank – or its Board of Executive Directors – may conclude that on balance it is better to continue lending to the particular country despite serious human rights issues. Or to a particular project because the perceived benefits outweigh the costs.

The challenge, of course, is ensuring that the Bank is making these decisions on a principled and predictable basis. And not according to its own whims and political preferences. And that it can be held accountable for the way in which it makes the decisions.

– World Bank freezes loans to Uganda because of anti-gay laws. But it doesn’t mean it’s becoming a human rights watchdog
– https://theconversation.com/world-bank-freezes-loans-to-uganda-because-of-anti-gay-laws-but-it-doesnt-mean-its-becoming-a-human-rights-watchdog-211630

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Professor of International Law, Intellectual Property Law and Food Law, University of Arkansas

The US and Kenya announced a trade and investment partnership in July 2022. Talks have been progressing on the way forward in nine areas, including agriculture, anti-corruption, digital trade, environment and climate change action, and workers’ rights and protections.

The Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP) will be the first significant trade partnership between the US and a country in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in the region currently rely on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), which offers duty- and quota-free access to the US market. The new deal is seen as a model for future agreements between the US and other sub-Saharan African countries.

The labour provisions proposed under the Kenya-US deal are not new. They have become standard features of all US free trade agreements since first appearing in the North American free trade agreement of 1994.

Kenya and the US undertake to work together:

to advance and protect labour rights through enforcement of and compliance with labour laws, promotion of social dialogue, and cooperation in other areas of mutual interest on labour and employment priorities, including with respect to forced labour in global supply chains.

There is currently very little information regarding the potential scope of the labour provisions. But there is reason to believe they will borrow heavily from precedents of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

Under the USMCA, Contracting Parties commit to four core international labour standards. These are: freedom of association and collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

I have recently authored a paper on the labour issues raised in the proposed free trade deal between the US and Kenya. I have also studied China’s bilateral treaties and reviewed its trade deals with African countries.

Ordinarily, a trade agreement that aims at promoting workers’ rights should be welcomed. Kenya faces numerous obstacles to effective protection of the rights of workers despite having many laws with this aim. But the imposition of stringent labour standards via a trade agreement raises concerns about:

• additional international obligations

• high implementation costs

• sovereignty

• hidden motives

• uneven playing field.

In my opinion, the inclusion of strong labour provisions in the STIP may have very little to do with protecting workers in Kenya. It may be more about sidelining China in Africa, protecting U.S. jobs, and enhancing US soft power in the region.

1. International obligations

The controversy over the issue of trade and labour standards is not new. Nearly thirty years ago, developing countries rejected attempts by some industrial nations to subject labour standards to World Trade Organisation rules and disciplines. Introducing them through a free trade pact implies contracting states will be required to adopt and enforce global labour laws. Including labour provisions in the STIP will have the effect of imposing additional commitments on Kenya beyond its current obligations as a member of the World Trade Organisation. Quite apart from the cost of implementation, imposing labour commitments through the backdoor of a trade agreement exposes Kenya to costly dispute settlement procedure and possible trade sanctions in event of a breach.

2. Sovereignty

The Kenyan parliament would likely play a very limited role in shaping the scope and content of the labour provisions of the trade agreement. In contrast, the US Congress plays a significant role in shaping the labour provisions of all pacts involving the US.

The limited input of Kenyan workers in the design of the labour provisions of the agreement is also a concern. By contrast, US workers and labour unions have had the opportunity to express their views on these issues. In its Strategic Plan FY 2022 – FY 2026, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) state that advancing a worker-centered trade policy “will require extensive engagement with unions, worker advocates, and underserved communities to ensure that workers’ perspectives and values play an integral and respected role in the development and implementation of U.S. trade policy.”

3. Hidden motives

It’s the US view that poor labour standards distort global markets and are a barrier to US businesses and workers competing on a level playing field.

The deal with Mexico and Canada prohibits them from importing goods from countries that use forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory child labour. It provides for mandatory inspection of facilities to be sure of compliance in those countries.

Labour provisions in Kenya could therefore have a direct impact on its trade with China, member states of the East African Community and other African states. It could mean that entities that are neither American nor Kenyan are inspected.

4. Uneven playing field

While the US has the capacity and resources to monitor labour conditions in Kenya and to enforce relevant provisions of the STIP, neither the Kenyan government nor its private sector has the capacity to do so in the US. So the spotlight will be on Kenya while labour rights violations in the US are likely to be swept under the carpet.

Despite a plethora of laws and regulations purporting to protect workers in the US, violations are commonplace, particularly among migrant workers. Forced labour and human trafficking of migrant farm workers in the US is rampant.

Until recently, migrant workers in the US were coerced into continuing to work despite violations of their rights.

5. High implementation costs

The cost of implementing labour provisions is significant. Substantial resources will be required to amend laws, appoint and train inspectors, and monitor compliance. Maintaining good records, establishing labour-management committees and providing arbitration services comes with costs.

Under the deal with Mexico and Canada, a decision made by a Party on the provision of enforcement resources does not excuse a Party’s failure to comply to enforce its labor laws.

What next?

Workers are the bedrock of the global economy and deserve full protection. Including labour provisions in the STIP could transform Kenya’s labour laws. It could also put pressure on China to take workers’ rights in Africa and Kenya more seriously.

But the idea of embedding robust labour obligations in a trade agreement between Kenya and the US is highly controversial and should be weighed carefully.

Such bilateral agreements must be scrutinised to ensure that their benefits for Kenya and Kenyan workers outweigh their costs. It’s important too that labour standards are without protectionist motive or effect.

If the Kenya-US deal must contain labour provisions, I have five proposals to make:

• Kenya must reject pressure to replicate the labour provisions in the US-Mexico pact. They might not be a good template.

• The labour provisions should include rights enshrined in core international human rights instruments most of which are yet to be ratified by the US.

• The issue of implementation costs and capacity constraints must be addressed upfront with binding long-term commitment on the US to provide necessary technical assistance and bear the implementation costs.

• The failure of the US government to address labour rights and migrant rights violations in the US, including in the agriculture sector, must also be on the table.

• A human rights and sustainability impact assessment of the labour provisions is necessary. Such an impact assessment should take into account vulnerable workers in Kenya including female workers, workers with disability, child workers, as well as workers in the rural areas.

– Kenya and the US are negotiating a trade deal that could be a model for Africa – but its position on workers needs a rethink
– https://theconversation.com/kenya-and-the-us-are-negotiating-a-trade-deal-that-could-be-a-model-for-africa-but-its-position-on-workers-needs-a-rethink-206584

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luka Kuol, Adjunct Professor, University of Juba

The people of South Sudan have not exercised the right to choose their leaders since the referendum that secured independence from Sudan in 2011. Instead, they have suffered through cycles of violent conflict that have prevented the democratic transfer of power.

South Sudan descended into violent conflict less than three years after independence. It signed its first peace agreement in 2015. This collapsed in less than a year and was followed by another wave of violence. The 2015 peace agreement was resuscitated in 2018 with hope it would lead to a newly elected government in February 2023.

After failing to fully implement the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, the signatories extended its term for 24 months to allow for better preparation for elections in December 2024. The elections, however, may be extended again.

I have studied constitution-making, security governance and post-conflict transitions. I also served as a minister in the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan National Government of Unity in 2005. In my view, postponing polls has become a currency in South Sudan, making a democratic transition through elections an elusive quest. However, it’s possible to hold elections if there is political will.

A recent public opinion survey showed that the majority of South Sudanese are opposed to any further delays to elections. Church leaders and civil society organisations have also called for elections. These sentiments indicate that the South Sudanese are tired of a status quo where the ruling elite clings to political power through endless power-sharing arrangements rather than through the ballot.

Three key things are needed for a credible poll:

• electoral laws to guide the process

• voter registration and constituency boundaries

• a safe environment to vote in.

Providing what’s needed

There are major political and logistical challenges in the way of an election in South Sudan. Resolving them will require hard choices and difficult trade-offs.

Electoral laws: one of the big issues in the political reforms process is whether the elections will be conducted under a permanent constitution – which is still being drafted – or the current constitution. A permanent constitution is one of the prerequisites for the conduct of election under the 2018 peace deal. However, tying a permanent constitution to the conduct of elections was unrealistic. Permanent constitution-making takes time. It requires the effective participation of citizens, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home areas.

Also, the permanent constitution should be ratified by an elected parliament. Not the current handpicked 650 members of the national legislature who are part of South Sudan’s elite power-sharing arrangements.

The amended 2011 transitional constitution, the 2012 elections Act and the 2018 revitalised peace agreement can provide the basis for laws to guide the 2024 elections.

Voter registration: another necessary condition for the conduct of elections is a population census. This is important for voter registration and the drawing of constituency boundaries. However, it would be ideal to conduct such a census when there is relative stability, and displaced persons and refugees can return to their homelands.

A population census will take time, though. So how can South Sudan register voters and draw boundaries without one? Political elites need to make the strategic decision to either use the 2010 constituency boundaries, population estimates or voter registration data. Given rapid demographic shifts – 40% of the country’s population has been forcefully displaced – projections based on the 2008 census could be used to reflect these changes.

The National Bureau of Statistics and other research centres, such as the public policy think-tank Sudd Institute, could objectively make population projections. Combined, these data sets can provide reasonable estimates for voter registration and drawing boundaries for constituencies.

Security, and political and civic space: violent conflict still plagues South Sudan. Should elections be held when there is greater security? Or be organised under the current conditions in the hope that they will produce a legitimate government that promotes peace? A public perceptions survey found that despite the fear of violence, the majority of South Sudanese want elections. Creating a minimum safe and secure environment, which includes political and civic space for elections, is within the reach of political elites. Especially with the unification and deployment of security forces.

What’s going right

South Sudan has put in motion two major laws that could help conduct elections.

The first is the progressive National Elections Bill. It proposes a mixed system that allows geographical representation, as well as special parliamentary quota seats for political parties and marginalised groups, such as women, persons with disabilities and the youth. This is aimed at ensuring inclusivity. It also reduces the risk of a single party holding a monopoly of power.

The elections bill has the potential to achieve political stability that rests on the distribution of power and resources to constituencies, as in the case of Kenya.

The second law is the newly amended Political Parties Act. Elections are only as credible as the parties that contest them. The amended law provides mechanisms for regulating political parties. It aims to ensure internal democratic governance and accountability in party constitutions. However, its implementation remains a challenge. For instance, the Political Parties Council hasn’t been formed, affecting the registration of political parties.

Most of South Sudan’s political parties are at the embryonic stage with limited or no political experience and resources. Investing in building their institutional capacities and governance will be as urgent as funding the elections.

What next?

South Sudan is at a crossroad. Its ruling elites have to decide between continuing on the endless power-sharing path or heed to the demands of the people and embrace elections for state legitimacy and democratic transition.

The latter provides citizens with hope of a better South Sudan governed by elected leaders. Yet, political elites are becoming increasingly calculating and transactional in meeting the minimum conditions for holding elections.

Providing funding for the elections, and related institutions and activities will test political commitment to the poll. The 2023-2024 budget – expected to be an elections budget – failed to allocate resources for the poll.

The challenges facing the 2024 elections can be surmounted by collective political will. This is currently in short supply.

– South Sudan is gearing up for its first election – 3 things it must get right
– https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-is-gearing-up-for-its-first-election-3-things-it-must-get-right-211355

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imrana Buba, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo

North-western Nigeria has become increasingly violent. This is due to the activities of militias, known locally as “bandits”. These are loosely organised armed groups, reportedly over 120 factions with 28 to 2,500 members. They are now deadlier than the well-known Boko Haram, which operates in north-eastern Nigeria.

The origins of the conflict in north-western Nigeria can be traced back to 2011 following disagreements between Hausa farmers and Fulani pastoralists over changes in land ownership and encroachment on grazing routes, primarily due to environmental and climatic factors. They were characterised by small-scale disputes and isolated hit-and-run attacks resulting in crop damage and livestock theft. This conflict also included skirmishes with primitive weapons, such as sticks, daggers and locally crafted Dane guns.

And then in 2018, many Hausa-dominated communities in the region formed “peace committees” to engage the Fulani militias. Through these committees, they entered an ad-hoc agreement to give the militias “protection payment” – levies in cash or kind, in exchange for protection from attacks.

The militias send letters to village heads for payment, leaving a phone number to contact when the villagers were ready to pay. The village heads would call their council and peace committee members to determine how much each resident should contribute. The system was comparable to how rural communities in pre-colonial Nigeria paid farm and livestock taxes and levies to traditional leaders.

But unlike standard taxation, the protection payment does not imply support for militias. Many residents attempted to avoid direct involvement while adhering to the terms of the agreement. The militias are also not motivated by a desire to rule over the communities. Instead of advancing a political or ideological cause, their primary goal is to enrich themselves.

Dangerous consequences

In a recently published article which is based on my PhD research on the dynamics of political violence in Nigeria, I argued that payments to the militias provided some communities with short-term safety. But that, in the long term, they are leading to dangerous consequences.

The strategy resulted in less violence for the first few months and encouraged more communities to pay the protection levies. However, the militias gradually began to demand more payment, and more militia groups emerged (competing against one another) to forcefully demand protection against their attacks.

As a result, violence against civilians increased, including rising fatalities, sexual violence, population displacement, asset destruction and economic disruption.

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Read more: What can be done to fight rural banditry in northern Nigeria

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Protection payment pathways

I explained that the protection payment escalates the conflict in the region through two pathways: acquiescence and resistance. Acquiescence occurs when a community pays a militia to protect them from other militias. This leads to increased predation and demands for more payments. Resistance occurs when a community pays a militia to protect them. If they refuse to continue payments, the militia responds with violence to punish the community and instil fear.

While many communities initially paid the militias as a self-protection strategy, it has become extortion as the militias became predatory over time. They are now demanding more money than initially agreed and adopting a criminal mode of operation. They forced the villagers to pay additional “harvest fees”, buy fertiliser or work on militia farms before they could till their land.

A 2022 investigation in hard-to-reach communities of Zamfara and Sokoto states identified civilian protection payments as one of the primary sources of revenue that militias use to finance their operations. Journalists estimated that communities in 13 of the 14 local government areas of Zamfara had paid over 538 million Naira (about US$711,080) in protection levies in less than a year.

The militias spend the money on more guns, readily available on the region’s illicit arms market, primarily smuggled in from the Sahel through porous borders. They also use the protection payment to pay “informants”, civilian collaborators who go about their daily lives while providing intelligence. When communities refuse to pay additional fees, they attack them with lethal weapons such as assault rifles and submachine guns, often killing many civilians in one attack.

When I conducted field research in Zamfara last summer, many vulnerable communities fled or continued to pay protection levies.

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Read more: Nigeria’s new police chief faces structural challenges – 5 key issues to tackle

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Next steps

While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the conflict, my research indicates that paying militias for protection is risky. It escalates conflict and violence against communities.

Instead, planned flight to safer areas is suggested as a safer alternative to protect civilians during armed conflicts. The government must also step up efforts to safeguard smaller towns and villages, which are frequently more vulnerable to attacks than state capitals. This could be done by deploying more security forces and, if possible, through dialogue with the militias.

– Bandits in Nigeria: how protection payments to militias escalate conflict in the north-west
– https://theconversation.com/bandits-in-nigeria-how-protection-payments-to-militias-escalate-conflict-in-the-north-west-211224