Category: Reportage

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

Chequered history of integration

A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

Hurdles to integration

The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

Painkiller or cure?

The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

– DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
– https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

Chequered history of integration

A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

Hurdles to integration

The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

Painkiller or cure?

The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

– DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
– https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacinta Delhaize, Lecturer, University of Cape Town

You may not know it, but right now there’s a huge cosmic rave party happening far, far above our heads. The chief party goers are known as supermassive black holes. These mysterious objects can have masses several million or billion times that of the Sun and are so dense that they warp space time around them.

As far as astronomers know, all galaxies harbour a supermassive black hole at their very centres. In some galaxies, large amounts of interstellar gas are spiralling around the supermassive black hole and getting pulled in beyond the event horizon and essentially on to the black hole. This process creates a huge amount of friction and energy, which can cause the “rave” I’m talking about – releasing huge amounts of light at many different colours and frequencies across the electromagnetic spectrum.

In some cases, the black hole will even spew jets of plasma, millions of light-years across intergalactic space. The plasma gas is so hot that it’s essentially a soup of electrons moving close to the speed of light. These plasma jets glow at radio frequencies, so they can be seen with a radio telescope and are, aptly, named radio galaxies. In a recent episode of the astronomy podcast The Cosmic Savannah, I likened their appearance to two glow sticks (the plasma jets) poking out of a ball of sticky tack (the galaxy). Astronomers hypothesise that the plasma jets keep expanding outwards as time passes, eventually growing so large that they become giant radio galaxies.

Millions of normally sized radio galaxies are known to science. But by 2020 only about 800 giant radio galaxies had been found, nearly 50 years since they had been initially discovered. They were considered rare. However, a new generation of radio telescopes, including South Africa’s MeerKAT, have turned this idea on its head: in the past five years about 11,000 giants have been discovered.

MeerKAT’s newest giant radio galaxy find is extraordinary. The plasma jets of this cosmic giant span 3.3 million light-years from end to end – over 32 times the size of the Milky Way. I’m one of the lead researchers who made the discovery. We’ve nicknamed it Inkathazo, meaning “trouble” in South Africa’s isiXhosa and isiZulu languages. That’s because it’s been a bit troublesome to understand the physics behind what’s going on with Inkathazo.

This discovery has given us a unique opportunity to study giant radio galaxies. The findings challenge existing models and suggest that we don’t yet understand much of the complicated plasma physics at play in these extreme galaxies.

Here comes ‘trouble’

The MeerKAT telescope is located in the Karoo region of South Africa, is made up of 64 radio dishes and is operated and managed by the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory. It’s a precursor to the Square Kilometre Array, which will, when it commences science operations around 2028, be the world’s largest telescope.

MeerKAT has already been pivotal in uncovering some of the hidden treasures of the southern sky since it was first commissioned in 2018.

This is the third giant radio galaxy that my collaborators and I have discovered with MeerKAT in a relatively small patch of sky near the equator, around the size of five full moons, that astronomers refer to as the “COSMOS field”. We pointed MeerKAT at COSMOS during the early stages of the most advanced surveys of distant galaxies ever conducted: the International Gigahertz Tiered Extragalactic Exploration (MIGHTEE).

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Read more: Discovery of two new giant radio galaxies offers fresh insights into the universe

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The MIGHTEE team, a collaboration of astronomers from around the world, and I first published the discovery of the two other giant radio galaxies in COSMOS in 2021.

We spotted Inkathazo more recently in my own MeerKAT follow-up observations of COSMOS, as well as in the full MIGHTEE survey.

However, Inkathazo differs from its cosmic companions in several ways. It doesn’t have the same characteristics as many other giant radio galaxies. For example, the plasma jets have an unusual shape. Rather than extending straight across from end-to-end, one of the jets is bent.

Additionally, Inkathazo lives at the very centre of a cluster of galaxies, rather than in relative isolation, which should make it difficult for the plasma jets to grow to such enormous sizes. Its location in a cluster raises questions about the role of environmental interactions in the formation and evolution of these giant galaxies.

MeerKAT’s exceptional capabilities are helping us to unravel this cosmic conundrum. We’ve created some of the highest-resolution spectral maps ever made for giant radio galaxies. These maps track the age of the plasma across different parts of the galaxy, providing clues about the physical processes at work.

The results revealed intriguing complexities in Inkathazo’s jets. Some electrons within the plasma jets receive unexpected boosts of energy. We think this may occur when the jets collide with hot gas in the voids between galaxies in a cluster. This gives us hints about what sort of plasma physics might be happening in these extreme parts of the Universe that we didn’t previously predict.

A treasure trove

The fact that we unveiled three giant radio galaxies by pointing MeerKAT at a single patch of sky suggests that there’s likely a huge treasure trove of these cosmic behemoths just waiting to be discovered in the southern sky. The telescope is incredibly powerful and it’s in a perfect location for this kind of research, so it’s ideally poised to uncover and learn more about giant radio galaxies in the years to come.

Kathleen Charlton, a Master’s student at the University of Cape Town, was the lead author of the research on which this article was based.

– South African telescope discovers a giant galaxy that’s 32 times bigger than Earth’s
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-telescope-discovers-a-giant-galaxy-thats-32-times-bigger-than-earths-248023

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thierry Vircoulon, Coordinateur de l’Observatoire pour l’Afrique centrale et australe de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales, membre du Groupe de Recherche sur l’Eugénisme et le Racisme, Université Paris Cité

Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country’s army.

These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.

What advantages could France lose by withdrawing its troops from African countries?

France’s military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022.

Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations. These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.

For instance, Operation Sagittarius, which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.

Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).

In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.

On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France’s military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.

What impact could military withdrawal have on France’s political and diplomatic influence in its former African colonies?

The closure of the bases would signal the end of France’s capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.

This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers. Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.

It’s important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).

The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.

Could this withdrawal reduce France’s influence in managing security crises in Africa?

As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the “gendarme of Africa”.

Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France’s expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.

This was reflected in France’s diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service. The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.

The end of France’s military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.

In Niger, the United States did not follow France’s hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.

In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.

How will the reduction in military presence affect France’s ability to protect its economic interests, particularly in the mining and energy sectors?

In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France’s foreign trade, 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.

France’s top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.

Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.

– What France loses by closing its military bases in Africa
– https://theconversation.com/what-france-loses-by-closing-its-military-bases-in-africa-247898

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira, Post-doctoral researcher, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

Urban agriculture takes many forms, among them community, school or rooftop gardens, commercial urban farms, and hydroponic or aquaponic systems. These activities have been shown to promote sustainable cities in a number of ways. They enhance local food security and foster economic opportunities through small-scale farming initiatives. They also strengthen social cohesion by creating shared spaces for collaboration and learning.

However, evidence from some African countries (and other parts of the world) shows that very few young people are getting involved in agriculture, whether in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. Studies from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Nigeria show that people aged between 15 and 34 have very little interest in agriculture, whether as an educational pathway or career. They perceive farming as physically demanding, low-paying and lacking in prestige. Systemic barriers like limited access to land, capital and skills also hold young people back.

South Africa has a higher rate of young people engaging in farming (24%) than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this number could be higher if young people better understood the benefits of a career in farming and if they had more support.

In a recent study I explored youth-driven urban agriculture in Khayelitsha, a large urban area outside Cape Town whose residents are mostly Black, low-income earners.

The young urban farmers I interviewed are using community gardens to grow more than vegetables. They’re also nurturing social connections, creating economic and business opportunities, and promoting environmental conservation. My findings highlight the transformative potential of youth-driven urban agriculture and how it can be a multifaceted response to urban challenges. It’s crucial that policy makers recognise the value of youth-led urban agriculture and support those doing the work.

The research

Khayelitsha is vibrant and bustling. But its approximately 400,000 residents have limited resources and often struggle to make a living.

I interviewed members of two youth-led gardens. One has just two members; the other has six. All my interviewees were aged between 22 and 27. The relatively low number of interviewees is typical of qualitative research, where the emphasis is placed on depth rather than breadth. This approach allows researchers to obtain detailed, context-rich data from a small, focused group of participants.

The first garden was founded in January 2020, just a few months before the pandemic struck. The founders wanted to tackle unemployment and food insecurity in their community. They hoped to create jobs for themselves and others, and to provide nutritional support, particularly for vulnerable groups like children with special needs.

The second garden was established in 2014 by three childhood friends. They were inspired by one founder’s grandmother, who loved gardening. They also wanted to promote organic farming, teach people healthy eating habits, and create a self-reliant community.

All of my interviewees were activists for food justice. This refers to efforts aimed at addressing systemic inequities in food production, distribution, and access, particularly for marginalised communities. It advocates for equitable access to nutritious, culturally appropriate food.

One of the gardens, for instance, operates about 30 beds. It cultivates a variety of produce: beetroot, carrots, spinach, pumpkins, potatoes, radishes, peas, lettuce and herbs. 30% of its produce is donated to local community centres each month (they were unable to say how many people benefited from this arrangement). The rest is sold to support the garden financially. Its paying clients include local restaurants and chefs, and members of the community. The garden also partners with schools, hospitals and other organisations to promote healthy eating and sustainable practices.

The second garden, which is on land belonging to a local early childhood development centre, also focuses on feeding the community, as well as engaging in food justice activism.

Skills, resilience and connections

The gardens also help members to develop skills. Members gain practical knowledge about sustainable agriculture, marketing and entrepreneurship, all while managing operations and planning for growth.

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Read more: Healthy food is hard to come by in Cape Town’s poorer areas: how community gardens can fix that

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This hands-on experience instils a sense of responsibility and gives participants valuable skills they can apply in future careers or ventures. The founder of the first garden told me his skills empowered him to seek help from his own community rather than waiting for government intervention. He approached the management of an early childhood development centre in the community to request space on their land, and this was granted.

Social connections have been essential to the gardens’ success. Bonding capital (close ties within their networks) and bridging capital (connections beyond their immediate community) has allowed them to strengthen relationships between themselves and civil society organisations. They’ve also been able to mobilise resources, as in the case of the first garden accessing community land.

Additionally, the gardens foster community resilience. Members host workshops and events to educate residents about healthy eating, sustainable farming and environmental stewardship.

By donating produce to local early childhood centres, they provide direct benefits to those most in need. These efforts have transformed the gardens into safe spaces for the community.

Broader collaboration has also been key to the gardens’ success. For instance, the second garden has worked with global organisations and networks, like the Slow Food Youth Network, to share and gain knowledge about sustainable farming practices.

Room for growth

My findings highlight the need for targeted support for youth-driven urban agriculture initiatives. Policy and financial backing can enable these young gardeners to expand their efforts. This in turn will allow them to provide more food to their communities, create additional jobs, and empower more young people.

At a policy level, the government could prioritise land access for urban agriculture projects, especially in under-served communities. Cities can foster an environment for youth initiatives to thrive by allocating spaces within their planning for urban farming.

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Read more: Africa’s megacities threatened by heat, floods and disease – urgent action is needed to start greening and adapt to climate change

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There’s also a need for educational programmes that emphasise the value of sustainable urban agriculture, and workshops and training on entrepreneurship and sustainable farming techniques. Community organising could further empower young farmers. Finally, continued collaboration with national and international food networks would help strengthen such initiatives.

– Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study
– https://theconversation.com/urban-food-gardens-produce-more-than-vegetables-they-create-bonds-for-young-capetonians-study-243500

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yap Boum, Professor in the faculty of Medicine, Mbarara University of Science and Technology

Walking through the crowded streets of the Pakadjuma neighbourhood in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, I am struck by the vibrant atmosphere around me.

Children play happily in puddles, surrounded by piles of plastic bags and open ditches of sewage. Shacks patched together from pieces of corrugated iron crowd the settlement. Loud rumba music blasts through the air as young people enjoy themselves in open bars, waiting for grilled pork or chicken to be served. Sex workers sit outside tin shacks in narrow alleyways, calling for customers.

Nearby a Médecins Sans Frontières triage centre is the only reminder that this slum area is the epicentre of the mpox epidemic in Kinshasa. There are no posters, no pamphlets or banners warning residents of the dangers of this viral disease that was declared a continental and global emergency in August last year.

At the clinic, patients suspected to have mpox are sent to one of three dedicated mpox centres in the city. Common symptoms include fever, headache, muscle ache, chills, exhaustion, swollen lymph nodes and lesions. With symptomatic care most patients get better in 7 to 35 days, depending on the severity of the case.

As an epidemiologist co-leading the response to mpox for Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, I visited Pakadjuma to get a better sense of the situation on the ground.

Mpox has historically been a rural disease in the DRC. This microcosm of Kinshasa sheds light on the complex challenges of managing the outbreak in a city.

Fighting on two fronts

With a population of more than 17 million, Kinshasa is Africa’s biggest megacity. Pakadjuma is one of the city’s many overcrowded areas where people live in extreme poverty.

Kinshasa, often called “Kin la Belle”, faces a unique crisis in the fight against mpox. Both strains of the virus, clade Ia and clade Ib, are circulating in the city simultaneously. This is first time this has happened.

Clade Ia, which is primarily transmitted from animal to human and then within households through touch, has been endemic to Africa for decades.

Clade Ib is a new strain and contracted predominantly through sexual contact. It is the strain that has spread rapidly across 21 African countries during the current epidemic in east and central Africa.

This dual transmission makes the fight against mpox even more complicated: how does one tackle a public health crisis rooted in both intimate human connections and structural inequities such as living in overcrowded areas?

Although the strains are treated similarly clinically, their spread and transmission differ.

Clade Ia is mainly associated with zoonotic transmission (from animals to humans) in rural areas. Animal surveillance and community education are required to control spillovers.

Clade Ib, with higher human-to-human transmissibility, necessitates intensified contact tracing, vaccination, and preventive measures in urban and peri-urban areas.

Tailoring strategies to these differences is key to containing the outbreak.

When condoms don’t work

Pakadjuma, in the north-east of the city, is known for poverty and high crime rates. For many girls and young women the sex trade is their only option if they want to survive.

One of the most pressing challenges to combat the virus in the area is curbing sexual transmission.

Unlike HIV, where condoms can significantly reduce the risk of spread, mpox poses a different challenge: because the virus is spread by touch there is no practical preventive measure for sexual transmission apart from complete abstinence.

Mpox lesions start in the groin, making any movement excruciating. For these sex workers, though, abstinence is not an option. It would mean losing their livelihood and the ability to feed their children.

For their clients, who come from all over the city, it would require altering a core aspect of their lives for a disease they perceive as less lethal than Ebola. There are no easy answers to this dilemma.

Tracing the spread

Contact tracing, a cornerstone of outbreak control, is another hurdle.

Identifying and tracing the contacts of sex workers is complex. As a result only a fraction of mpox cases are confirmed with laboratory analysis.

On average, each mpox case has about 20 contacts, yet tracing clients in a highly confidential sexual network is next to impossible.

Without effective contact tracing, infected individuals remain in the community, often seeking treatment only when their condition worsens. From discussions with Médecins Sans Frontières staff in the triage zone, it emerges that suspected mpox cases usually arrive in advanced stages of the disease, when symptoms are clearly visible. Many patients first attempt other remedies such as traditional healing methods, before seeking medical care.

Fortunately Kinshasa benefits from a strong laboratory network led by the Institut National de la Recherche Biomédicale and test results are available within 48 to 72 hours. This state-of-the-art institute was pioneered by Dr Jean Jacques Muyembe, the microbiologist who first discovered Ebola.

In the first week of January 2025 there were 1,155 confirmed cases and 27 deaths in the city, according to the DRC Ministry of Health.

Even for those who seek care at the dedicated mpox centres, navigating the chaotic, congested roads is a nightmare. Yellow minibuses – ominously known locally as the “Spirit of Death” – are crammed and it can take hours to get to a destination.

With increasing patient numbers, mpox centres in the city are overwhelmed.

The fight on all fronts

Addressing the mpox outbreak in Kinshasa requires a multifaceted approach which includes:

Vaccination: Blanket vaccination drives offer the strongest hope for controlling the outbreak in hotspots such as Pakadjuma where contact tracing is almost impossible. In these cases the whole community needs to be vaccinated.

This could break transmission chains while allowing individuals at risk, such as sex workers, to continue plying their trades.

Prevention and control: Home care is essential, particularly in informal settlements like Pakadjuma. Providing food and material support to patients and their families and encouraging the isolation of infected relatives will help to limit the spread of the disease.

These measures require new thinking, however, when people are trying to survive from day to day.

Talking to the community: This is difficult because of the stigma around the disease, but it must be at the heart of the response.

Amplifying the message: The media, local leaders and trusted community members need to be engaged to spread the word loud and clear.

This all needs to happen immediately or the epidemic will be almost impossible to contain in this vast, sprawling city. The consequences would be dire.

– Mpox in the DRC: residents of the slum at the centre of Kinshasa’s epidemic have little chance of avoiding this major health crisis
– https://theconversation.com/mpox-in-the-drc-residents-of-the-slum-at-the-centre-of-kinshasas-epidemic-have-little-chance-of-avoiding-this-major-health-crisis-247809

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Corinna Jentzsch, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Leiden University

Mozambique’s parliament and its new president, Daniel Chapo, were sworn in in mid-January 2025 after a tumultuous post-election period of protests, barricades and police violence.

The 9 October 2024 elections prompted countless reports of fraud, leading the European Union election observer mission to note

irregularities during counting of votes and unjustified alteration of election results.

Based on this, and other accounts of fraud, the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane claimed to have won the elections and coordinated several weeks of protests across the country.

These were met with a harsh police response. Over 4,200 people were reportedly arrested, 730 shot and 300 killed with live ammunition between 21 October 2024 and 16 January 2025.

After spending several weeks abroad, Mondlane returned to Mozambique on 9 January to join ongoing political talks between the government and opposition parties.

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Read more: Mozambique’s deadly protests: how the country got here

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How can Mozambique move forward?

To get out of its political crisis will not be easy. It will require the party in power, Frelimo, to fundamentally change how it deals with disagreement and discontent. Buying off political opposition elites, as has been done in the past, will not calm this political storm.

Based on my research into political violence, I suggest that the cycles of violence in the country can only be broken if the new president addresses three issues related to state repression. He needs to do this in dialogue with opposition forces to earn trust and public support for the new government.

The three issues are:

• putting an end to violence perpetrated by the police and army

• ending political assassinations and ensuring accountability for the ones that have taken place

• protecting media freedom and ending violence against journalists.

No more blind eye to police (and army) violence

Human rights experts urged the government in November 2024 to end the post-election violence and allow thorough investigations. Experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council expressed concerns about

violations of the right to life, including of a child, deliberate killings of unarmed protesters and the excessive use of force by the police deployed to disperse peaceful protests.

Such extensive repression has been a common response by the Mozambican security forces over the past years, with severe consequences for the evolution of conflict. For example, state repression has been a major contributor to armed conflict in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where an Islamist insurgency has been raging since 2017. Victims of violence by security forces are an important source of recruits for the insurgency.

Accountability for political assassinations

Mozambique has suffered from targeted killings of political opposition figures. The most recent, high-profile political assassinations took place after the elections in October. Elvino Dias, Mondlane’s lawyer, and Paulo Guambe, an official of Podemos, the political party that supported Mondlane’s run for president, were shot dead in Maputo by unknown gunmen.

Dias was preparing a court case challenging the election results.

Mozambique has a long history of such political assassinations. These have rarely been investigated and no one has been held accountable. The government and police regularly deny any involvement, and people have come to speak of “death squads” seeking to intimidate the political opposition and civil society.

Freedom of the press and civil society

The ability of the press in Mozambique to hold people accountable for their actions has been severely constrained. Its ability to report and investigate those involved in state-sanctioned violence has been a challenge for a long time.

In its annual report for 2023 the Media Institute of Southern Africa documented the extent to which journalists had been intimidated and attacked. It reported that such incidents increased during election periods.

This was indeed the case in the 2024 pre-election period. Journalists faced arrests when, for example, reporting on police trying to disrupt opposition parties’ events.

Mozambique enjoys a diverse media landscape, including multiple private and local media outlets. Nevertheless, press freedom has been curtailed. An example has been the treatment of journalists investigating the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado. Soon after the conflict began in October 2017, the government barred journalists from visiting the province, and many of those reporting nevertheless were detained and held for extended periods or arrested for unsubstantiated charges.

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Read more: Mozambique’s long struggle to build a nation – four novels that tell the story

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The case of Amade Abubacar made headlines in 2019 when he was detained and held for 13 days in military barracks without access to a lawyer. He was then charged with “violation of state secrets” and “public instigation to crime”.

What Abubacar did was report on the insurgency. Since then, the situation has got worse for the media. Last year, the Cabo Delgado governor Valige Tauabo accused unnamed journalists of colluding with the insurgents.

As I was writing this, news reached me that Arlindo Chissale, a journalist and political activist from Nacala, had been arrested, tortured and killed by the “death squads” mentioned earlier on 7 January 2025. Arlindo worked with me on researching the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

Freedom of the press is important to hold the new government accountable for the promises it has made to the Mozambican people.

The way forward

Chapo delivered a well-crafted inauguration address on 15 January. It was well crafted because, as some analysts commented, he incorporated many of the policies being advocated by Mondlane.

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Read more: Venâncio Mondlane is Mozambique’s political challenger: what he stands for

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He said in his speech that he had heard what the protesters were telling him during the demonstrations. And he promised to promote unity, human rights and political dialogue to (re-)create social and political stability.

Chapo is also aware of the waves being made by Mondlane, who has recognised the political power of mobilising people around the issue of police violence. On his return to Mozambique, Mondlane presented the government with a list of demands to be implemented in the first 100 days of the new government. The first was that steps needed to be taken to stop the violence against the population.

Since his return he has also met victims of violence at the hands of the police and army.

The challenge is that Chapo’s party, Frelimo, which has been in power since independence in 1975, is strong and can severely curtail the president’s ability to introduce relevant reforms.

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Read more: Mozambique’s cycles of violence won’t end until Frelimo’s grip on power is broken

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It’s therefore far from clear whether Chapo can pursue any of his suggested policy goals.

Dialogue with Mondlane is necessary. But if this leads to another “elite bargain” that might get him a cabinet position but does not benefit the common people, Mozambicans will not calm down. Any agreement must address the lack of accountability for police violence, stop political assassinations, and allow journalists to investigate political violence.

– Political assassinations, police violence and lack of press freedom: 3 barriers to peace in Mozambique
– https://theconversation.com/political-assassinations-police-violence-and-lack-of-press-freedom-3-barriers-to-peace-in-mozambique-248153