Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nikolaos Kargopoulos, Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Cape Town

Giraffes are among the world’s most recognisable animals. With their elongated necks and long legs, their gracious movements and unique coat patterns, they have inspired people’s imaginations for centuries.

But is a giraffe just a giraffe? Or is there more variety between the animals at a genetic level than is evident just from looking at them?

For more than a decade many researchers have compared the DNA of giraffes from all parts of Africa. These studies have revealed that there are four distinct giraffe species: the southern (Giraffa giraffa), Masai (Giraffa tippelskirchi), reticulated (Giraffa reticulata), and northern (Giraffa camelopardalis) giraffe.

Different giraffe species face different risks. Some are among the most threatened large mammals in the world. While the southern and the Masai giraffe are relatively numerous and their populations estimated at approximately 45,000 and 50,000 individuals respectively, the situation does not look quite as rosy for the reticulated and the northern giraffe. Based on the latest estimates from the Giraffe Conservation Foundation (GCF), only 16,000 and 6,000 individuals respectively remain in the wild.

Therefore, it is critical to verify whether there are indeed different species of giraffe or not so that direct conservation efforts for the most threatened species can be increased before it’s too late.

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Read more: How many giraffe species are there? Understanding this is key to their protection

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The concept of species is fundamental in biology – but there is no consensus on its definition. There are many different approaches depending on individual scientists’ points of view. The best possible way to clarify the taxonomy (the system that organises living entities into groups) of organisms is through multiple approaches.

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Read more: Giraffes could go extinct – the 5 biggest threats they face

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There have been several studies of giraffe species based on their DNA, as well as on their ecology, behaviour, health and coat patterns.

But there haven’t been many based on their skulls. That’s where our new study comes in. By examining the skulls of more than 500 giraffes from across the African continent, we were able to show that there are significant differences in the skull shapes of the different types of giraffe – and confirm that there are four species.

These new findings are crucial for giraffe taxonomy and, ultimately, their conservation.

How the study was done

Giraffe skulls are important to the animals’ reproduction and evolution. That’s because of their ossicones, the horn-like structures that are longer and wider in males than in females.

The size and shape of the ossicones is important in the dominance of males and their mating success with female giraffe. While some preliminary data already suggested some potential differences in the ossicone morphology between the giraffe species, limitations on the available specimens and the methodologies at the time reduced the validity of the results.

For our research we used state-of-the-art equipment and methodologies, and we studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa. The skulls were directly sampled in the field from across their natural range in Africa, as well as museum collections, wildlife authority offices, and taxidermists in different countries in Africa, Europe and the US.

This extensive study required help from many different partners. While the project was initiated and guided by the Giraffe Conservation Foundation and the University of Cape Town, many colleagues in Africa, Europe and North America contributed.

We used a handheld 3D scanner to capture the skulls’ shape in 3D. Then we used 3D geometric morphometrics methods to compare the shape of the giraffe skulls and find out if we could group them and find any significant differences. We chose so-called landmarks – specific points on the skulls – and captured their coordinates in space (their 3D distance from the centre of mass of the skull).

Finally, specialised software was used to compare the differences in the coordinates of landmarks between our specimens and to conduct statistical analyses to show if these differences were significant or not.

Skull variations

These rigorous analyses allowed us to show skull variations between four species.

These differences mostly concerned the ossicones. But there were also minor differences in their face, eye sockets, the region around the teeth, and the back part of the skull.

The most striking difference concerned the median ossicone of the males. This is a smaller third ossicone situated in the midline of the skull above their eyes. We determined that there is a general trend in the size and shape of this ossicone that follows geography and taxonomy. In southern giraffe, the third ossicone is practically a small protrusion; in northern giraffe it is large and pointed; the Masai and reticulated giraffe have ossicones that are somewhere between those two forms.

Such differences are likely important in the way individuals of a species recognise each other, thus affecting their reproductive success. Males with more developed ossicones intimidate their rivals to gain access to territory and females.

Attention for individual species

Our study is confirmation of what scientists have known for almost a decade and supports the taxonomic split of the giraffe.

Similar discussions over two decades finally resulted in the African elephant being split into two distinct species in 2021.

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – which, it must be pointed out, is not a taxonomic authority – still only recognises one species of giraffe. It lumps all giraffes into one broad, threatened Red List category.

We strongly believe that the IUCN needs to stand tall for these animals and reassess their status. It is time for each giraffe species to get separate and enhanced attention, both locally and internationally, in particular when it comes to their conservation. Giraffes and their wild habitats must be protected before it’s too late.

– We studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa – and confirmed there are 4 distinct species
– https://theconversation.com/we-studied-more-than-500-giraffe-skulls-from-all-over-africa-and-confirmed-there-are-4-distinct-species-247466

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zsa-Zsa Temmers Boggenpoel, Academic, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a new law to govern the expropriation (or compulsory acquisition) of private property by government for public purposes or in the public interest.

The passing of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 followed a parliamentary process that began in 2020.

The act repeals the apartheid-era Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, and aims to align expropriation law with the constitution. It sets out the procedures, rules and regulations for expropriation. Besides setting out in quite a detailed fashion how expropriations are to take place, the act also provides an outline regarding how compensation is to be determined.

In South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past, land distribution was grossly unequal on the basis of race. The country is still suffering the effects of this. So expropriation of property is a potential tool to reduce land inequality. This has become a matter of increasing urgency. South Africans have expressed impatience with the slow pace of land reform.

Property rights and land reform

There is much debate in the country about the provisions of the new act. The debate is mostly about the extent to which it affects existing private property rights. Some argue the act is unconstitutional. Others welcome it as a necessary step in the right direction.

I’m a professor of law with a keen interest in this area of the law, and recently edited a book on land expropriation in South Africa by leading experts. My view is that an expropriation act that is aligned with the constitution should be welcomed, to enable land reform to work effectively.

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Read more: Land reform in South Africa: what the real debate should be about

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Land reform also needs a capable and proactive state that implements the legal framework in such a manner that prioritises expropriation as a mechanism to ensure land reform.

So far, expropriation has not been used effectively to redistribute land more equitably, as part of land reform.

I am not convinced that the act, in its current form, is the silver bullet to effect large-scale land reform – at least not the type of radical land reform that South Africa urgently needs.

Understandably, the act will have a severe impact on property rights. But it still substantially protects landowners affected by expropriation. Only in very limited cases would they not be compensated.

Protections for land owners

The act says that property must not be expropriated arbitrarily or for a purpose other than a public purpose or in the public interest.

Public purpose means by or for the benefit of the public. For example, expropriating property to build roads, schools and hospitals. Public interest is broader and includes the nation’s commitment to land reform.

“Arbitrary” would usually mean without reason or justification.

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Read more: South Africa has another go at an expropriation law. What it’s all about

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The act further requires that an expropriating authority – an organ of state or person empowered by the act or any other legislation – must first try to reach an agreement with the owner to acquire the property on reasonable terms before considering expropriation.

This gives some power to a landowner, even though expropriation does not normally require consent. The act also says a specific expropriation must always be authorised by a law.

No compensation?

Section 12 of the act deals with compensation for expropriation. It is arguably the most controversial part of the new legislation. Section 12(1) does not appear to be problematic and is largely the same wording as section 25(3) of the constitution. This part of the property clause sets out what must be taken into account when compensation for expropriation is determined.

Section 12(3) of the act refers to “nil compensation” – when nil rand (monetary) compensation may be paid. There is no explicit reference to nil compensation in the current wording of section 25 of the constitution. It’s a new thing in the Expropriation Act.

However, courts have toyed with the idea that section 25 of the constitution already provides room for a reduction in compensation.

The circumstances in which nil compensation could be granted in terms of the new act are in fact very limited. Section 12(3) leaves the discretion to the expropriating authority to determine when it may be just and equitable to pay nil compensation. However, the act lacks guidelines on how such a discretion must be exercised.

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Read more: Land is a heated issue in South Africa – the print media are presenting only one side of the story

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The scope of section 12(3) is also limited in some respects. For one, it is restricted to land. Only where land is expropriated would nil compensation be an option. Therefore, not all forms of property can be expropriated without compensation. The notion of property under section 25(1) of the constitution is generally wide and includes various rights and interests, which are broader than just land. For instance, personal rights, mineral rights and licences are included under the section 25(1) notion of property.

This wide understanding of property is not applicable to section 12(3), which refers to “land” being expropriated.

Section 12(3) is also limited to the expropriation of land “in the public interest”. Nil compensation is therefore envisaged only in the context of expropriation of land undertaken in the public interest, and not also for a public purpose.

Three of the four categories listed in section 12(3), where nil compensation is envisaged, are linked to the way in which the property was being used prior to the expropriation. Land used in a productive manner is therefore not evidently envisaged under section 12(3).

Nil compensation is not necessarily limited to the instances listed. Still, the amount of compensation must – in all instances – be just and equitable.

Novel approach

The act forces South Africans to engage with the idea of nil compensation in a much more direct manner.

The presence of a clause dedicated to nil compensation provides new clarity on when this could apply.

It is hard to determine whether this act will pass constitutional muster without seeing how expropriation under it will work in practice. It remains to be seen whether it will have the far-reaching consequences that many fear, or call for.

– Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation law: scholar weighs up the act
– https://theconversation.com/land-seizure-and-south-africas-new-expropriation-law-scholar-weighs-up-the-act-244697

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

Plastic waste in Nigeria presents a dual challenge: cleaning up environmental pollution, and tapping into its economic potential.

Many countries worldwide face similar challenges. India, for one, has chosen policies that give producers of plastic the responsibility to manage their waste. Rwanda has banned single-use plastic and promoted recycling initiatives led by communities.

These approaches show it’s possible to address plastic waste issues while fostering economic opportunities.

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Read more: Nigeria’s plastic ban: why it’s good and how it can work

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In Nigeria, informal collectors of plastic bottle waste are central to achieving both of these goals. They turn waste into monetary value.

Previous research has highlighted the environmental and economic benefits of collecting plastic bottle waste. There’s been less attention on what shapes perceptions of waste collection as a business, particularly in Nigeria.

This article explores that gap, looking at the socio-cultural, economic and environmental influences on those perceptions.

I am a researcher in the areas of plastic waste management, environmental governance and sustainable development. My work includes studying homes made from recycled plastic bottles in sustainable community-based housing projects.

Here I’ll be drawing from an exploratory survey conducted in the Ijebu area of Ogun State, Nigeria. Using a questionnaire, we surveyed 86 participants who had at least five years of experience in the plastic waste industry.

The study identified factors like education, family size, religion, gender, age, and economic dynamics as relevant to participation in the business of plastic bottle waste collection.

Understanding these influences might help the government to target policies.

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Read more: Nigeria is the world’s 2nd biggest plastic polluter: expert insights into the crisis

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Education level and information

Our study found that participants with higher education levels better understood the economic benefits of plastic waste collection as a systematic form of business. The less educated participants viewed waste collection more as a hand-to-mouth way of earning a living.

Education programmes built into waste management campaigns could improve recognition of waste collection as a structured and profitable business opportunity and develop a business-like culture among the collectors.

Parenthood, family size and financial obligations

Family size was a factor affecting perceptions of plastic bottle waste collection as a business. People with large families saw waste collection as a feasible way to provide food, housing, education and other essentials.

However, the association of waste collection with income instability highlights the need to formalise and stabilise the sector. Waste collection must be made into a sustainable and reliable business model.

Religion and cultural norms

Religion and cultural beliefs emerged as influences from our survey. This was evident in the responses of people who followed African traditional religions and Islam.

These respondents viewed waste collection as financially feasible, aligning with religious teachings that emphasise resource management and stewardship. For example, Islamic teachings on israf (avoiding wastefulness) and zakat (charity) promote efficient resource use and economic activities that benefit communities.

Similarly, African traditional religion often emphasises communal responsibility and the sustainable use of resources. These religious principles underscore the cultural acceptance of waste collection as both a practical and a morally guided economic activity.

Other cultural norms, such as the value placed on communal responsibility and cooperation, also influenced attitudes towards waste collection. In communities with a strong tradition of collective action, where unity and mutual support are highly valued, waste collection is often viewed as a collaborative effort.

These cultural norms reinforce the idea that waste collection is not just an individual task, but a collective duty that benefits the entire community.

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Read more: Informal waste management in Lagos is big business: policies need to support the trade

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Gender dynamics

Gender plays a role in perception and practice in waste collection. Our survey found that male participants were more likely than female participants to perceive this activity as a business.

As constrained as they are by lack of access to resources, women are involved in separating and marketing reusable items. Measures like microfinance could increase women’s engagement and business opportunities.

This would empower women and make waste collection a more inclusive and sustainable business.

Age and desire to be an entrepreneur

Perceptions were influenced by age in our study. Younger individuals, up to 14 years old, viewed plastic bottle waste collection as a gateway to employment. Adults aged 33-38 used their experience to get better returns on the business.

This age-based distinction suggests that different stages of life bring unique motivations and approaches to waste collection.

Policy actions that support entrepreneurship at various life stages can promote long-term engagement in the industry. This will help formalise waste collection as a sustainable and profitable business.

Economic and social factors

Income opportunities affected participants’ experiences more than social factors. Oftentimes, this determined how long they stayed in the business. Those earning more were likelier to reinvest and grow, while lower earnings often led to disengagement or exit. This highlights the importance of financial incentives in shaping waste collection practices.

Social connections also play a role in fostering collaboration. It facilitates teamwork and the exchange of ideas, and creates a sense of shared purpose and collective outcomes among participants.

Strengthening these economic and social bonds can formalise plastic bottle waste collection, making it a more efficient and profitable business.

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Read more: Waste disposal in Nigeria is a mess: how Lagos can take the lead in sorting and recycling

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Looking ahead

The study has significant application to Nigeria’s waste management industry. Adding education programmes into waste management programmes will improve people’s business skills.

Well-coordinated intervention strategies can remove cultural and gender-specific barriers. For instance, cooperatives and microfinance may make waste collection more financially appealing.

Strategies can also draw on cultural norms to increase community acceptance of waste collection and make it more inclusive.

Samuel Oludare Awobona, a doctoral student at Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria, contributed to this research.

– Nigeria’s plastic bottle collectors turn waste into wealth: survey sheds light on their motivation
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-plastic-bottle-collectors-turn-waste-into-wealth-survey-sheds-light-on-their-motivation-247819

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zsa-Zsa Temmers Boggenpoel, Academic, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a new law to govern the expropriation (or compulsory acquisition) of private property by government for public purposes or in the public interest.

The passing of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 followed a parliamentary process that began in 2020.

The act repeals the apartheid-era Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, and aims to align expropriation law with the constitution. It sets out the procedures, rules and regulations for expropriation. Besides setting out in quite a detailed fashion how expropriations are to take place, the act also provides an outline regarding how compensation is to be determined.

In South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past, land distribution was grossly unequal on the basis of race. The country is still suffering the effects of this. So expropriation of property is a potential tool to reduce land inequality. This has become a matter of increasing urgency. South Africans have expressed impatience with the slow pace of land reform.

Property rights and land reform

There is much debate in the country about the provisions of the new act. The debate is mostly about the extent to which it affects existing private property rights. Some argue the act is unconstitutional. Others welcome it as a necessary step in the right direction.

I’m a professor of law with a keen interest in this area of the law, and recently edited a book on land expropriation in South Africa by leading experts. My view is that an expropriation act that is aligned with the constitution should be welcomed, to enable land reform to work effectively.

---

Read more: Land reform in South Africa: what the real debate should be about

---

Land reform also needs a capable and proactive state that implements the legal framework in such a manner that prioritises expropriation as a mechanism to ensure land reform.

So far, expropriation has not been used effectively to redistribute land more equitably, as part of land reform.

I am not convinced that the act, in its current form, is the silver bullet to effect large-scale land reform – at least not the type of radical land reform that South Africa urgently needs.

Understandably, the act will have a severe impact on property rights. But it still substantially protects landowners affected by expropriation. Only in very limited cases would they not be compensated.

Protections for land owners

The act says that property must not be expropriated arbitrarily or for a purpose other than a public purpose or in the public interest.

Public purpose means by or for the benefit of the public. For example, expropriating property to build roads, schools and hospitals. Public interest is broader and includes the nation’s commitment to land reform.

“Arbitrary” would usually mean without reason or justification.

---

Read more: South Africa has another go at an expropriation law. What it’s all about

---

The act further requires that an expropriating authority – an organ of state or person empowered by the act or any other legislation – must first try to reach an agreement with the owner to acquire the property on reasonable terms before considering expropriation.

This gives some power to a landowner, even though expropriation does not normally require consent. The act also says a specific expropriation must always be authorised by a law.

No compensation?

Section 12 of the act deals with compensation for expropriation. It is arguably the most controversial part of the new legislation. Section 12(1) does not appear to be problematic and is largely the same wording as section 25(3) of the constitution. This part of the property clause sets out what must be taken into account when compensation for expropriation is determined.

Section 12(3) of the act refers to “nil compensation” – when nil rand (monetary) compensation may be paid. There is no explicit reference to nil compensation in the current wording of section 25 of the constitution. It’s a new thing in the Expropriation Act.

However, courts have toyed with the idea that section 25 of the constitution already provides room for a reduction in compensation.

The circumstances in which nil compensation could be granted in terms of the new act are in fact very limited. Section 12(3) leaves the discretion to the expropriating authority to determine when it may be just and equitable to pay nil compensation. However, the act lacks guidelines on how such a discretion must be exercised.

---

Read more: Land is a heated issue in South Africa – the print media are presenting only one side of the story

---

The scope of section 12(3) is also limited in some respects. For one, it is restricted to land. Only where land is expropriated would nil compensation be an option. Therefore, not all forms of property can be expropriated without compensation. The notion of property under section 25(1) of the constitution is generally wide and includes various rights and interests, which are broader than just land. For instance, personal rights, mineral rights and licences are included under the section 25(1) notion of property.

This wide understanding of property is not applicable to section 12(3), which refers to “land” being expropriated.

Section 12(3) is also limited to the expropriation of land “in the public interest”. Nil compensation is therefore envisaged only in the context of expropriation of land undertaken in the public interest, and not also for a public purpose.

Three of the four categories listed in section 12(3), where nil compensation is envisaged, are linked to the way in which the property was being used prior to the expropriation. Land used in a productive manner is therefore not evidently envisaged under section 12(3).

Nil compensation is not necessarily limited to the instances listed. Still, the amount of compensation must – in all instances – be just and equitable.

Novel approach

The act forces South Africans to engage with the idea of nil compensation in a much more direct manner.

The presence of a clause dedicated to nil compensation provides new clarity on when this could apply.

It is hard to determine whether this act will pass constitutional muster without seeing how expropriation under it will work in practice. It remains to be seen whether it will have the far-reaching consequences that many fear, or call for.

– Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation bill: scholar weighs up the new act
– https://theconversation.com/land-seizure-and-south-africas-new-expropriation-bill-scholar-weighs-up-the-new-act-244697

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

Donald Trump, America’s new president, has cut back massively on US commitments to asylum seekers, blocked all asylum processes and started to remove irregular immigrants.

Trump’s new measures are far reaching. They include the suspension of the US refugee admissions programme. Flights booked for refugees to the US have been cancelled. Arrests and deportations have begun.

Strongly anti-immigrant policies were also pursued under the Biden administration, though Trump’s dramatic steps take them much further. Other countries in the global north have also introduced tougher policies. The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum sets out tougher border controls, quicker assessment of asylum seekers and swifter removal of those who did not qualify. In the UK, Labour prime minister Keir Starmer has promised to bring down the net migration rate and treat people-smugglers like terrorists.

Based on my research into migration over the past 30 years I believe that these measures are unlikely to last. There are two linked trends that make closing the borders of the global north impractical and destined for revision.

The first is that populations in most of the global north are ageing fast (on average) and the fertility rate, or natural population growth rate, has plummeted. There are many more older people as a percentage of the population.

Secondly, with a workforce shrinking and the dependency ratio (the proportion of non-working to working people) rising rapidly, closing borders to potential labourers from other countries, without any other change, would lead to declining living standards in the global north. Economic growth and government revenues would slow or stagnate, undermining infrastructure maintenance and social service provision.

There are several possible strategies that could be alternatives to anti-immigration measures. Some older people could migrate south, robots and AI could do more work, workers in the global south could perform remote work for the north, and arrangements could be made to allow migrants into the north either permanently or as circulating migrants.

All these strategies are already in use, if modestly. Their application would have to expand considerably.

Misplaced panic

The responses of governments in the global north are exaggerated. Governments putting in place tough anti-immigrant measures have done so on the back of a narrative that there’s been a significant rise in the number of migrants worldwide.

This isn’t true. Some countries, such as the US, Germany and Colombia, have seen a spike in refugees and other migrants. But for the rest of the world the picture remains much the same as it has done for decades.

Foreign-born residents (the most widely used definition of migrants) rose as a proportion of residents worldwide from 2.3% in 1970 to 3.6% in 2020. But in 1960 the number was over 3%, and in the late 1800s migrants made up somewhere between 3% and 5% of the global population.

So, 3.6% is nothing new.

As for refugees, in 2023 there were about 38 million, of whom 69% sought refuge in neighbouring countries and 75% in middle- and low-income countries.

In general, therefore, rich countries have not been carrying the greatest burden.

The real reason behind these tougher measures is that living standards have stagnated in many countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The cost and availability of housing have worsened; inequality has grown since the 1980s; the quality and availability of public services have deteriorated since the global financial crisis of 2008 and COVID-19; and the quality of employment has shifted to precarious work and poorly paid service sector occupations.

This has contributed to the rise of populism, including anti-foreigner sentiment and even xenophobia.

Trump’s actions are the most extreme yet. They include an order to block “aliens involved in the invasion” using “appropriate measures” that give the security forces further powers. The prohibition of southern border asylum hearings in the US and the instruction to “remain in Mexico” means that prospective asylum seekers from third countries may not cross the border to make their applications at the port of entry. They must apply remotely.

Trump has also ordered that birthright citizenship must be limited to the children of certain categories of residents, essentially citizens or those with residence rights in the form of a “green card”. This move has been temporarily blocked in some states by judges as unconstitutional.

In addition, the acting head of the Homeland Security Department gave Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials the power to deport migrants admitted temporarily into the US under several programmes of the Biden administration, targeting refugees from Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Haiti, and possibly Afghan and Ukrainian refugees too.

The very first bill to receive final approval from the US Congress under Trump’s second term, the Laken-Riley Act, would require the detention and deportation of migrants who enter the country without authorisation and are charged with certain crimes. This bill was passed with 263 votes and 156 votes against, meaning that 46 House Democrats supported the Republican bill.

In contrast, in the global south, as I have discussed elsewhere, the trend has been in the opposite direction. South American regional communities liberalised migration most extensively in recent decades, but African regional communities have made progress too, as has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The way forward

Some alternative strategies are leading the way.

In Canada, the Temporary Foreign Worker programme has expanded steadily since 1973, increasingly including long-term circulating migrating lower-skilled workers for key occupations like catering, care, construction and agriculture. Though it is currently under political scrutiny because of the panic in the north over migration, and because of housing shortages in Canada, it is likely to survive and evolve. Similar systems are emerging across the global north.

In the EU, Talent Partnerships are now encouraged. Germany, for example, has talent partnerships with Kenya and Morocco, where they train health workers and IT technicians in those countries to work and live in Germany. Spain has various partnerships in Latin America and Africa. Prime minister Pedro Sanchez has chosen to be upfront on the choices. In October last year he told the Spanish people:

Spain needs to choose between being an open and prosperous country or a closed off poor country.

The current fashion for population protectionism in the global north is increasingly nasty, but it is unlikely to stand the test of time. Several constructive responses to the rising dependency ratio are feasible, but being open to more migration, possibly in new forms and through new channels. is an inevitable part of the solution.

New formal pathways for working migrants and reasonable systems for asylum seekers, along with full enforcement of rules against irregular migrants, could be the combination that works politically and economically.

– Anti-immigration policies: why harsh new rules put in place by Trump and other rich countries won’t last
– https://theconversation.com/anti-immigration-policies-why-harsh-new-rules-put-in-place-by-trump-and-other-rich-countries-wont-last-248359

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of Freiburg

Chad held parliamentary elections in late December 2024. The final results released on 21 January 2025 gave the well-established former ruling party, the Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), 124 seats out of 188.

The election marked the end of a four-year transition in Chad following the death of former president Idriss Déby Itno in March 2021. Déby had ruled Chad since 1991. Mahamat Déby Itno assumed power on the death of his father.

The result has meant that Mahamat Déby has given himself a degree of legitimacy as president through elections. He can comfortably remain in power for at least another five or even ten years.

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Read more: Chad’s election outcome already seems set: 4 things Mahamat Déby has done to stay in power

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I have been following Chad’s politics from inside and outside the country for more than 15 years. In my view, Mahamat Déby’s actions during the transition, with the help of the transitional authorities and his late father’s old teams, were aimed at keeping him in power. The December 2024 parliamentary elections were a formality. The poll was not won on polling day. It was clear from the run-up that, as was the case with the May 2024 presidential elections, every effort was being made to minimise the success of the opposition.

Four factors stand out. They are the composition of the electoral authorities, lack of an up-to-date electoral register, violence against dissenting voices, and high costs of participation in the election.

In my view Chadians’ trust in the democratic process has ceased completely. This bodes ill for a country that ranks as one of the poorest. It is also one of the most corrupt. The consolidation of Mahamat Déby’s power could widen the social divide and lead to violent conflict between different groups in Chad, which is highly stratified along ethnic and religious lines.

Dissatisfaction with his decades of autocratic rule characterised Idriss Déby’s reign. Political-military movements challenged him regularly, and the last attack led to his death.

This dissatisfaction will continue and could once again lead to violent conflicts.

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Read more: Chad: promises of a new chapter fade as junta strengthens its hold ahead of elections

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Corruption of the process

Mahamat Déby and the Movement Patriotique du Salut took a number of steps to secure victory in the election.

Firstly, the presidents of the electoral authority ANGE (Agence Nationale de Gestion des Élections) and of the constitutional court nominated by Mahamat Déby were responsible for organising and for validating elections (and will continue to be responsible until 2031). Having been loyal to Idriss Déby and now to his son, they cannot be trusted to be objective and independent in their pronouncements and final decisions.

Secondly, the electoral register was last updated in August 2024. Therefore, young people who had just turned 18 could not vote. In Chad, the majority of the population is under 25. Young people in particular in the south support the opposition.

Thirdly, the transitional regime’s violent crackdown on opposing voices played a role in the final outcome of the election.

The transition was initially characterised by peace talks with the political-military movements and by expanding the security sector to secure its rule. In October 2022, several hundred mainly young people were killed by security forces while demonstrating against the extension of the transition and Mahamat Déby’s candidacy for presidency.

In the intervening period the state took various steps against opposition figures.

In February 2024 Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Mahamat Deby and a potential rival in the presidential elections, was shot dead by security forces.

In May 2024, Mahamat Déby was elected president. In December 2024 he took on the title of marshal – previously held only by his father.

The opposition was also hampered in participating in the poll for financial reasons. Taking part in the elections is expensive. Each candidate in the parliamentary election had to pay 500,000 CFA (US$785) to the treasury. Candidates for the provincial election paid 200,000 CFA (US$314). In poverty-stricken Chad, without regular funding for political parties, it was particularly difficult for smaller parties to meet these criteria.

The situation was different for the ruling party, founded by Idriss Déby. For decades it has benefited from state resources. It is the only party with a nationwide presence. Other parties are mainly active in the regions of their founders.

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Read more: Chad’s Mahamat Deby doubles down on authoritarian rule in wake of election victory

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Resistance

Opposition parties called for a boycott. The Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques, a coalition of nine parties, criticised the new electoral law and the lack of transparency of the count at the polling stations.

Succès Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, a former prime minister who came second in the 2024 presidential elections, also called for a boycott. He accused the government of falsifying the results of the parliamentary election beforehand and of having the final lists saved in a computer. His party did not participate in the poll.

The results of the parliamentary elections presented on 11 January 2025 by Ahmed Barticheret, president of the electoral commission, and confirmed by the constitutional court on 21 January, therefore revealed no surprises.

Alongside the huge victory of the Movement Patriotique du Salut, two other parties not really in opposition won 12 and 7 seats respectively. The other successful parties won just one seat each. Chad has over 300 political parties, of which 38 are represented in the new parliament.

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Read more: Chad presidential election: assassination of main opposition figure casts doubt on country’s return to democracy

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Consequences

Movement Patriotique du Salut has an overwhelming majority in parliament. This means that there are no checks and balances. Like his father, Mahamat Déby can continue to rule without any parliamentary control.

He is already used to that. Since 2021, he has appointed members of the transitional parliament by presidential decree. The few voices of individual members of parliament belonging to the “real” opposition have no influence.

As the low turnout – put at 40% on election day – shows, the majority of voters did not expect the election result to change the political situation. On the other hand, supporters of the ruling party continue to benefit from proximity to power and state resources.

As dissatisfaction continues, the possibility of renewed attacks by dissidents cannot be ruled out. If it is not a military attack, frustrated individuals might try to target the presidency or other symbols of the regime.

In early January 2025 a group of unidentified young people reportedly attacked the presidency. The incident was played down by the government spokesman, leaving plenty of room for speculation.

But it was a reminder that a peaceful future is not assured.

– Chad’s parliamentary election hands Mahamat Déby absolute control. Here’s why it’s dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/chads-parliamentary-election-hands-mahamat-deby-absolute-control-heres-why-its-dangerous-248342