Analysis – Page 6 – AfricaMidEastNgin

January 22, 2025

Using your own laptop or phone for work? Why it’s a security hazard for businesses

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thembekile Olivia Mayayise, Senior Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Next time you’re working in a coffee shop or similar public space, take a moment to look around at your “co-workers” for the day, busy, like you are, with laptops, cellphones and tablets. How many of those devices belong to the organisations that employ them? Or are they – and you – using personal devices to conduct company business?

Many businesses are embracing the convenience of a practice known as “bring your own device”. This allows employees to use their personal or privately owned devices such as smartphones, laptops, USB drives, and even personal cloud storage, for work purposes. A broader term, “bring your own technology”, encompasses the use of privately owned software for business activities.

According to technology company Cisco’s 2024 Cybersecurity Readiness Index, 85% of the more than 8,000 companies surveyed around the world reported that their employees accessed company platforms using unmanaged devices.

There are undeniable benefits to a “bring your own device” approach. These include lower purchase costs for companies and more flexibility for staff. But the practice is also risky.

Privately owned devices aren’t always well set up for security. They often lack endpoint security controls like anti-virus software and encryption (converting plaintext data into an unreadable format). This leaves them vulnerable to data breaches and other forms of cyberattack. Such attacks are common and can be costly. Cybersecurity company Kaspersky documented almost 33.8 million mobile cyberattacks worldwide in 2023 – a 50% rise from 2022 figures.

So, what can organisations do to reduce the risks associated with “bring your own device”? As a cybersecurity professional who conducts research on and teaches cybersecurity topics, here is my advice for businesses that want to keep their data safe while letting employees use their own technology.

Who should be concerned?

Organisations of all sizes that use internet and communication technology (ICT) for business operations should address the risks that come with “own devices”. This isn’t just a matter for IT departments. Without collaboration between technical teams and management, it’s impossible to balance operational efficiency and robust data security measures.

This should be an immediate priority if:

your organisation or business has no “bring your own device” policies, standards and guidelines in place
you haven’t introduced fundamental technical safeguards for personal devices. These may be virtual private networks, up-to-date anti-virus software, multi-factor authentication, encryption and mobile device management tools.
your business doesn’t have adequate processes for managing user accounts (often the case for entities without dedicated ICT resources)
your ICT operations are fragmented, with no uniform standards or practices across departments
the organisation hasn’t assessed the risks of “bring your own device” practices.

It’s never too late to strengthen cybersecurity controls for these practices. As cyber risks evolve, organisations must adapt to protect their information. Assess the financial and reputational risks of a data breach and you’ll almost certainly find that it’s worth spending money upfront to prevent huge losses in future.

Managing the risks

Organisations with the necessary cybersecurity resources can take measures in-house. Others may need to consider outsourcing in critical areas where there are major gaps.

First, you need a comprehensive “bring your own device” strategy that’s tailored to your organisation’s needs. This should align with organisational objectives and set out who has to have which measures in place. It should outline how letting employees use their own devices for work will meet business needs.

Then, the company must create policies to help in the governance of privately owned devices.

But it’s no use merely putting a policy on paper: communicate it to all staff, and make it easily accessible at all times through platforms such as the intranet. Communicate any policy updates to all users through various channels such as emails or workshops. Provide regular, customised training. Not everybody is tech-savvy; employees may need help to install the necessary safeguards.

And remember to update your team about any changes. It’s crucial to perform regular (monthly or quarterly) or continuous risk assessments and make necessary changes.

Critically, the organisation must monitor and enforce compliance. All members of staff, from top executives to junior staff, need to adhere to policies to uphold data security. Cybersecurity is a shared responsibility, and it’s important to be vigilant about certain threats, such as whale phishing – when scammers pretend to be senior officials at a company to specifically target other senior and key officials.

Avoid disaster

These strategies can help companies to prevent “bring your own device” from becoming “bring your own disaster”. A well-managed approach isn’t just a safeguard against threats – it’s an investment in your organisation’s growth, stability and credibility.

– Using your own laptop or phone for work? Why it’s a security hazard for businesses
– https://theconversation.com/using-your-own-laptop-or-phone-for-work-why-its-a-security-hazard-for-businesses-244418

January 22, 2025

Mozambique’s cycles of violence won’t end until Frelimo’s grip on power is broken

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Manuel Francisco Sambo, PhD candidate, Doshisha University

Mozambique’s political history has been marred by violence, disputed elections and authoritarian control. The pattern continues. As the 2024 elections have shown, Mozambique remains trapped in a cycle of violence and instability. Mass protests due to widespread allegations of electoral fraud and police violence led to the deaths of dozens of people and widescale destruction.

My research on peace and security in east and southern Africa has focused on Mozambique’s post-independence political history. Based on my work, I argue that Mozambique is at an impasse. It is unable to fully embrace authoritarianism – or to build a functioning democracy.

One obstacle to full authoritarian rule is social media. It has reduced the state’s grip on what information is shared, who shares it and what voices are heard. The government has lost the ability to silence critics and dictate what it wants the country to believe.

To appease the international community Mozambique has maintained a democratic posture. But the country hasn’t been able to build a strong democratic state. It’s prevented by the entrenched power of the political, economic and military elites through Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), the ruling party. Frelimo has dominated since the country’s independence in 1975.

The result is cycles of violence and political instability.

These cycles will continue unless Mozambique undertakes sweeping economic and political reforms. These would need to include the decentralisation of power, dismantling the Frelimo-linked patronage networks that control the economy, establishment of an independent judiciary, and fairer political competition.

It is unclear whether the newly inaugurated President Daniel Chapo will dare to ignite these reforms.

Why authoritarianism hasn’t worked

For much of its post-independence history, Mozambique was governed by an authoritarian regime under the single rule of Frelimo. Frelimo came to power in 1975 after leading the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule.

In the 1990s, the country adopted multiparty democracy and a new constitution. The constitution established universal suffrage and periodic elections for the presidency and legislature. It also guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life and protection from torture.

But Frelimo maintained its hold on power. The party did this through political repression, manipulation of electoral processes and patronage systems.

The political landscape has changed in the last decade, however. It’s more difficult for the state to maintain – or expand – its authoritarian grip.

Authoritarian regimes control opposition and dissent, but the state’s capacity to do this is diminishing.

Social media and digital communication tools have made it difficult to suppress ideas. Historically the government relied on state-controlled media to control the narrative and censor opposing views.

Smartphones and social media platforms have revolutionised the way information circulates. For instance, news about election irregularities, corruption and violence spreads fast. It often outpaces state censorship.

The ongoing protests after the 2024 elections are a testament to this. While the government has deployed forces to quell dissent, the scale of the protests and the speed at which they spread demonstrate the power of social media. Mozambicans have a platform to build alternative narratives, mobilise and resist.

Retaining international support

Another factor constraining the state has been the need to retain international support. This means maintaining the outward appearance of a democratic system. Mozambique’s economy is highly dependent on external assistance, particularly from western countries and international financial institutions.

Government officials are aware that they could lose foreign aid and investment if the democratic process is abandoned. This would deepen the country’s economic crisis and Frelimo’s challenges.

The withdrawal of aid in 2016 following the hidden debt scandal is evidence of donors’ leverage over Mozambique. Three Mozambican state-owned companies took loans from western donors for national projects that never materialised. As a result of aid suspension, Mozambique was forced to arrest prominent individuals. They included the former head of the secret services and the son of former president Armando Guebuza.

Democracy still a pipe dream

Frelimo’s widespread control has made it resistant to meaningful political change. A genuine democracy would require dismantling these entrenched structures of power.

Frelimo has protected the political and economic elites who benefit from its dominance. The party has kept its grip on power through a combination of patronage networks, corruption and control over key sectors of the economy. These elites include business people, military leaders and government officials. All are deeply invested in maintaining the status quo.

A genuine democracy, in which opposition parties could freely compete and challenge Frelimo’s monopoly on power, would threaten their interests.

The party has shown time and again that it is willing to manipulate the electoral process, use violence and stifle opposition to maintain its hold on power.

Elections are held regularly. Seven general elections have been held since the inception of multiparty democracy constitution. But they often lack transparency and fairness.

What needs to be done

Reforms are needed to break up patronage networks and redistribute power and resources. Frelimo’s leadership has shown little interest in doing this. It would jeopardise their control over state resources and the wealth they’ve accumulated over decades.

Mozambique’s political economy further complicates the prospects for democracy. Frelimo-linked elites dominate key sectors, such as natural gas, mining and agriculture, and benefit from favourable policies, state contracts and access to state-owned enterprises.

These economic interests are deeply intertwined with the party’s political power. It’s unlikely, therefore, that the elite will willingly relinquish control.

– Mozambique’s cycles of violence won’t end until Frelimo’s grip on power is broken
– https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-cycles-of-violence-wont-end-until-frelimos-grip-on-power-is-broken-247575

January 21, 2025

Kenya’s farmers have lots of digital tools to help boost productivity – how they can be made more effective

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Evelyne Njuguna, Doctoral Reseacher in Agricultural Economics, University of Hohenheim

Digital agriculture is often hailed as an almost magical trigger for promoting successful farming, even among smallholder farmers in the developing world.

Its proponents argue that using digital tools to, for instance, generate records and calendar schedules, can help farmers grow better crops, manage their resources more efficiently, and connect with organised markets, all while reducing post-harvest losses.

But not all researchers are convinced that digital solutions are the answer to farmers’ problems. Some argue that the hype around these tools diverts attention from the real, on-the-ground challenges farmers face.

One Kenyan avocado farmer, speaking to a researcher in 2021, said: “We don’t need another app.” Rather, he said: “Crates! We need crates to avoid our avocados getting smashed on the way to the buyer.”

Kenya has become a particularly ripe market for digital agriculture tools. The country, one of Africa’s major technology hubs, has been labelled the “Silicon Savannah”. Eighty percent of its approximately 4.5 million smallholder farmers own mobile phones and operate within Kenya’s well established mobile money ecosystem.

We are researchers in agricultural economics. In a recent study we examined Kenya’s digital agriculture landscape to see what solutions were available and whether these were addressing farmers’ real challenges.

We took an inventory of all the digital agriculture tools listed in Google’s Play Store, assessing the technology and services offered by these tools with information from their own homepages. Some are phone apps; others are innovations whose hardware can be mounted onto farm machinery or are standalone gadgets like handheld scanners. We also studied peer-reviewed articles and reports to see where such tools had documented impacts, with a particular focus on Kenya.

We found that, over the past decade, the number of digital tools available to smallholder farmers has greatly increased. These tools have, as documented in the literature we reviewed, helped farmers (in Kenya and elsewhere) improve their knowledge, access markets, and boosting productivity and income.

However, better integration of digital solutions with traditional farming practices is crucial. Field experts must support farmers in applying digital advice and provide hands-on guidance. Additionally, combining these solutions with local knowledge, cultural practices and market development will make them more effective and beneficial for farmers.

What tools are available to farmers?

Investing in agriculture is one of the fastest and most effective ways to reduce poverty, ensure food security, and transform the economies of developing countries’ rural areas.

But in Kenya, as in many other African countries, farmers struggle with low agricultural productivity. It is up to five times lower than the global average.

One of the reasons is limited agricultural services, such as extension services. These services offer technical advice and support and help farmers to access the inputs they need for production, like fertilisers and seeds. In Kenya, there is only one extension agent per 1,200 farmers. Farmers struggle to access high quality seeds and fertilisers.

Many digital agriculture tools promise to resolve these issues.

In our study we found that the number of digital tools available to farmers in Kenya had tripled over the past decade, from 17 in 2013 to 52 in 2023.

The development of these tools surged in 2016 but has slowed down recently. This may be due to market saturation and a focus on improving existing tools. There’s a shift from tools that offer general farming information (which could also be found in text books or advisory material) to “farm-specific” tools. These provided personalised advice based on farm or livestock-specific data that farmers either entered manually or was collected digitally by sensors.

Some examples of apps include iShamba, which provides information and enables learning for farmers, and the AgroCares Scanner, offering advice on soil health based on farm-specific testing. Another is DigiFarm, which connects farmers with financial services.

Most of these tools are developed by private companies, though some work with public extension services. Many are designed for farmers with smartphones. Others rely on feature phones or use intermediaries to connect less tech-savvy farmers with the services they need.

How do digital tools address farmers’ challenges?

The literature review part of the study allowed us to identify several ways digital solutions can and do help farmers in Kenya.

However, digital agriculture tools’ effect on food security and the environment remains unclear.

What is missing?

The effectiveness of farm-specific solutions depends on accurate and reliable data. Challenges like limited access to smartphones and data, as well as digital literacy, must be addressed.

We also found that few tools explicitly target sustainable practices or offer climate adaptation solutions. Integrating metrics like water use efficiency and soil health into digital platforms can help farmers make eco-friendly decisions, and adapt to weather related risks. Governments and agencies could incentivise such climate-resilient practices through digital platforms.

There are also gaps in understanding the long-term effects of digital tools on farm productivity, food security and environmental sustainability.

Finally, comprehensive and rigorous evaluations are needed to understand the full effect of these tools: their usability, affordability, and how easy it is to integrate them with existing farming practices.

– Kenya’s farmers have lots of digital tools to help boost productivity – how they can be made more effective
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-farmers-have-lots-of-digital-tools-to-help-boost-productivity-how-they-can-be-made-more-effective-246690

January 20, 2025

Ethiopian earthquakes and volcanic eruptions: earth scientist explains the link

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Amdemichael Tadesse, Fondation Wiener-Anspach Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Earth Sciences, University of Oxford

Ethiopia’s Afar and Oromia regions have been hit by several earthquakes and tremors since the beginning of 2025. The strongest, with a magnitude of 5.7, struck on 4 January. The US Geological Survey and the German Research Centre for Geosciences reported that its epicentre was 142km east of the capital, Addis Ababa, which is in the Oromia region. It came just a day after a quake with a magnitude of 5.5 hit the same area. Two more quakes were reported over the weekend of 11 January.

The Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Council is relocating around 60,000 residents in the two regions to temporary shelters because of the risk of further earthquakes.

The earthquakes have also sparked fears of volcanic eruptions because they are happening near two active volcanoes, Fentale and Dofen. The Conversation Africa asked volcano researcher Amdemichael Tadesse to explain what’s happening below the earth’s surface.

How common is it for quakes in Ethiopia to trigger volcanic eruptions?

Earthquakes and volcanic activity are both common in Ethiopia. The country is located in a geologically active region, the East African Rift System. But it’s rare for earthquakes to directly trigger volcanic eruptions in Ethiopia.

The current episode of earthquake activity is being caused by magmatic activity in Oromia and Afar region. Magma (molten rock) is intruding into the subsurface beneath two volcanoes, Fentale and Dofen, which are geographically close to each other.

Ethiopia has around 50 active volcanoes. Most are in the Ethiopian Rift, the northern segment of the East African Rift System. An active volcano has magma stored deep within its crust that could potentially erupt in the future. There’s evidence of past eruptions at many of these active volcanoes. Some date back hundreds of years. In contrast, a dormant volcano has not erupted for thousands of years and shows no immediate signs of reactivation or imminent eruption.

Why have the earthquakes sparked fears of volcanic eruptions?

Volcanoes and earthquakes are both natural phenomena driven by the dynamic processes that shape Earth’s interior and surface.

The outermost layer of Earth, the lithosphere, is composed of solid rock and is broken into large sections called tectonic plates. These plates fit together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They move slowly on the more fluid layer beneath them, the asthenosphere. Convection currents in Earth’s mantle drive the movement of tectonic plates.

Tectonic plates interact at their boundaries in three primary ways: they move apart, collide, or slide past one another. These interactions produce geological activity, including earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Most volcanoes and earthquakes occur along these plate boundaries, where the stress and movement of the plates cause the lithosphere to fracture.

A satellite view of Fentale Volcano, a dormant volcano located in Oromia, Ethiopia near Lake Basaka, which has recently experienced minor earthquakes. Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2025

Many processes associated with volcanoes can generate earthquakes. This makes seismic (earth-shaking) activity a common feature of volcanic regions. Unlike pure tectonic earthquakes, seismicity at volcanoes often occurs in swarms. They can take place over periods of days to months or even years. These volcano-related earthquakes are often caused by ground fracturing and the displacement of rock due to the movement of magma beneath the surface. Magma rising from deep within Earth puts pressure on the surrounding rocks. That causes them to crack and release seismic waves. It’s this process that’s currently being observed in the Fentale-Dofen region – magmatic activity is generating sustained seismic activity.

What can be done to mitigate the risks of volcanic eruptions now and in future?

Volcanic eruptions and earthquakes pose risks to human lives, infrastructure and the environment.

These events cannot be prevented. But their effects can be mitigated by planning and acting ahead of time.

Monitoring and early warning systems are critical. The current magma intrusion I’ve described is being tracked by satellite remote sensing observations and seismic data from Ethiopia’s national and international seismic networks. The instruments being used help to detect changes in seismic activity, and ground deformation, which often come before volcanic eruptions.

This data, as well as evidence gathered by studying past earthquake and volcanic events (from either historical records or geological records) can help scientists to understand how often they occur, and at what kind of magnitudes and sizes.

Detailed maps that identify areas at risk are essential. These maps guide urban planning, infrastructure development and evacuation strategies. Identifying critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools and water supplies, in high-risk zones makes it possible to prepare.

It is also crucial to establish efficient and trustworthy communication between scientists involved in managing the crisis, the authorities making decisions, and the general public.

Early warnings and clear communication protocols must be established to get information quickly to affected populations. Alerts can be delivered through different means like mobile apps, SMS, radio and public announcements. In Ethiopia, mainstream media and public announcements have been used in the past to convey critical information. Using modern technologies like mobile platforms and localised SMS-based systems could make the crisis communication even more efficient.

Community preparedness and education are important, too. Regular training and drills help individuals, schools and workplaces prepare for volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. In Ethiopia, the Disaster Risk Management Commission is supposed to operate preparedness systems across the country, but more can be learnt from global best practices. Japan, for instance, has developed a robust disaster preparedness culture that has reduced the impacts of natural hazards. This includes routine drills, widespread education programmes, and active community engagement.

Educating communities about the signs of volcanic activity, evacuation routes and emergency protocols empowers them to act quickly and appropriately.

Governments and aid organisations should maintain reserves of emergency supplies, such as food, water, medical kits and shelter materials, to meet the immediate needs of people affected by natural disasters.

Specialised response teams with expertise in volcanology, seismology and disaster management can take swift and coordinated action during emergencies.

This is by no means an exhaustive list. Stronger infrastructure and better long-term planning for land use are also key. Taking these measures can greatly reduce the harm that volcanic eruptions and earthquake-related activities can cause.

– Ethiopian earthquakes and volcanic eruptions: earth scientist explains the link
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopian-earthquakes-and-volcanic-eruptions-earth-scientist-explains-the-link-247245

January 19, 2025

South Africa in 2025: 8 key factors that will shape the future and test the government

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State

South Africa’s political and economic landscape shifted significantly after the 2024 national elections. The ruling ANC’s dramatic loss of support resulted in a government of national unity – a pivotal moment in the country’s political history.

It is still too early to assess the unity government’s success. But it signifies an effort by political parties to agree on the values and principles that should guide behaviour and decision-making in the national government.

The unity government presents new possibilities for South Africa. In the words of President Cyril Ramaphosa:

to work together as political parties for the good of the country, and to deliver a government that will be united in action and purpose.

However, a key question remains: will it hold? The question arises because the unity government demands that its constituent parties cooperate, even though their respective constituencies may want different things.

Certain issues will put pressure on the coalition. Consequently, the unity government raises uncertainties about the country’s political stability and direction. Particularly given the coalition’s heavy reliance on President Cyril Ramaphosa’s facilitating leadership.

As a political science researcher, I have studied South Africa’s political landscape for the past two decades, and analysed its political risk.

Here I outline eight key factors – among others – that will shape the country’s short and medium term trajectory and test the strength of its unity government.

Depth of democracy

It was necessary to form the unity government to stabilise governance. But its durability is uncertain. The coalition’s middle ground may be strained as conflicting priorities arise among its members. Key are ideological differences over National Health Insurance and conflicting foreign policy issues.

At the same time, legitimacy and confidence in governance need to be restored. Voter turnout has declined – from 89% in 1999 to 58% in 2024.

If this democracy experiment fails, it could dent the confidence of voters and business. Forming the unity government improved business confidence to “cautious optimism”.

Incumbency and succession

Divisions in the ANC continue to threaten its unity. These were highlighted at the party’s 2017 elective conference. Ramaphosa narrowly secured re-election as ANC president, exposing serious rifts within the party. These internal divisions cast uncertainty over Ramaphosa’s effective leadership of his party. His successor might affect the ANC’s future role in the unity government.

The ANC’s national elective conference in 2027 will set the party’s direction and mark the end of Ramaphosa’s leadership.

Early jostling for positions in the ANC has begun, amid ideological differences over the future of the party, the unity government and the country.

Trust in government

Public confidence in government institutions has eroded since 1994, particularly at the municipal level. Protests at the poor – or lack of – delivery of basic services, including water and sanitation, are pervasive. Violent protests reflect growing dissatisfaction.

Declining trust in parliament and other governmental bodies – starting during former president Jacob Zuma’s term (2009-2018) – is a major concern.

Much of the electorate feels that voting changes nothing.

It’s uncertain whether the unity government can boost public confidence and trust.

Disparities and unemployment

Stark wealth disparities and unemployment exceeding 30% add to societal tensions. Youth unemployment is even higher.

The risk of large-scale political unrest has decreased since democracy in 1994. But frustration among the poor, unemployed and marginalised still carries the risk of sporadic riots and instability.

The violent protests in July 2021, mainly in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, are a reminder. The underlying factors for over 300 fatalities, looting and destruction stemmed from the state’s failure to address poverty.

The unity government needs to power economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty.

Safety and security

Safety and security rank among South Africa’s most pressing issues. Crime rates remain alarmingly high, including organised crime and violence.

Trust in police is low, fuelling growth in the private security sector. There are now over 2.7 million registered private security officers and 150,000 police officers.

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership is key to the success of the unity government. GCIS via Flcker

The “oldest and simplest justification” for government is to protect citizens from crime and violence.

The unity government must restore public trust in the police and enhance security.

Economic sentiment

Despite the country’s numerous challenges, the economy attracted nearly R100 billion (US$5.3 billion) in foreign direct investment inflows in 2023, equivalent to 1.4% of GDP.

Against expectations, inflows have exceeded outflows every year since the 2008/9 global financial crisis.

The country offers several advantages to foreign investors. These include world-class financial services and communication sectors, robust capital markets, quality tertiary institutions and a transparent legal framework.

It also has abundant natural resources, a strategic geographic position as a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa, and a degree of political and policy stability.

Crime remains perhaps the greatest deterrent for potential tourists. It’s also a pressing concern for business leaders.

Addressing crime must thus be among the top priorities of the unity government.

Government competence

Poor governance and a crisis of competence plague public administration, particularly at the local level. Service delivery failures, such as water provision, stem from inadequate skills and from corruption and maladministration.

State-owned enterprises also pose governance challenges. Eskom, the power utility, seems to be turning around. However, the Post Office, Transnet – the transport utility – and others exemplify systemic inefficiencies and corruption.

The July 2021 unrest underscored the state’s institutional weaknesses. The report on the riots stated that inadequate service delivery, bad living conditions, economic challenges and persistent poverty created fertile ground for unrest.

The unity government must foster a professional and effective public service that delivers tangible improvements.

Regional landscape

South Africa is not threatened by any neighbours. However, illegal migration has become a major cause for concern since the economic crisis in Zimbabwe began in the 1990s. Perceptions are growing that migrants are overwhelming the resources of the country, and take jobs from South Africans and engage in crime.

The presence of illegal miners, many from impoverished neighbouring nations, heightens social tensions.

The jihadist conflict in Mozambique and current political instability there pose regional security concerns for South Africa.

The country was recently forced to shut its primary border crossing with Mozambique, a hub for coal and chrome exports, amid the latter’s election-related protests. Addressing these regional dynamics requires a strong foreign policy stance and robust measures to pursue peace in Mozambique.

– South Africa in 2025: 8 key factors that will shape the future and test the government
– https://theconversation.com/south-africa-in-2025-8-key-factors-that-will-shape-the-future-and-test-the-government-247379

January 19, 2025

Heart attacks and high blood pressure are on the rise in Africa – what does air pollution have to do with it?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marvellous Adeoye, Global health researcher, University of Essex

Air pollution has an alarming effect on global health. In 2019, it was responsible for 4.2 million global deaths. Inhaling air pollution harms health in many different ways beyond simply having effects on the lungs. Over 70% of air pollution deaths are due to cardiovascular diseases – diseases of the heart and blood vessels, such as heart attacks and strokes.

For many years, cardiovascular diseases were considered to be more of a problem of more prosperous countries, but this is not the case anymore.

In Africa cardiovascular diseases are now the second leading cause of death after respiratory infections and tuberculosis. The numbers of cardiovascular deaths are much higher in low-income countries where access to diagnosis and treatment is limited by resources available. But where does air pollution fit in?

Scientists Marvellous Adeoye, Mariachiara Di Cesare and Mark Miller explain what is known and what isn’t about air pollution and cardiovascular health in Africa.

How big is the burden of cardiovascular deaths in Africa?

While infectious diseases remain a major concern in Africa, cardiovascular disease cases are increasing, especially in urban areas. Between 1990 and 2019 cardiovascular diseases jumped from being the 6th leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa to the 2nd highest. The most recent figures show that in the same period the number of cardiovascular deaths in the region has increased from 650,000 to 1.2 million.

Factors contributing to the increase in cardiovascular deaths include changes in lifestyle, a shift to living in urban settings, and a growing and increasingly older population.

An additional problem is that the region is not ready to address the increasing numbers of cardiovascular cases. Africa is experiencing a dramatic shortage of cardiovascular specialists. In 2018 the region had only around 2,000 cardiologists for the entire continent of 1.2 billion people.

How bad is air pollution in Africa?

While air pollution is now beginning to decline at a global level, there are huge regional variations, with air quality still deteriorating in many low- and middle-income countries, including countries in Africa.

Estimates of levels of air pollution show that they are high in Africa and getting worse, especially in urban areas. Levels of air pollution are, on average, three times higher than those observed in high-income regions such as Europe. Overall, 60% of African countries experienced an increase in airborne pollution particles between 2010 and 2019.

Common sources of air pollution in Africa include vehicle emissions and industrial activities, as well as the burning of agricultural waste after harvesting. The use of solid fuels in homes like wood, charcoal and dried animal dung also releases pollutants into the atmosphere.

This mixture of air pollution can generate a range of air pollutants which can affect health in different ways. Pollutants include airborne particles of various sizes, and gases such as nitrogen dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide.

What’s missing?

Research in other regions of the world clearly shows that air pollution has an impact on cardiovascular health. However, the evidence from Africa is limited due to both a lack of air quality data – just 24 of the 54 African nations are set up to measure air quality in some capacity – and studies that look at the health consequences.

Our research found only six academic studies exploring the impact of air pollution on cardiovascular diseases in the region. The majority focus on urban populations in South Africa.

This makes it difficult to determine the health impact of air pollution across Africa as a whole.

Still, our review identified studies showing clear associations between several air pollutants and increased cardiovascular hospitalisations and death.

What needs to be done?

There is a critical need to expand air quality monitoring across the continent, and then to use this data to assess the links between different air pollutants and cardiovascular disease.

We need data from different countries in Africa and both urban and rural locations. This will enable policymakers to target regulations and public health interventions.

Public health education is also essential to raise awareness about lifestyle risk factors and the health impacts of air pollution. It will allow individuals to take steps to reduce their exposure and improve their cardiovascular health.

– Heart attacks and high blood pressure are on the rise in Africa – what does air pollution have to do with it?
– https://theconversation.com/heart-attacks-and-high-blood-pressure-are-on-the-rise-in-africa-what-does-air-pollution-have-to-do-with-it-243816

January 19, 2025

Films can change the world – why universities and film schools should teach impact strategies

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Liani Maasdorp, Senior lecturer in Screen Production and Film and Television Studies, University of Cape Town

When was the last time a film changed the way you saw the world? Or the way you behaved?

Miners Shot Down (2014) countered mainstream media narratives to reveal how striking mine workers were gunned down by police at Marikana in South Africa. Black Fish (2013) made US theme park SeaWorld’s stock prices plummet. And Virunga (2014) stopped the British oil company Soco International from mining in the Congolese national park from which the film takes its name.

These films were all at the centre of impact campaigns designed to move people to act. In filmmaking, “impact” may involve bringing people together around important issues. It could also lead to people changing their minds or behaviour. It might change lives or policies.

Impact is achieved not just by a film’s own power to make people aware of and care about an issue. It requires thinking strategically about how to channel that emotion into meaningful and measurable change.

Although it is a growing field, for which there are numerous funding opportunities, impact producing is seldom taught at film schools or in university film programmes. Teaching tends to be ad hoc or superficial.

As scholars who study and teach film, we wanted to know more about where and how people are learning about impact producing; the benefits of learning – and teaching – impact production; and the barriers that prevent emerging filmmakers and film students in Africa and the rest of the majority world from learning this discipline. (Also called the “global south” or the “developing world”, majority world is a term used to challenge the idea that the west is the centre of the world.)

So, for a recent article in Film Education Journal, we conducted desk research, a survey shared with the members of the Global Impact Producers Alliance and interviews with a sample of stakeholders, selected based on their knowledge of teaching impact or experience of learning about it.

We found that there are university and college courses that focus on social issue filmmaking, but hardly any that prioritise social impact distribution. Access to free in-person training is highly competitive, generally requiring a film in production. We also found that free online resources – though numerous – can be overwhelming to those new to the field. And the majority of the courses, labs and resources available have been created in the west.

We believe it is important for film students and emerging filmmakers to know at least the basics of impact producing, for a range of reasons. Film is a powerful tool that can be used to influence audience beliefs and behaviour. Students need to know how they are being influenced by the media – and also how they can use it to advance causes that make the world more just and sustainable. The skills are transferable to other story forms, which empowers students to work in different contexts, in both the commercial and independent film sectors. It can benefit a student’s career progression and future job prospects.

Existing opportunities

We found that current impact learning opportunities range in depth and accessibility.

Many webinars, masterclasses and short one-off training opportunities are freely available online. But some are not recorded: you have to be there in person. Many form part of film festivals and film market programmes, which charge registration fees.

Impact “labs” are on offer around the world. They usually run for less than a week and are offered by different organisations, often in collaboration with Doc Society (the leading proponent of impact production worldwide). Although they are almost all free of charge, the barrier to entry is high: they are aimed at filmmakers with social impact films already in the making.

We found that the postgraduate programmes (MA and PhD) most aligned with this field are offered by a health sciences university in the US, Saybrook Univerity, and are very expensive.

African content, global reach

In our journal article we presented two impact learning opportunities from the majority world as case studies. One, the Aflamuna Fellowship, is an eight-month in-person programme based in Beirut, Lebanon. It combines theoretical learning, “job shadowing” on existing impact campaigns, and in-service learning through designing and running impact campaigns for new films. This programme has proven very helpful to filmmakers approaching topics that are particularly sensitive within the Middle East and north Africa regions, such as LGBTQ+ rights.

The other, the UCT/Sunshine Cinema Film Screening Impact Facilitator short course, is based in South Africa but is hosted entirely online. It was developed by the University of Cape Town Centre for Film and Media Studies and the mobile cinema distribution NGO Sunshine Cinema and launched in 2021. We are both connected to it – one as course convenor (Maasdorp) and the other (Loader) as one of the 2023 alumni.

Self-directed learning (including learning videos, prescribed films, readings and case studies) is followed by discussions with peers in small groups and live online classes with filmmakers, movement builders and impact strategists. The final course assignment is to plan, market, host and report on a film screening and facilitate an issue-centred discussion with the audience. Topics addressed by students in these impact screenings are diverse, ranging from voter rights, to addiction, to climate change, to gender-based violence.

Both case studies offer powerful good practice models in impact education. Projects developed as part of these programmes go on to be successful examples of impact productions within the industry. The documentary Lobola, A Bride’s True Price? (2022, directed by Sihle Hlophe), for instance, got wide reaching festival acclaim, walking away with several prizes across Africa. Both programmes combine theoretical learning; discussion of case studies relevant to the local context; engagements with experienced impact workers; and application of the learning in practice.

It is clear from this study that there is a hunger for more structured impact learning opportunities globally, and for local, context specific case studies from around the world.

– Films can change the world – why universities and film schools should teach impact strategies
– https://theconversation.com/films-can-change-the-world-why-universities-and-film-schools-should-teach-impact-strategies-242043

January 17, 2025

Tanzania’s Maasai are being forced off their ancestral land – the tactics the government uses

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Teklehaymanot G. Weldemichel, Lecturer in Environment and Development, University of Manchester

Tanzania has a long and troubling history of evicting communities from their lands. This has happened under the guise of expanding protected conservation areas, which make up over 40% of its territory.

In recent years, the Maasai of the Ngorongoro district – a region renowned for abundant wildlife and the iconic Ngorongoro Crater – have been the target of these evictions. They’ve faced threats to their nomadic lifestyle, centred on cattle herding.

The government claims the evictions are necessary to protect the environment from a large Maasai population. Currently, around 100,000 Maasai reside within the protected area.

The reality, however, is that the right of the Maasai to use that land is being taken away by the government. The land is then leased to expand lucrative wildlife tourism and elite hunting grounds. Tourism, mostly driven by wildlife, constitutes over 17% of the country’s GDP.

The evictions have become more frequent, more violent and more widespread under Samia Suluhu Hassan, who assumed the presidency in 2021. Over the past few years, Maasai have been shot, detained and abused by government forces. This has sparked an outcry from local communities, activists and academics.

Members of the Maa unity agenda protest in Nairobi, condemning the forceful eviction of the Loliondo Ngorongoro Maa community by the Tanzanian government, on 17 June 2022. Photo by TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images

Among these voices is Maria Tsehai, a prominent Tanzanian activist who was recently abducted, and then released, in Nairobi, Kenya. Her abduction – likely part of the broader crackdown against Tanzanian government critics – has drawn attention to the repression of those opposing policies to relocate Maasai communities.

I have over several years researched conservation policies and practices in east Africa, including Tanzania.

In a paper published in 2022, I unpacked the ways in which the Tanzanian authorities, in collaboration with global conservation and tourism actors, have implemented policies forcing Maasai communities to abandon their ancestral lands. This was done through conservation management plans that undermine the interests of local communities and traditional livelihoods. The ability of the Maasai to meet their needs was also limited, for instance through restricting their access to social services.

As a result, nearly all the 100,000 Maasai living within the Ngorongoro conservation area face extreme poverty.

This impoverishment is being used to justify evicting them from ancestral lands.

Evictions for ‘conservation’

When the Ngorongoro Conservation Area was established in the late 1950s, it was meant to both conserve wildlife and safeguard the interests of the Maasai. At that time it was home to about 8,000 people.

Over time, successive policies neglected and deliberately undermined the interests of the Maasai community. This has been happening for more than six decades.

Since 2022, local media have reported that about 9,778 people have relocated from the conservation area. But the intention is for most to eventually be removed.

International conservation organisations – such as Frankfurt Zoological Society and Unesco (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) – have played a part in this. They provided narratives that enabled the Tanzanian government to justify its violation of Maasai rights within the conservation area.

The former director of the Frankfurt Zoological Society, Bernhard Grzimek, in particular, advocated for the removal of the Maasai since the early days of the conservation area’s establishment.

In assessment reports, Unesco’s World Heritage Committee similarly requested the Tanzanian authorities to “voluntarily” relocate residents by “increasing incentives to relocate”. This is because the conservation area is a world heritage site.

Tourism actors are also complicit in the evictions. For them the Maasai may be seen as an inconvenience or competitors for resources, such as water.

Removal strategies

Various policies push the Maasai to relocate.

First, while local communities are allowed to live in the conservation area, this was made legally contingent on their strict adherence to nomadic pastoralism. Pastoralist lifestyles are considered compatible with wildlife conservation. This means Maasai can remain in the area only as livestock producers, reliant on seasonal migration. Permanent settlements are largely prohibited. These conditions restrict the Maasai from diversifying their livelihoods beyond livestock production.

Second, though authorities advocate for traditional pastoralism, they simultaneously undermine it. Through laws, mobility is restricted; for instance they can only graze in certain areas. Access to critical dry-season grazing areas and water points is limited. These are fundamental requirements for nomadic pastoralism. As a result, the productivity of pastoralism has drastically declined.

Third, the Maasai communities in the conservation area have, for a long time, been deprived of social services. This includes education and health. Investments by both the state and other actors in social infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, are also prevented.

The impoverishment that the Maasai face as a result of these policies is being used as a justification for their eviction. More than 80% of the population lives under the poverty line and nearly 74% of the population have no formal education. Authorities claim that resettlement is in the Maasai’s best interest.

These tactics have thus made the Maasai more vulnerable to displacement and their land easier to appropriate. Marginalised and impoverished, many Maasai either relocate on their own or are coerced into “voluntary” resettlement.

Conservation-related injustices

The ongoing dispossession and abuse of the Maasai, and other communities in Tanzania, raises urgent questions about global conservation agendas, state power and local community rights.

This is not unique to the Ngorongoro conservation area or Tanzania. Similar land grabs and evictions of marginalised communities, under the guise of nature protection, are occurring in many places across the world. As global alarm over biodiversity loss intensifies, the drive to expand protected areas has gained momentum.

However, such conservation efforts often mask power dynamics that result in the dispossession of vulnerable populations. It is vital to scrutinise how these policies are implemented at the local level.

Without accountability and genuine inclusion of local communities, such initiatives risk perpetuating the very inequalities and biodiversity loss that they claim to address.

– Tanzania’s Maasai are being forced off their ancestral land – the tactics the government uses
– https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-maasai-are-being-forced-off-their-ancestral-land-the-tactics-the-government-uses-247349

January 17, 2025

African countries need more PhD graduates but students are held back by a lack of money and support

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Oluwatomilayo Omoya, Lecturer in Nursing (Teaching and Reseach), Flinders University

Over the past 15 years there’s been an increasing demand from within and outside the higher education sector for African countries to produce more PhD graduates. For this to happen, it’s important to know what’s holding people back from pursuing or completing their doctoral degrees. The authors of a new review article did just that, with a focus on South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria. Five themes emerged from their work: PhD candidates’ sociodemographic profiles, access to funding, the availability of resources and training, experiences with PhD supervisors, and personal coping mechanisms.

The Conversation Africa spoke with the paper’s authors, Oluwatomilayo Omoya, Udeme Samuel Jacob, Olumide A. Odeyemi and Omowale A. Odeyemi, to learn more about their findings.

Why is it important for African countries to produce PhD graduates?

PhD programmes have been shown to play a crucial role in advancing research, innovation, and economic and scientific progress.

That’s because the more research capacity a country has, the more likely it will be able to address gaps in healthcare, economic barriers and food insecurity. This point has been emphasised by, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Union.

Doctoral education builds academic expertise. This drives growth across multiple sectors, such as health, education and technology. It also fosters an environment where creative and practical solutions to local challenges can thrive.

What are some of the main obstacles PhD students faced in the countries you studied?

Our study was a scoping review. This research method allowed us to broadly survey existing studies and identify key concepts, evidence types and knowledge gaps. The review included articles from different African countries, among them South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria.

One of the biggest hurdles we identified for PhD students is a lack of resources. Many of the continent’s universities are underfunded. They struggle to offer their staff and students adequate research facilities, libraries and even internet access.

Another major challenge is the shortage of quality doctoral supervision. In many African universities, the number of qualified supervisors is far lower than the number of doctoral candidates. This imbalance means that some students receive little attention. Their progress may suffer as a result.

A PhD is, by nature, a solitary pursuit. But without the proper support, students can feel disconnected from the academic community. This sense of isolation can increase dropout rates and hinder the completion of research projects.

Supervisors are frequently overwhelmed with other responsibilities – their own research, administrative duties, or teaching large undergraduate classes. This leaves them with limited time to mentor PhD students. The students they’re tasked with supervising can end up feeling isolated.

Personal funding is also hard to come by. Scholarships are rare and, when they are available, they don’t always cover all the student’s expenses over the course of their research. Many students must work full-time jobs to support themselves while pursuing their doctorate. This can severely affect their ability to dedicate time to their studies.

Even in cases where funding is available, it’s often linked to short-term projects or grants that don’t allow students to finish their research without interruption. This leads to long delays in graduation rates, which creates a bottleneck effect: students remain stuck in the system for years, clogging the flow of new researchers entering academia.

Another challenge is that African doctoral students who do succeed may leave their home countries for better opportunities abroad. The so-called “brain drain” phenomenon has a profound effect on Africa’s ability to build a strong academic community. While many African PhD students go on to do groundbreaking research in Europe, North America or Asia, their departure means their home institutions – and countries – lose valuable knowledge and experience.

Brain drain is not just about better salaries or living conditions; it’s also about the availability of cutting-edge research opportunities. Once abroad, many students are able to access better resources and then choose to stay in environments that allow them to thrive professionally.

What role does gender play in the likelihood of completing a PhD?

Women pursuing PhDs face additional challenges that their male peers do not. We found that women PhD students frequently face gender biases, both socially and professionally, that make it harder to fulfil their academic goals.

Over the past decade, the number of women enrolling in PhD training in some countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, has increased.

However, women are less likely than men to complete their doctoral studies, partly because of the cultural expectations and responsibilities they bear. Female students who are married or have children must often balance managing their households and care-giving responsibilities with pursuing their studies.

In regions where family is traditionally prioritised over career aspirations, women may feel an added layer of guilt or societal pressure, which can lessen the time they have to focus on research.

Moreover, in areas where colonial or apartheid legacies still influence societal structures, Black women in particular report additional barriers. They say they feel overlooked or underestimated in academic spaces.

There has been some progress. Organisations like the Consortium for Advanced Research Training in Africa (Carta) offer programmes that support women throughout their academic journeys. However, a greater, gender-responsive approach is needed to ensure that women have access to resources, mentorship and flexible support systems that address these unique challenges.

Increasing support for women in PhD programmes isn’t just about numbers. It means institutions and the wider society must address the structural and cultural barriers that hold women back.

Are there solutions to the issues you’ve identified?

The challenges facing doctoral students in Africa are complex, but not impossible to overcome.

With the right investments and a commitment to reform, universities on the continent can grow into global centres of excellence in research and development. It’s vital for societies not to lose sight of the importance of higher education. As we’ve said, and as a large body of evidence shows, strong doctoral training programmes and investing in research and innovation to address the challenges faced by the African continent are key to ensuring that the next generation of researchers and innovators can lead the way in solving some of the world’s most pressing problems.

Governments, universities and funding organisations can collaborate by providing scholarships and research grants, creating gender equality policies, and introducing mentorship programmes or improving those that already exist.

– African countries need more PhD graduates but students are held back by a lack of money and support
– https://theconversation.com/african-countries-need-more-phd-graduates-but-students-are-held-back-by-a-lack-of-money-and-support-243946

January 15, 2025

Peacekeeping armies: what are they, why do African states build them and what impact do they have?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nina Wilén, Associate Professor, Lund University

Since 1948, more than two million uniformed peacekeepers have served in over 70 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions.

They have come from over 120 UN member states. But, a few countries have regularly contributed a significant proportion of their troops. They have also made peacekeeping a foreign policy priority, and adapted their armed forces to fit UN requirements. These states have developed what we call “peacekeeping armies”.

Since the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of these peacekeepers have been deployed in Africa. Many of them by African countries. Today, 11 of the top 20 countries that contribute to UN peacekeepers are African. African states also provide soldiers for operations authorised by the African Union and other African regional organisations.

Why do these countries contribute so many peacekeeping troops so regularly? How do they do it consistently? What are the consequences for the individual soldiers, the military organisations, and the wider practice of peacekeeping? Answering these questions requires a deeper analysis.

In our recent research, we analysed 70 troop-contributing countries. We looked at patterns of troop deployments in peace operations and official security documents.

As debates continue over whether and how to deploy new peace operations in places like Haiti, Sudan, and Gaza, the world should look to states that have explicitly designed their military to perform peacekeeping tasks. It must also reflect on the implications this could have for the development of future operations.

What is a peacekeeping army?

We define a “peacekeeping army” as one that has undertaken institutional reforms to regularly perform the military functions of peacekeeping at a relatively large scale compared to the size of the relevant state’s active force. It must also have ranked international peacekeeping as one of its top priorities.

Our definition is based on four elements: function, adaptation, scale, and salience.

First, a peacekeeping army must be able to perform the military functions required for contemporary peacekeeping.

Second, a traditional army must have adapted to enable more effective performance of peacekeeping tasks. Such adaptation involves relevant institutional reforms, including designing relevant capabilities, force structures, training systems, or doctrine.

Third, in terms of scale, a peacekeeping army should regularly deploy troop contingents representing at least 5% of its active armed forces.

Finally, states that develop peacekeeping armies afford peace operations a high level of prominence in their national security. They also make them a visible part of their domestic and foreign policy. Our longer article discusses several countries that share these characteristics, including Burundi, Rwanda, Uruguay, and Ghana.

Why do states develop peacekeeping armies?

States develop peacekeeping armies for different reasons and at different times. However, we found some factors are more likely to drive the process than others.

First, reconstructing national and international identities to acquire international status and domestic legitimacy appears to be key. Historically, this has been apparent in states as diverse as Canada, Ireland, Ghana, and Uruguay.

Second, poorer states, like Rwanda and Burundi, might have economic incentives such as the modernisation of military equipment, infrastructure development, and personnel reimbursements.

Third, authoritarian governments might see providing peacekeepers as a form of regime protection and coup-proofing strategy. They do so by both physically distancing security forces outside the country, and by using financial benefits to buttress their loyalty.

Once established, a peacekeeping army can influence individual soldiers, the military organisation, and the government.

For individuals, most soldiers in these armies get the opportunity to deploy abroad. They enjoy the financial, training, and operational benefits that come with peacekeeping without the heightened risks of a war-fighting mission. Nevertheless, some peace operations deploy to active war zones, where it might be dangerous for soldiers.

For the state, the relatively high proportion of soldiers contributed to peacekeeping incentivises a government to adapt its military to the requirements of the organisation authorising the peacekeeping mission. It will also need to maintain at least the image of a stable and professional army. Interestingly, recent studies have shown that international perceptions of an effective army are more important than ensuring democratic civil–military relations.

Three policy implications of peacekeeping armies

In terms of wider peacekeeping practices, three policy implications stand out.

First, states that develop peacekeeping armies have incentives to extend the duration of peace operations for their own benefit. This, even when the local context is not conducive. Once their soldiers are deployed, these governments can gain a degree of negotiating power. Either by expressing reluctance to withdraw troops or threatening to do so if certain requests are not met. However, since these are unlikely to be powerful states, their influence on the duration of peace operations remains limited.

Second, since most peacekeeping armies are in poorer and (semi)autocratic states, they will usually lack financial and material resources to develop and modernise. Consequently, they will likely require material, financial, and technical assistance from external partners. This is perhaps to the detriment of building locally sustainable peacekeeping institutions. In such situations, external peacekeeping training and capacity-building programmes will remain important.

Finally, if more peacekeeping armies emerge in (semi)autocratic states, they are likely to have a higher tolerance for casualties. And, they face less public pressure for transparency and accountability than democratic contributing countries.

Such (semi)autocratic armies might therefore accept deployment on more dangerous missions. Over time, this could set new standards for UN peacekeeping in terms of risk assessment and ongoing debates over the safety and security of peacekeepers.

– Peacekeeping armies: what are they, why do African states build them and what impact do they have?
– https://theconversation.com/peacekeeping-armies-what-are-they-why-do-african-states-build-them-and-what-impact-do-they-have-244523