Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lawrence O. Gostin, University Professor; Founding Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law, Georgetown University

President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the World Health Organization (WHO) will be keenly felt across the globe, with profound implications for health in Africa.

In the executive order putting the withdrawal process in place, Trump also paused the transfer of US funds, support and resources to the WHO.

Trump’s executive order is his second attempt to pull the US out of the agency. He has also complained that the US financial contribution to the international organisation is “onerous”.

The biggest impacts will come from the loss of US funding. The US is by far the WHO’s largest state donor, contributing approximately 18% of the agency’s total funding.

The WHO’s funding is split into two tranches.

There are assessed contributions: countries’ membership fees, to which all WHO members agree and over which the WHO has full control. The US accounts for 22%, or US$264 million of these, for the current 2024/25 budget. The US is yet to pay the WHO its assessed contributions for 2024 and 2025. Withdrawing from the organisation without paying these fees would violate US law and must be challenged in the US courts.

Then there are voluntary contributions: donations by member countries, foundations and other sources, usually earmarked to that donor’s priorities. The US contributes 16%, or US$442 million, of all voluntary contributions.

In the case of the US, these priorities include HIV/AIDS, polio eradication and health emergencies.

As experts in global health law, we are deeply concerned about the impacts of this order, which will be far reaching.

The US withdrawal from the WHO threatens core health programmes in Africa. It will weaken the ability of African countries to respond to health emergencies, and could lead to increases in death and illness on the continent.

It will also have broader implications for leadership and governance in global health.

Impact on core programmes

Trump’s decision to withdraw comes at a time when the WHO’s health priorities in Africa were already underfunded. Eight of 12 areas were funded less than 50% earlier this year.

Twenty-seven percent of all US funding through the WHO for the African region goes to polio eradication, 20% supports improved access to quality essential health services, and much of the balance goes to pandemic preparedness and response.

The WHO/US partnership has long supported the HIV/AIDS response in Africa, but the redirection and reduction in funds could reduce the availability of prevention, testing and treatment programmes across the continent. This threatens progress to end AIDS by 2030.

The funding gap will also have an impact on programmes designed to increase access to quality essential health services, including the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis and malaria, and child and maternal health services.

If the WHO is forced to cut back on these services due to a lack of financing, it could lead to increases in mortality and morbidity in Africa.

European countries filled the financing gap in 2020 when Trump last withheld US funding from the WHO. But it is unlikely that they will be able to do so again, as countries across Europe are facing their own geopolitical and financial challenges.

The WHO’s budget was already thinly spread, and its mandate keeps growing.

Through its new investment round, the WHO raised US$1.7 billion in pledges, and is expecting another US$2.1 billion through partnerships and other agreements. Yet even before the US president’s executive order, this left a funding gap of approximately US$3.3 billion (or 47%) for the WHO’s 2025-2028 strategy.

If the gap left by the loss of US funding cannot be filled from other sources, it will fall to African nations to fund health programmes and services that are cut, placing a greater strain on governments reckoning with limited fiscal space.

Weakened response to health emergencies

Trump’s decision comes at a pivotal moment for health in Africa, which is experiencing major outbreaks.

The US has been a key actor supporting WHO-led emergency responses to outbreaks.

Last year, the US partnered with the WHO and Rwanda to rapidly bring a Marburg outbreak under control. The Marburg virus continues to threaten the continent. Tanzania has just confirmed an outbreak.

Earlier in August 2024, the WHO and Africa Centres for Disease Control each declared mpox on the continent to be a public health emergency.

The Biden administration delivered 60,000 vaccines, pledged 1 million more, and contributed over US$22 million to support capacity building and vaccination.

But now US health officials have been instructed to immediately stop working with the WHO, preventing US teams in Africa from responding to Marburg virus and mpox.

Even before these outbreaks, the US supported WHO-led emergency responses to COVID-19, Ebola and HIV/AIDS. The US withdrawal could lead to increased transmission, sickness and death in vulnerable regions.

Similarly, strong partnership between the WHO and the US has helped build health system capacities in Africa for public health emergencies.

US experts have supported nearly half of all WHO joint external evaluation missions to assess countries’ pandemic preparedness and response capacities under the International Health Regulations. This is a binding WHO agreement to help countries prepare for, detect and initially respond to health emergencies globally.

The US withdrawal from the WHO risks eroding these efforts, though it may also accelerate a regionalisation of health security already underway in Africa, led by the African Union through the Africa CDC.

Restructuring of governance

The US was instrumental in establishing the WHO and shaping WHO norms and standards, in particular driving amendments to the International Health Regulations adopted in June 2024. This included improved obligations to facilitate the rapid sharing of information between the WHO and countries.

The US has also been a key figure in ongoing negotiations for a new international treaty, a Pandemic Agreement. This would create new rights and obligations to prevent, prepare for and respond to pandemics with elements that go beyond the International Health Regulations. These include obligations on the equitable sharing of vaccines.

Trump’s executive order would prevent these instruments from being implemented or enforced in the US.

This would only entrench inequitable dynamics when the next global health emergency breaks out, given the concentration of global pharmaceutical companies in the US.

The order also pulls the US out of the Pandemic Agreement negotiations. This will inevitably create new diplomatic dynamics. Optimistically, this could provide enhanced opportunities for African nations to strengthen their position on equity.

The US departure from the WHO will create a leadership vacuum, ushering in a restructuring of power and alliances for global health.

This vacuum could cede influence to US adversaries, opening the door to even greater Chinese influence on the African continent.

But it also presents opportunities for greater African leadership in global health, which could strengthen African self-reliance.

Trump has directed the US to find “credible and transparent” partners to assume the activities the WHO would have performed. And yet there is no substitute for the WHO, with its worldwide reach and stature.

For more than 75 years, the WHO has been, and remains, the only global health organisation with the membership, authority, expertise and credibility to protect and promote health for the world’s population.

For this reason, the African Union, among scores of other bodies and leaders, has already urged Trump to reconsider.

It is now time for the global community to stand up for the WHO and ensure its vital health work in Africa and beyond can thrive.

– WHO in Africa: three ways the continent stands to lose from Trump’s decision to pull out
– https://theconversation.com/who-in-africa-three-ways-the-continent-stands-to-lose-from-trumps-decision-to-pull-out-248237

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gerrit Kurtz, Peace and Conflict Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Intense fighting has ravaged Sudan since 15 April 2023. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Famine, displacement and mass atrocities are wreaking havoc in the country.

International mediation efforts have been lacklustre and fruitless. The United Nations security council has been preoccupied with other crises and blocked by its own divisions. The African Union has created diplomatic groups, a high-level panel and a presidential committee, none of which has been particularly active. It has been very slow in tackling the political process it wanted to lead.

The US and Saudi Arabia convened several rounds of talks, first in Jeddah, then in Switzerland. The Sudanese Armed Forces delegation failed to turn up in Switzerland. The Rapid Support Forces expressed willingness to talk peace, while simultaneously committing sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale. The Biden administration only lately slapped sanctions on the top leaders of both forces, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).

I have studied civil wars, mediation and peacebuilding for more than 12 years, with a focus on Sudan, including regular visits to the country and the region in the past five years. Based on this experience I have identified five reasons why mediation has failed. These are: the resistance of the conflict parties based on the dynamic nature of the war; continued military and financial aid by their external sponsors; as well as mediation attempts that were too narrow, not viewed as impartial, and lacking in coherence.

Clearly, a new approach to mediation is needed, not simply a new mediator. Turkey has recently offered to lead talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces, but Egypt, Kenya and several multilateral organisations also keep looking for opportunities.

Any new initiative will have to have certain components if it’s going to succeed:

• political parameters, ideally set by a parallel civilian political process, of what might come next for Sudan should guide mediators

• negotiations should take place in secret so that trust can be established

• back channel communications networks must be established with potential spoilers without ceding undue legitimacy to them

• a gender- and youth-inclusive approach

• more effective international coordination

• consistent pressure on the conflict parties and their external backers.

Why previous mediation efforts failed

Firstly, neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have shown significant willingness to stop hostilities.

The military fortunes of the two sides has waxed and waned. As long as either side feels successful militarily, they are unlikely to commit to sincere negotiations. Outright military victory leading to control of the whole territory (and its borders) remains out of reach for all.

Secondly, their respective allies have not shown any particular interest in peace.

External actors have provided military support to the warring parties, and helped finance them. The UAE is the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese Armed Forces cooperates with Egypt, Eritrea, Iran and Russia, for arms deliveries and training. The UAE promised the US to stop supporting the Rapid Support Forces, but the arms flows continued.

Thirdly, some conflict management efforts were based on a flawed conflict analysis. There were attempts to organise a face-to-face meeting between Hemedti and Burhan, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. But the war is not primarily a contest of “two generals”. Neither Hemedti nor Burhan has full control of their forces. Nor is a renewed military government acceptable to large parts of Sudan’s vibrant civil society.

Fourth, mediation efforts suffered because some of the parties saw them as lacking impartiality. Sudanese Armed Forces leaders don’t trust Kenya, whose President William Ruto is closely aligned with the UAE and has, until recently, allowed the Rapid Support Forces to conduct meetings and a press conference in Nairobi. Kenya was supposed to lead the Intergovernmental Authority on Development quartet of mediators, which never really got off the ground. Similarly, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union.

Finally, there was a competition of mediation platforms, allowing the warring parties to shop for the most convenient forum for them.

What a path to a ceasefire might look like

International attention is currently focused on Turkish president Recep Erdogan, who has offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces has harshly criticised the UAE for its support to the Rapid Support Forces. The offer, then, is based on the assumption the UAE might actually cease that support.

Any new approach should differ from previous efforts.

• Mediators should provide a broad sense of political parameters for a post-war (interim) order, ideally with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. Those could include a conditional amnesty as well as assurances of personal safety for the top military leaders and of some stake in a transitional period, without promising any blanket impunity or renewed power-sharing.

But international mediators should grant the warring parties political recognition and legitimacy only in exchange for feasible concessions.

• Negotiations should take place in secret, allowing confidential exchanges between declared enemies. This is particularly important for the Sudanese Armed Forces given the rivalry among its leadership.

• Back channel communications should be established to all actors with real constituencies in Sudan, without empowering them unnecessarily. Turkey is well-placed to reach out to senior members of the previous (Bashir) regime who have found exile there. They control large parts of the fighting forces on the side of Sudanese Armed Forces and could prove to be a major spoiler. The armed groups in the so-called “joint forces” would also need to feel somewhat included.

• Mediators should find ways to include a broad array of civilian actors, in particular women and youth groups. Instead of only targeting “men with guns”, a peace process should be gender-inclusive.

• Any lead mediator should keep other interested parties such as the EU, the UK, Norway, and the other countries and organisations already mentioned, informed and engaged.

• Pressure should be kept up by the US, UK and EU on external backers of the two main warring parties, and target both military and financial flows. Policies, including further targeted sanctions, should be as aligned as possible.

Preparing for a window of opportunity

There’s no guarantee that the violence would cease even if these conditions were met. The main belligerents are likely to continue their current offensives. The Sudanese Armed Forces will try to oust the Rapid Support Forces from central Khartoum completely. The Rapid Support Forces will keep trying to take El Fasher, the only capital in Darfur not under their control.

The impending re-capture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces may provide an opportunity for a new round of talks, if it comes with consistent international pressure. Mediators should be ready to push for an end to the fighting.

– Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work
– https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-a-fresh-mediation-effort-is-needed-how-it-could-work-248330

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.

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Read more: Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight

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And the conflict still rages.

One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.

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Read more: Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions

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Use of force

In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.

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Read more: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle

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Resistance to outside intervention

In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.

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Read more: Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability

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Looking ahead

Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

– Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it
– https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Fowler, Starr Director of the Research and Academic Program, Clark Art Institute, and lecturer in Art History, Williams College

The so-called golden age of Dutch painting in the 1600s coincided with an economic boom that had a lot to do with the transatlantic slave trade. But how did the slave trade shape the art market in the Netherlands? And how is it reflected in the paintings of the time?

This is the subject of a new book called Slavery and the Invention of Dutch Art by art historian Caroline Fowler. We asked about her study.

What was Dutch art about before slavery and what was the golden age?

The earliest paintings that would be called Dutch were predominantly religious. They were made for Christian devotion. In the 1500s, major divisions in the church led to a fragmentation of Christianity called the Reformation.

In this new religious climate, artists began to create new types of paintings, studying the world around them. They included landscapes, seascapes, still lifes, and interior scenes of their homes. Instead of working for the church, many painters began to work within an art market. There was a rising middle class that could afford to buy paintings.

Historically, this period in Dutch economic prosperity has been called the “golden age”. This is when many of the most famous Dutch painters worked, such as Rembrandt van Rijn and Johannes Vermeer.

Their work was made possible by a strong Dutch economy built on global trade networks. This included the transatlantic slave trade and the rise of the middle class. Although artists did not directly paint the transatlantic slave trade, in my book I argue that it is central to understanding the paintings produced in the 1600s as it made the economic market possible.

In turn, many of the types of painting that developed, like maritime scenes and interior scenes, are often obliquely or directly about international trade. The slave trade is a haunting presence in these images.

How did this play out within Dutch colonialism?

The new “middle class” consisted of economically prosperous merchants, artisans, lawyers and doctors. For many of the wealthiest merchants, their prosperity was fuelled by their investments in trade overseas. In land and plantations, and also commodities such as sugar, salt, mace and nutmeg.

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Read more: Slavery, tax evasion, resistance: the story of 11 Africans in South America’s gold mines in the 1500s

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Slavery was illegal within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic on the European continent. But it was widely practised within Dutch colonies around the world. Slavery was central to their trade overseas – from the inter-Asian slave network that made possible their domination in the export of nutmeg, to the use of enslaved labour on plantations in the Americas. It also contributed in less visible ways to Dutch economic prosperity, like the development of maritime insurance.

What was the relationship between artists and Dutch colonies?

In the new school of painting, artists would sometimes travel to the Dutch colonies. For example, Frans Post travelled to Dutch Brazil and painted the sugar plantations and mills. Another artist named Maria Sibylla Merian went to Dutch Suriname, where she studied butterflies and plants on the Dutch sugar plantations.

Both depict landscapes and the natural world but don’t directly engage with the profound dehumanisation of slavery, and an economic system dependent on enslaved labour. But this doesn’t mean that it’s absent in their sanitised renditions.

Among the sources that I used to think about the presence of the transatlantic slave trade in a culture that did not overtly depict it were inventories of paintings and early museum collections. Often the language in these sources differed from the painting in important ways. They demonstrate how the violence of the system emerges in unexpected places.

One inventory that describes paintings by Frans Post, for example, also narrates the physical punishment meted out if the enslaved tried to run away from the Dutch sugar plantations. This isn’t depicted in the painting, but it is part of the inventory that travelled beside the painting.

These moments reveal the profound presence of this system within Dutch painting, and point to the ways in which artists negotiated making this structure invisible in their paintings although they were not able to completely erase its presence.

How do you discuss Rembrandt’s paintings in your book?

Historically, studies of the transatlantic slave trade in early modern painting (about 1400-1700) have looked at paintings that directly depict either enslaved or Black individuals.

One of the points of this book is that this limits our understanding of the transatlantic slave trade in Dutch painting. A focus on blackness, for example, precludes understanding how whiteness is constructed at the same time. It fails to recognise the ways in which artists sought to diminish the presence of the slave trade in their sanitised rendition of Dutch society.

One painting that I use to think about this is Rembrandt van Rijn’s very famous work called Syndics of the Draper’s Guild. It’s a group portrait of wealthy, white merchants gathered around a table looking at a book of fabric samples.

Although there aren’t enslaved or black individuals depicted, this painting would be impossible without the transatlantic slave trade. Cloth from the Netherlands was often exchanged for enslaved people in west Africa, for example.

In my book, I draw attention to these understudied histories to understand how certain assumptions around whiteness, privilege, and wealth developed in tandem with an emerging visual vocabulary around blackness and the transformation of individual lives into chattel property.

What do you hope readers will take away from the book?

I hope that readers will think about how many of our ideas about freedom, the middle class, art markets, and economic prosperity began in the 17th-century Dutch Republic. As this book demonstrates, a central part of this narrative that has been overlooked was the transatlantic slave trade in building this fantasy.

This is in many ways an invention that traces back to the paintings of overt consumption and wealth produced in the Dutch Republic – like Vermeer’s interiors of Dutch homes.

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Read more: How we proved a Rembrandt painting owned by the University of Pretoria was a fake

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My aim with this book is to present not only a more complex view of Dutch painting but also a reconsideration of certain dogmas today around prosperity and the art market. The rise of our current financial system, art markets and visible celebration of landscapes, seascapes and interior scenes are all inseparable from the transformation of individual lives into property. We live with this legacy today in our systems built on racial, economic and gendered inequalities.

– Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting
– https://theconversation.com/rereading-rembrandt-how-the-slave-trade-helped-establish-the-golden-age-of-dutch-painting-247918