Analysis – Page 3 – AfricaMidEastNgin

February 1, 2025

South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Robert Botha, Research Fellow at the Impumelelo Economic Growth Lab. The Impumelelo Economic Growth Lab is a unit of the Bureau for Economic Research (BER), Stellenbosch University

South Africa’s fiscal trajectory paints a concerning picture. Public expenditure exceeds revenue. As a result sovereign debt is building up and interest on this debt is increasing.

This raises concerns over the South African government’s financial sustainability. The debt-to-GDP ratio has skyrocketed from 23.6% in 2008/09 to a projected 74.7% in 2024/25. The International Monetary Fund has recommended that, over the long term, South Africa should reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% of GDP, in line with that of peers.

Arguably more important than the debt level is how quickly debt has accumulated. Debt servicing costs, which consist of the interest on government debt and other costs directly associated with borrowing, have been the fastest-growing line item in the national budget. Rising interest payments have been crowding out critical expenditures on services such as health, education and infrastructure.

As I argue in a recently published report titled “A fiscal anchor for South Africa: Avoiding the mistakes of the past”, establishing a credible fiscal anchor (or fiscal rule) could be step towards avoiding a debt spiral and regaining fiscal sustainability and credibility.

Fiscal rules are constraints on fiscal policy, designed to impose numerical limits. For example, a limit on the allowable debt-to-GDP ratio, or the allowable balance after accounting for government expenditure and revenue. Fiscal rules are widely used – 105 countries have adopted them so far.

Failing to address the country’s fiscal challenges risks plunging South Africa into a debt trap. This happens when a country finds it difficult to escape a cycle of debt and has to borrow more to pay off old debt. If debt-servicing costs continue to rise, essential public services will come under even greater strain.

Several emerging markets have experienced the severe consequences of unchecked debt accumulation and debt servicing costs. Argentina is one example. Without a credible plan to stabilise and reduce debt and debt servicing costs, the risk of economic stagnation and financial instability grows quickly.

Fiscal erosion and credibility concerns

The roots of South Africa’s current predicament lie in years of mistakes. These include:

spending beyond its means
questionable political decisions like bailing out state-owned entities
poor governance and oversight at municipal and local government level, which led to inefficient public spending.

These factors were underpinned by an underperforming economy, unrealised forecasts and arguably weak institutional checks.

For the last 15 years South Africa’s National Treasury has undertaken to stabilise the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. This would have required keeping the ratio constant. But these commitments have consistently been deferred. Debt stabilisation targets have been revised upwards 13 times, from 40% in 2015/16 to the current 75.5%. The stabilisation year has been pushed back 10 times, from the initial year of 2015/16 to the current target of 2025/26. This has created a perception of inconsistent policy.

Over-optimistic macroeconomic forecasting has undermined credibility. Over the last ten years, GDP growth projections have routinely overshot actual performance by an average of 0.5 percentage points in the first year of forecasts and even more in subsequent years. In defence of the National Treasury, the South African economy has performed worse than more forecasters expected in recent years.

Adding to the fiscal strain are rising social expenditures, the public sector wage bill and repeated bailouts of state-owned enterprises. This spending relieves short-term political and social pressures, but undermines the country’s long-term fiscal health.

Without credible mechanisms to constrain spending, South Africa’s fiscal framework lacks the discipline needed to ensure sustainability, and to restore credibility.

Why fiscal rules matter

Fiscal rules are there to promote discipline, ensure that debt can be paid and enhance credibility. The experience in the 105 countries that have adopted them suggests that strong, well-designed rules can signal a government’s commitment to fiscal prudence.

It’s difficult to establish whether there is a causal relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal performance. But there’s at least a correlation. As a practical example of enforcing fiscal rules, in November 2023, the German constitutional court overruled a budget that was passed in the Bundestag but breached Germany’s fiscal rules.

However, fiscal rules are not a panacea. Poorly designed or inadequately enforced rules can make the problems worse. For South Africa, this risk is acute.

Political commitment and strong institutional frameworks are needed too. Also, a shift in how fiscal policy is conceived and implemented.

Designing new rules

Drawing lessons from global best practices, South Africa’s fiscal rules must be enforceable, flexible and simple. A well-designed rule should:

stabilise and eventually reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio
target government spending as a share of GDP, emphasising consumption spending like salaries and goods and services, rather than capital expenditure
have political buy-in
be overseen independently
be legally binding and enforceable.

Context

South Africa’s low economic growth rate is a complication. Average interest rates on government debt are higher than the nominal GDP growth rate. But reining in spending too much could stifle growth, creating a vicious cycle.

That’s why stabilising debt first would make more sense than aiming to reduce debt too rapidly.

South Africa’s fiscal rules must also have some flexibility. For instance, they could allow for shocks such as natural disasters or global economic crises.

Fiscal rules could follow a phased approach to initially focus on stabilising debt, and then to move towards reducing debt. Both of these phases would entail expenditure rules to guide annual budget processes and to place limits on spending.

The benefits

Credible fiscal rules could have a number of benefits.

Firstly, they could improve South Africa’s credibility by signalling to markets and international institutions that South Africa is committed to fiscal discipline.

Secondly, fiscal credibility is associated with reduced sovereign risk premiums, which translates into lower debt-servicing costs. In turn this would free up resources for critical development priorities.

Third, they can foster a more stable economic environment for investment and growth.

Fourth, they would help coordinate policies. South Africa enjoys rule-based monetary policy in the form of inflation targeting but lacks the same for fiscal policy. This can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. For example, the central bank can keep interest rates too high, not necessarily because it thinks the treasury’s policies are inflationary, but because it cannot predict the treasury’s actions.

The way forward

Adopting fiscal rules in South Africa comes with risks. Weak institutional capacity, especially in oversight bodies like the Parliamentary Budget Office, could undermine rule enforcement.

To shield against these risks, South Africa should have stronger institutions. It could create an independent statutory fiscal council, possibly falling under Parliament, the National Treasury or as an independent constitutional advisory body.

Oversight bodies would also need to build their capacity.

– South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-debt-has-skyrocketed-new-rules-are-needed-to-manage-it-248355

February 1, 2025

South African troops are dying in the DRC: why they’re there and what’s going wrong

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lindy Heinecken, Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology., Stellenbosch University

The death of South African soldiers on a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has sparked fierce debate about the deployment of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers there. Some, including political parties, have questioned whether the soldiers were adequately trained, equipped and supported. Lindy Heinecken has spent decades researching the South African military in peacekeeping operations and has interviewed hundreds of soldiers about their experiences and the challenges during deployment. We asked her for her insights.

What is South Africa doing in the DRC?

The country is part of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), which includes troops from Malawi and Tanzania. This deployment followed approval by the Southern African Development Community in May 2023, in response to the deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC. The South African National Defence Force is leading the mission.

Their mandate is to support the DRC government, a member of the 16-member SADC group, in restoring peace, security and stability. The fact that the mandate states that it is to support the DRC government in combating armed groups that threaten peace and security in the eastern DRC implies that this is not a peacekeeping mission.

The legal basis for the deployment lies in the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, (2003), which states that

Any armed attack perpetrated against one of the States Parties shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and shall be met with immediate collective action.

The mandate gives them the responsibility to protect civilians, disarm armed groups, and help implement the August 2024 ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, brokered by Angola as part of the Luanda Process. This agreement aimed to provide a more secure environment, and protect critical infrastructure to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. This is in line with the United Nations’ responsibility to protect victims of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The M23 rebel group, which is supported by Rwanda, has committed a wide range of atrocities in the eastern DRC which can be traced back to the 1994 genocide.

The impact on civilians has been devastating. While pinning down an exact number is difficult, it’s clear that the rebel forces operating in the eastern DRC, particularly the M23, pose a significant challenge to the stability of the region, and the safety and security of civilians.

The rebels are implicated in mass killings of civilians, rape and other forms of sexual violence and attacks on camps for internally displaced persons. The M23’s atrocities have been condemned by the international community. The United Nations and human rights bodies have called for an end to the violence. They also demand accountability for the perpetrators.

In sum, South African soldiers – alongside Malawians and Tanzanians – are in the DRC to assist the Congolese army in combating the armed groups and to protect civilians from violence and human rights abuses.

Are the soldiers adequately prepared and equipped?

Many questions have been asked about whether South African troops on the mission forces are adequately trained and equipped. Critics claim this deployment is suicidal.

South African soldiers are well-trained and have served in numerous peace operations. Their extensive deployment means that they have accumulated valuable experience. They have been part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo, Monusco, almost since inception in 1999.

Monusco forces are still present in the DRC, but in the process of withdrawing. Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi requested they leave because of their perceived ineffectiveness.

Nonetheless, there are some valid concerns about the South Africans’ current level of preparedness for the DRC mission. Not least given the complex political situation. There are over 100 diverse armed groups involved. And the terrain is difficult.

The combination of budget cuts, resource limitations, and the complex nature of the conflict raises questions about the South African National Defence Force’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives, and ensure the safety of its personnel.

The force takes its own equipment on missions to ensure it is self-sufficient and can meet its specialised needs. The problem is that this equipment is old, leading to shortages due to maintenance problems. This affects the force’s ability to carry out its duties.

Budget cuts for defence over the years, to less than 1% of GDP compared to the global average of 2%, have severely affected the military’s ability to maintain equipment, conduct training exercises and modernise its force. This has led to a decline in overall readiness.

South African troops in the DRC lack essential resources, including adequate air support, attack helicopters and modern equipment. This limits their ability to respond quickly to threats and provide close air support for ground troops.

Despite having one of the most capable air forces in Africa, it is unable to deploy its Gripen and Rooivalk helicopters because they have not been serviced and lack spare parts.

The use of older equipment has also been less effective against the well-equipped M23.

Besides being outgunned, the regional mission is also out-manned.

The SADC mission in the DRC was authorised to have 5,000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania. The actual deployment has fallen far short of this number. As of late January 2025, only about 1,300 troops had been deployed.

Where to from here?

There are concerns in the DRC about the presence of multiple foreign forces, given the relative ineffectiveness of these interventions.

There are also questions about the legitimacy of the mission. Rwanda has opposed the deployment, saying that the SAMIDRC, and specifically South Africa’s involvement, undermines regional unity and cooperation.

The best approach to peace and stability in the DRC requires a concerted effort by regional actors – the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and the Southern African Development Community – to address the underlying causes of the conflict. This requires political dialogue with the regional actors, the UN, the international community and, most importantly, the Congolese people.

As for South Africa, it is time for some critical reflection on the future roles of its military. The equipment shortages and challenges it faces raise serious concerns about the defence force’s ability to carry out its core mandate of protecting South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the constitution.

The tragedy in the DRC highlights the dire need for the South African National Defence Force to be redesigned, modernised and funded to become more effective and capable, ready to meet the immediate challenges it faces (like ageing equipment) and ensure the security of South Africa.

– South African troops are dying in the DRC: why they’re there and what’s going wrong
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-troops-are-dying-in-the-drc-why-theyre-there-and-whats-going-wrong-248696

January 31, 2025

We studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa – and confirmed there are 4 distinct species

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nikolaos Kargopoulos, Post-doctoral fellow, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Cape Town

Giraffes are among the world’s most recognisable animals. With their elongated necks and long legs, their gracious movements and unique coat patterns, they have inspired people’s imaginations for centuries.

But is a giraffe just a giraffe? Or is there more variety between the animals at a genetic level than is evident just from looking at them?

For more than a decade many researchers have compared the DNA of giraffes from all parts of Africa. These studies have revealed that there are four distinct giraffe species: the southern (Giraffa giraffa), Masai (Giraffa tippelskirchi), reticulated (Giraffa reticulata), and northern (Giraffa camelopardalis) giraffe.

Different giraffe species face different risks. Some are among the most threatened large mammals in the world. While the southern and the Masai giraffe are relatively numerous and their populations estimated at approximately 45,000 and 50,000 individuals respectively, the situation does not look quite as rosy for the reticulated and the northern giraffe. Based on the latest estimates from the Giraffe Conservation Foundation (GCF), only 16,000 and 6,000 individuals respectively remain in the wild.

Therefore, it is critical to verify whether there are indeed different species of giraffe or not so that direct conservation efforts for the most threatened species can be increased before it’s too late.

The concept of species is fundamental in biology – but there is no consensus on its definition. There are many different approaches depending on individual scientists’ points of view. The best possible way to clarify the taxonomy (the system that organises living entities into groups) of organisms is through multiple approaches.

There have been several studies of giraffe species based on their DNA, as well as on their ecology, behaviour, health and coat patterns.

But there haven’t been many based on their skulls. That’s where our new study comes in. By examining the skulls of more than 500 giraffes from across the African continent, we were able to show that there are significant differences in the skull shapes of the different types of giraffe – and confirm that there are four species.

These new findings are crucial for giraffe taxonomy and, ultimately, their conservation.

How the study was done

Giraffe skulls are important to the animals’ reproduction and evolution. That’s because of their ossicones, the horn-like structures that are longer and wider in males than in females.

The size and shape of the ossicones is important in the dominance of males and their mating success with female giraffe. While some preliminary data already suggested some potential differences in the ossicone morphology between the giraffe species, limitations on the available specimens and the methodologies at the time reduced the validity of the results.

Comparison of male and female skulls of the four species in lateral view. Kargopoulos et al 2024

For our research we used state-of-the-art equipment and methodologies, and we studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa. The skulls were directly sampled in the field from across their natural range in Africa, as well as museum collections, wildlife authority offices, and taxidermists in different countries in Africa, Europe and the US.

Map showing the geographical range of the extant giraffe species and subspecies as well as representative male skulls of each subspecies in lateral view. Kargopoulos et al 2024, CC BY

This extensive study required help from many different partners. While the project was initiated and guided by the Giraffe Conservation Foundation and the University of Cape Town, many colleagues in Africa, Europe and North America contributed.

We used a handheld 3D scanner to capture the skulls’ shape in 3D. Then we used 3D geometric morphometrics methods to compare the shape of the giraffe skulls and find out if we could group them and find any significant differences. We chose so-called landmarks – specific points on the skulls – and captured their coordinates in space (their 3D distance from the centre of mass of the skull).

Finally, specialised software was used to compare the differences in the coordinates of landmarks between our specimens and to conduct statistical analyses to show if these differences were significant or not.

Skull variations

These rigorous analyses allowed us to show skull variations between four species.

These differences mostly concerned the ossicones. But there were also minor differences in their face, eye sockets, the region around the teeth, and the back part of the skull.

The most striking difference concerned the median ossicone of the males. This is a smaller third ossicone situated in the midline of the skull above their eyes. We determined that there is a general trend in the size and shape of this ossicone that follows geography and taxonomy. In southern giraffe, the third ossicone is practically a small protrusion; in northern giraffe it is large and pointed; the Masai and reticulated giraffe have ossicones that are somewhere between those two forms.

Such differences are likely important in the way individuals of a species recognise each other, thus affecting their reproductive success. Males with more developed ossicones intimidate their rivals to gain access to territory and females.

Attention for individual species

Angolan giraffe eating in north-west Namibia. © Giraffe Conservation Foundation, Author provided (no reuse)

Our study is confirmation of what scientists have known for almost a decade and supports the taxonomic split of the giraffe.

Similar discussions over two decades finally resulted in the African elephant being split into two distinct species in 2021.

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – which, it must be pointed out, is not a taxonomic authority – still only recognises one species of giraffe. It lumps all giraffes into one broad, threatened Red List category.

We strongly believe that the IUCN needs to stand tall for these animals and reassess their status. It is time for each giraffe species to get separate and enhanced attention, both locally and internationally, in particular when it comes to their conservation. Giraffes and their wild habitats must be protected before it’s too late.

– We studied more than 500 giraffe skulls from all over Africa – and confirmed there are 4 distinct species
– https://theconversation.com/we-studied-more-than-500-giraffe-skulls-from-all-over-africa-and-confirmed-there-are-4-distinct-species-247466

January 31, 2025

Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation law: scholar weighs up the act

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zsa-Zsa Temmers Boggenpoel, Academic, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a new law to govern the expropriation (or compulsory acquisition) of private property by government for public purposes or in the public interest.

The passing of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 followed a parliamentary process that began in 2020.

The act repeals the apartheid-era Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, and aims to align expropriation law with the constitution. It sets out the procedures, rules and regulations for expropriation. Besides setting out in quite a detailed fashion how expropriations are to take place, the act also provides an outline regarding how compensation is to be determined.

In South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past, land distribution was grossly unequal on the basis of race. The country is still suffering the effects of this. So expropriation of property is a potential tool to reduce land inequality. This has become a matter of increasing urgency. South Africans have expressed impatience with the slow pace of land reform.

Property rights and land reform

There is much debate in the country about the provisions of the new act. The debate is mostly about the extent to which it affects existing private property rights. Some argue the act is unconstitutional. Others welcome it as a necessary step in the right direction.

I’m a professor of law with a keen interest in this area of the law, and recently edited a book on land expropriation in South Africa by leading experts. My view is that an expropriation act that is aligned with the constitution should be welcomed, to enable land reform to work effectively.

Land reform also needs a capable and proactive state that implements the legal framework in such a manner that prioritises expropriation as a mechanism to ensure land reform.

So far, expropriation has not been used effectively to redistribute land more equitably, as part of land reform.

I am not convinced that the act, in its current form, is the silver bullet to effect large-scale land reform – at least not the type of radical land reform that South Africa urgently needs.

Understandably, the act will have a severe impact on property rights. But it still substantially protects landowners affected by expropriation. Only in very limited cases would they not be compensated.

Protections for land owners

The act says that property must not be expropriated arbitrarily or for a purpose other than a public purpose or in the public interest.

Public purpose means by or for the benefit of the public. For example, expropriating property to build roads, schools and hospitals. Public interest is broader and includes the nation’s commitment to land reform.

“Arbitrary” would usually mean without reason or justification.

The act further requires that an expropriating authority – an organ of state or person empowered by the act or any other legislation – must first try to reach an agreement with the owner to acquire the property on reasonable terms before considering expropriation.

This gives some power to a landowner, even though expropriation does not normally require consent. The act also says a specific expropriation must always be authorised by a law.

No compensation?

Section 12 of the act deals with compensation for expropriation. It is arguably the most controversial part of the new legislation. Section 12(1) does not appear to be problematic and is largely the same wording as section 25(3) of the constitution. This part of the property clause sets out what must be taken into account when compensation for expropriation is determined.

Section 12(3) of the act refers to “nil compensation” – when nil rand (monetary) compensation may be paid. There is no explicit reference to nil compensation in the current wording of section 25 of the constitution. It’s a new thing in the Expropriation Act.

However, courts have toyed with the idea that section 25 of the constitution already provides room for a reduction in compensation.

The circumstances in which nil compensation could be granted in terms of the new act are in fact very limited. Section 12(3) leaves the discretion to the expropriating authority to determine when it may be just and equitable to pay nil compensation. However, the act lacks guidelines on how such a discretion must be exercised.

The scope of section 12(3) is also limited in some respects. For one, it is restricted to land. Only where land is expropriated would nil compensation be an option. Therefore, not all forms of property can be expropriated without compensation. The notion of property under section 25(1) of the constitution is generally wide and includes various rights and interests, which are broader than just land. For instance, personal rights, mineral rights and licences are included under the section 25(1) notion of property.

This wide understanding of property is not applicable to section 12(3), which refers to “land” being expropriated.

Section 12(3) is also limited to the expropriation of land “in the public interest”. Nil compensation is therefore envisaged only in the context of expropriation of land undertaken in the public interest, and not also for a public purpose.

Three of the four categories listed in section 12(3), where nil compensation is envisaged, are linked to the way in which the property was being used prior to the expropriation. Land used in a productive manner is therefore not evidently envisaged under section 12(3).

Nil compensation is not necessarily limited to the instances listed. Still, the amount of compensation must – in all instances – be just and equitable.

Novel approach

The act forces South Africans to engage with the idea of nil compensation in a much more direct manner.

The presence of a clause dedicated to nil compensation provides new clarity on when this could apply.

It is hard to determine whether this act will pass constitutional muster without seeing how expropriation under it will work in practice. It remains to be seen whether it will have the far-reaching consequences that many fear, or call for.

– Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation law: scholar weighs up the act
– https://theconversation.com/land-seizure-and-south-africas-new-expropriation-law-scholar-weighs-up-the-act-244697

January 31, 2025

Nigeria’s plastic bottle collectors turn waste into wealth: survey sheds light on their motivation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

Plastic waste in Nigeria presents a dual challenge: cleaning up environmental pollution, and tapping into its economic potential.

Many countries worldwide face similar challenges. India, for one, has chosen policies that give producers of plastic the responsibility to manage their waste. Rwanda has banned single-use plastic and promoted recycling initiatives led by communities.

These approaches show it’s possible to address plastic waste issues while fostering economic opportunities.

In Nigeria, informal collectors of plastic bottle waste are central to achieving both of these goals. They turn waste into monetary value.

Previous research has highlighted the environmental and economic benefits of collecting plastic bottle waste. There’s been less attention on what shapes perceptions of waste collection as a business, particularly in Nigeria.

This article explores that gap, looking at the socio-cultural, economic and environmental influences on those perceptions.

I am a researcher in the areas of plastic waste management, environmental governance and sustainable development. My work includes studying homes made from recycled plastic bottles in sustainable community-based housing projects.

Here I’ll be drawing from an exploratory survey conducted in the Ijebu area of Ogun State, Nigeria. Using a questionnaire, we surveyed 86 participants who had at least five years of experience in the plastic waste industry.

The study identified factors like education, family size, religion, gender, age, and economic dynamics as relevant to participation in the business of plastic bottle waste collection.

Understanding these influences might help the government to target policies.

Education level and information

Our study found that participants with higher education levels better understood the economic benefits of plastic waste collection as a systematic form of business. The less educated participants viewed waste collection more as a hand-to-mouth way of earning a living.

Education programmes built into waste management campaigns could improve recognition of waste collection as a structured and profitable business opportunity and develop a business-like culture among the collectors.

Parenthood, family size and financial obligations

Family size was a factor affecting perceptions of plastic bottle waste collection as a business. People with large families saw waste collection as a feasible way to provide food, housing, education and other essentials.

However, the association of waste collection with income instability highlights the need to formalise and stabilise the sector. Waste collection must be made into a sustainable and reliable business model.

Religion and cultural norms

Religion and cultural beliefs emerged as influences from our survey. This was evident in the responses of people who followed African traditional religions and Islam.

These respondents viewed waste collection as financially feasible, aligning with religious teachings that emphasise resource management and stewardship. For example, Islamic teachings on israf (avoiding wastefulness) and zakat (charity) promote efficient resource use and economic activities that benefit communities.

Similarly, African traditional religion often emphasises communal responsibility and the sustainable use of resources. These religious principles underscore the cultural acceptance of waste collection as both a practical and a morally guided economic activity.

Other cultural norms, such as the value placed on communal responsibility and cooperation, also influenced attitudes towards waste collection. In communities with a strong tradition of collective action, where unity and mutual support are highly valued, waste collection is often viewed as a collaborative effort.

These cultural norms reinforce the idea that waste collection is not just an individual task, but a collective duty that benefits the entire community.

Gender dynamics

Gender plays a role in perception and practice in waste collection. Our survey found that male participants were more likely than female participants to perceive this activity as a business.

As constrained as they are by lack of access to resources, women are involved in separating and marketing reusable items. Measures like microfinance could increase women’s engagement and business opportunities.

This would empower women and make waste collection a more inclusive and sustainable business.

Age and desire to be an entrepreneur

Perceptions were influenced by age in our study. Younger individuals, up to 14 years old, viewed plastic bottle waste collection as a gateway to employment. Adults aged 33-38 used their experience to get better returns on the business.

This age-based distinction suggests that different stages of life bring unique motivations and approaches to waste collection.

Policy actions that support entrepreneurship at various life stages can promote long-term engagement in the industry. This will help formalise waste collection as a sustainable and profitable business.

Economic and social factors

Income opportunities affected participants’ experiences more than social factors. Oftentimes, this determined how long they stayed in the business. Those earning more were likelier to reinvest and grow, while lower earnings often led to disengagement or exit. This highlights the importance of financial incentives in shaping waste collection practices.

Social connections also play a role in fostering collaboration. It facilitates teamwork and the exchange of ideas, and creates a sense of shared purpose and collective outcomes among participants.

Strengthening these economic and social bonds can formalise plastic bottle waste collection, making it a more efficient and profitable business.

Looking ahead

The study has significant application to Nigeria’s waste management industry. Adding education programmes into waste management programmes will improve people’s business skills.

Well-coordinated intervention strategies can remove cultural and gender-specific barriers. For instance, cooperatives and microfinance may make waste collection more financially appealing.

Strategies can also draw on cultural norms to increase community acceptance of waste collection and make it more inclusive.

Samuel Oludare Awobona, a doctoral student at Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria, contributed to this research.

– Nigeria’s plastic bottle collectors turn waste into wealth: survey sheds light on their motivation
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-plastic-bottle-collectors-turn-waste-into-wealth-survey-sheds-light-on-their-motivation-247819

January 31, 2025

Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation bill: scholar weighs up the new act

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zsa-Zsa Temmers Boggenpoel, Academic, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a new law to govern the expropriation (or compulsory acquisition) of private property by government for public purposes or in the public interest.

The passing of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 followed a parliamentary process that began in 2020.

Property rights and land reform

Land reform also needs a capable and proactive state that implements the legal framework in such a manner that prioritises expropriation as a mechanism to ensure land reform.

So far, expropriation has not been used effectively to redistribute land more equitably, as part of land reform.

I am not convinced that the act, in its current form, is the silver bullet to effect large-scale land reform – at least not the type of radical land reform that South Africa urgently needs.

Protections for land owners

The act says that property must not be expropriated arbitrarily or for a purpose other than a public purpose or in the public interest.

“Arbitrary” would usually mean without reason or justification.

This gives some power to a landowner, even though expropriation does not normally require consent. The act also says a specific expropriation must always be authorised by a law.

No compensation?

However, courts have toyed with the idea that section 25 of the constitution already provides room for a reduction in compensation.

This wide understanding of property is not applicable to section 12(3), which refers to “land” being expropriated.

Nil compensation is not necessarily limited to the instances listed. Still, the amount of compensation must – in all instances – be just and equitable.

Novel approach

The act forces South Africans to engage with the idea of nil compensation in a much more direct manner.

The presence of a clause dedicated to nil compensation provides new clarity on when this could apply.

– Land seizure and South Africa’s new expropriation bill: scholar weighs up the new act
– https://theconversation.com/land-seizure-and-south-africas-new-expropriation-bill-scholar-weighs-up-the-new-act-244697

January 31, 2025

Anti-immigration policies: why harsh new rules put in place by Trump and other rich countries won’t last

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

Donald Trump, America’s new president, has cut back massively on US commitments to asylum seekers, blocked all asylum processes and started to remove irregular immigrants.

Trump’s new measures are far reaching. They include the suspension of the US refugee admissions programme. Flights booked for refugees to the US have been cancelled. Arrests and deportations have begun.

Strongly anti-immigrant policies were also pursued under the Biden administration, though Trump’s dramatic steps take them much further. Other countries in the global north have also introduced tougher policies. The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum sets out tougher border controls, quicker assessment of asylum seekers and swifter removal of those who did not qualify. In the UK, Labour prime minister Keir Starmer has promised to bring down the net migration rate and treat people-smugglers like terrorists.

Based on my research into migration over the past 30 years I believe that these measures are unlikely to last. There are two linked trends that make closing the borders of the global north impractical and destined for revision.

The first is that populations in most of the global north are ageing fast (on average) and the fertility rate, or natural population growth rate, has plummeted. There are many more older people as a percentage of the population.

Secondly, with a workforce shrinking and the dependency ratio (the proportion of non-working to working people) rising rapidly, closing borders to potential labourers from other countries, without any other change, would lead to declining living standards in the global north. Economic growth and government revenues would slow or stagnate, undermining infrastructure maintenance and social service provision.

There are several possible strategies that could be alternatives to anti-immigration measures. Some older people could migrate south, robots and AI could do more work, workers in the global south could perform remote work for the north, and arrangements could be made to allow migrants into the north either permanently or as circulating migrants.

All these strategies are already in use, if modestly. Their application would have to expand considerably.

Misplaced panic

The responses of governments in the global north are exaggerated. Governments putting in place tough anti-immigrant measures have done so on the back of a narrative that there’s been a significant rise in the number of migrants worldwide.

This isn’t true. Some countries, such as the US, Germany and Colombia, have seen a spike in refugees and other migrants. But for the rest of the world the picture remains much the same as it has done for decades.

Foreign-born residents (the most widely used definition of migrants) rose as a proportion of residents worldwide from 2.3% in 1970 to 3.6% in 2020. But in 1960 the number was over 3%, and in the late 1800s migrants made up somewhere between 3% and 5% of the global population.

So, 3.6% is nothing new.

As for refugees, in 2023 there were about 38 million, of whom 69% sought refuge in neighbouring countries and 75% in middle- and low-income countries.

In general, therefore, rich countries have not been carrying the greatest burden.

The real reason behind these tougher measures is that living standards have stagnated in many countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The cost and availability of housing have worsened; inequality has grown since the 1980s; the quality and availability of public services have deteriorated since the global financial crisis of 2008 and COVID-19; and the quality of employment has shifted to precarious work and poorly paid service sector occupations.

This has contributed to the rise of populism, including anti-foreigner sentiment and even xenophobia.

Trump’s actions are the most extreme yet. They include an order to block “aliens involved in the invasion” using “appropriate measures” that give the security forces further powers. The prohibition of southern border asylum hearings in the US and the instruction to “remain in Mexico” means that prospective asylum seekers from third countries may not cross the border to make their applications at the port of entry. They must apply remotely.

Trump has also ordered that birthright citizenship must be limited to the children of certain categories of residents, essentially citizens or those with residence rights in the form of a “green card”. This move has been temporarily blocked in some states by judges as unconstitutional.

In addition, the acting head of the Homeland Security Department gave Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials the power to deport migrants admitted temporarily into the US under several programmes of the Biden administration, targeting refugees from Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Haiti, and possibly Afghan and Ukrainian refugees too.

The very first bill to receive final approval from the US Congress under Trump’s second term, the Laken-Riley Act, would require the detention and deportation of migrants who enter the country without authorisation and are charged with certain crimes. This bill was passed with 263 votes and 156 votes against, meaning that 46 House Democrats supported the Republican bill.

In contrast, in the global south, as I have discussed elsewhere, the trend has been in the opposite direction. South American regional communities liberalised migration most extensively in recent decades, but African regional communities have made progress too, as has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The way forward

Some alternative strategies are leading the way.

In Canada, the Temporary Foreign Worker programme has expanded steadily since 1973, increasingly including long-term circulating migrating lower-skilled workers for key occupations like catering, care, construction and agriculture. Though it is currently under political scrutiny because of the panic in the north over migration, and because of housing shortages in Canada, it is likely to survive and evolve. Similar systems are emerging across the global north.

In the EU, Talent Partnerships are now encouraged. Germany, for example, has talent partnerships with Kenya and Morocco, where they train health workers and IT technicians in those countries to work and live in Germany. Spain has various partnerships in Latin America and Africa. Prime minister Pedro Sanchez has chosen to be upfront on the choices. In October last year he told the Spanish people:

Spain needs to choose between being an open and prosperous country or a closed off poor country.

The current fashion for population protectionism in the global north is increasingly nasty, but it is unlikely to stand the test of time. Several constructive responses to the rising dependency ratio are feasible, but being open to more migration, possibly in new forms and through new channels. is an inevitable part of the solution.

New formal pathways for working migrants and reasonable systems for asylum seekers, along with full enforcement of rules against irregular migrants, could be the combination that works politically and economically.

– Anti-immigration policies: why harsh new rules put in place by Trump and other rich countries won’t last
– https://theconversation.com/anti-immigration-policies-why-harsh-new-rules-put-in-place-by-trump-and-other-rich-countries-wont-last-248359

January 30, 2025

Chad’s parliamentary election hands Mahamat Déby absolute control. Here’s why it’s dangerous

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of Freiburg

Chad held parliamentary elections in late December 2024. The final results released on 21 January 2025 gave the well-established former ruling party, the Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), 124 seats out of 188.

The election marked the end of a four-year transition in Chad following the death of former president Idriss Déby Itno in March 2021. Déby had ruled Chad since 1991. Mahamat Déby Itno assumed power on the death of his father.

The result has meant that Mahamat Déby has given himself a degree of legitimacy as president through elections. He can comfortably remain in power for at least another five or even ten years.

I have been following Chad’s politics from inside and outside the country for more than 15 years. In my view, Mahamat Déby’s actions during the transition, with the help of the transitional authorities and his late father’s old teams, were aimed at keeping him in power. The December 2024 parliamentary elections were a formality. The poll was not won on polling day. It was clear from the run-up that, as was the case with the May 2024 presidential elections, every effort was being made to minimise the success of the opposition.

Four factors stand out. They are the composition of the electoral authorities, lack of an up-to-date electoral register, violence against dissenting voices, and high costs of participation in the election.

In my view Chadians’ trust in the democratic process has ceased completely. This bodes ill for a country that ranks as one of the poorest. It is also one of the most corrupt. The consolidation of Mahamat Déby’s power could widen the social divide and lead to violent conflict between different groups in Chad, which is highly stratified along ethnic and religious lines.

Dissatisfaction with his decades of autocratic rule characterised Idriss Déby’s reign. Political-military movements challenged him regularly, and the last attack led to his death.

This dissatisfaction will continue and could once again lead to violent conflicts.

Corruption of the process

Mahamat Déby and the Movement Patriotique du Salut took a number of steps to secure victory in the election.

Firstly, the presidents of the electoral authority ANGE (Agence Nationale de Gestion des Élections) and of the constitutional court nominated by Mahamat Déby were responsible for organising and for validating elections (and will continue to be responsible until 2031). Having been loyal to Idriss Déby and now to his son, they cannot be trusted to be objective and independent in their pronouncements and final decisions.

Secondly, the electoral register was last updated in August 2024. Therefore, young people who had just turned 18 could not vote. In Chad, the majority of the population is under 25. Young people in particular in the south support the opposition.

Thirdly, the transitional regime’s violent crackdown on opposing voices played a role in the final outcome of the election.

The transition was initially characterised by peace talks with the political-military movements and by expanding the security sector to secure its rule. In October 2022, several hundred mainly young people were killed by security forces while demonstrating against the extension of the transition and Mahamat Déby’s candidacy for presidency.

In the intervening period the state took various steps against opposition figures.

In February 2024 Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Mahamat Deby and a potential rival in the presidential elections, was shot dead by security forces.

In May 2024, Mahamat Déby was elected president. In December 2024 he took on the title of marshal – previously held only by his father.

The opposition was also hampered in participating in the poll for financial reasons. Taking part in the elections is expensive. Each candidate in the parliamentary election had to pay 500,000 CFA (US$785) to the treasury. Candidates for the provincial election paid 200,000 CFA (US$314). In poverty-stricken Chad, without regular funding for political parties, it was particularly difficult for smaller parties to meet these criteria.

The situation was different for the ruling party, founded by Idriss Déby. For decades it has benefited from state resources. It is the only party with a nationwide presence. Other parties are mainly active in the regions of their founders.

Resistance

Opposition parties called for a boycott. The Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques, a coalition of nine parties, criticised the new electoral law and the lack of transparency of the count at the polling stations.

Succès Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, a former prime minister who came second in the 2024 presidential elections, also called for a boycott. He accused the government of falsifying the results of the parliamentary election beforehand and of having the final lists saved in a computer. His party did not participate in the poll.

The results of the parliamentary elections presented on 11 January 2025 by Ahmed Barticheret, president of the electoral commission, and confirmed by the constitutional court on 21 January, therefore revealed no surprises.

Alongside the huge victory of the Movement Patriotique du Salut, two other parties not really in opposition won 12 and 7 seats respectively. The other successful parties won just one seat each. Chad has over 300 political parties, of which 38 are represented in the new parliament.

Consequences

Movement Patriotique du Salut has an overwhelming majority in parliament. This means that there are no checks and balances. Like his father, Mahamat Déby can continue to rule without any parliamentary control.

He is already used to that. Since 2021, he has appointed members of the transitional parliament by presidential decree. The few voices of individual members of parliament belonging to the “real” opposition have no influence.

As the low turnout – put at 40% on election day – shows, the majority of voters did not expect the election result to change the political situation. On the other hand, supporters of the ruling party continue to benefit from proximity to power and state resources.

As dissatisfaction continues, the possibility of renewed attacks by dissidents cannot be ruled out. If it is not a military attack, frustrated individuals might try to target the presidency or other symbols of the regime.

In early January 2025 a group of unidentified young people reportedly attacked the presidency. The incident was played down by the government spokesman, leaving plenty of room for speculation.

But it was a reminder that a peaceful future is not assured.

– Chad’s parliamentary election hands Mahamat Déby absolute control. Here’s why it’s dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/chads-parliamentary-election-hands-mahamat-deby-absolute-control-heres-why-its-dangerous-248342

January 30, 2025

Femicide in Kenya: William Ruto has set up a task force – feminist scholar explains its flaws

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Awino Okech, Professor of Feminist and Security Studies, SOAS, University of London

Gender-based violence is a major challenge in Kenya, which has recorded a significant rise in deaths of women and girls in recent years.

In January 2024, a coalition of organisations across the east African nation organised multi-city public marches to call for government action against these deaths. A year later, President William Ruto established a 42-member taskforce to address gender-based violence. What is its potential to lead to real change for women and girls? Feminist and security studies professor Awino Okech explores the issue.

What do you make of the Kenyan government’s response to gender-based violence?

Language matters, in my view, so it is important to focus the attention on femicide, which is what triggered recent public conversation in Kenya and is the primary issue at hand.

Femicide is the specific act of men killing women because they are women. Gender-based violence focuses on the gender power relations that create conditions for violence. This does not always result in loss of life. Gender-based violence includes men killed by other men because of their sexuality, widows disenfranchised by property laws, female genital mutilation and forced marriage.

Unlike in the past, Kenya has seen increasing reports of women being murdered. The country doesn’t have a proper data management system for such incidences. Nevertheless, the numbers recorded by organisations such as Femicide Count show the scale of the problem. In 2023 it recorded 152 femicides based on cases reported in the media. Africa Uncensored, an investigative journalism media house, estimates that 500 women were killed between 2017 and 2024. Kenya’s law enforcement agencies recorded 97 cases of femicide between September and November 2024. Globally, UN Women reported that in 2023 alone, one woman was killed every 10 minutes in intimate partner and family-related murders.

What is the likelihood of the presidential working group’s success?

First, at face value, any public action taken by a government to illustrate that it is listening to its citizens is an important first step.

Second, the fact that it is called a “technical working group on gender-based violence” illustrates the potential it has to lose focus on the issue that catalysed its creation – femicide.

Third, there is a history in Kenya of setting up task forces with financial resources largely directed at remunerating members and conducting “consultations”, only to tell the country what was already known. Consultations are critical for legitimacy and a base for action. But there are more expedient ways to do this work.

This includes analysing existing reports, statements and recommendations offered by women’s rights organisation over the decades, including a 2024 statement on ending femicide. An insistence on a large task force in the light of the government’s austerity drive only raises questions about where limited resources should be directed.

Finally, I am concerned that some of the leading voices on femicide in the last 10 years are missing from this task force. It is the activism of the coalition of actors organising under EndFemicideKE that recentred the conversation on femicide with some of the organisations leading urgent response work in their communities. The task force must not ignore this expertise.

What steps should Kenya be taking to address femicide?

Invest in programmes that emphasise positive masculinities. This means raising a generation of men whose idea of manhood is not based on hatred of or violence against women. This work is an important counter measure to the growing “manosphere” in Kenya. The manosphere refers to websites, blogs and online forums focused on promoting misogyny and opposition to feminism. These online spaces have grown globally and are viewed as central to grooming men to commit femicide.
Increase resources to programmes aimed at women who are at risk of violence. The signs of violence predate the act of violence and murder. Providing resources to create safe physical and online spaces – such as hotlines for women to get the support they need to secure their lives, or effective investigative services – is key. Central to this action is the role of the police service in taking seriously and investigating any claims of potential threats of violence. People need to feel safe going to the police to report threats of harm and have trust in their capacity to deliver justice. This action requires trust building between communities and the police service.
Deal with the structural causes of femicide. At the heart of this targeted violence against women are the underlying patriarchal assumptions about how women should act relative to men in society. We cannot ignore the importance of building people’s consciousness about the deep biases they have been socialised to believe in. This work must be led by community champions who value the sanctity of human life.

What needs to be done to hold institutions accountable?

First, the relevant state institutions, such as public hospitals and clinics, the police and judiciary, need money and people with the right skills, so they can intervene in the root causes and symptoms of gender-based violence.

Second, Kenya needs to create a national database on femicide. This would indicate where and how to deploy resources.

Third, there needs to be an annual and public report on the state of gender-based violence that tracks where money has gone, and shows the relationship between actions and outcomes. An initial increase in cases might not indicate failure but rather heightened awareness. With the right interventions, numbers should drop over time.

Fourth, build trust between citizens and state institutions. In December 2024, a peaceful march in Nairobi held during the global 16 days of activism against gender-based violence campaign was teargassed by police. This happened two weeks after the Kenyan president publicly committed to addressing femicide.

The right to peaceful protest is enshrined in Kenya’s constitution. When the police respond with violence to peaceful women protesters talking about the murder of women, how can citizens trust officers’ ability to take dead women seriously?

– Femicide in Kenya: William Ruto has set up a task force – feminist scholar explains its flaws
– https://theconversation.com/femicide-in-kenya-william-ruto-has-set-up-a-task-force-feminist-scholar-explains-its-flaws-248313

January 30, 2025

South African poetry has a new digital archive – what’s behind the project

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Research Associate, University of Oxford

South African poetry, rich with history, has long been an underappreciated cornerstone of the country’s cultural landscape. But a new free-to-access digital archive is helping change that.

Focused on the poets published by a small but important press in a town called Makhanda in the Eastern Cape province, the Deep South Books and Archive initiative seeks to elevate their voices by offering an archive of background information about their work and lives as well as extensive excerpts from their books. It’s a rare window into a vital but overlooked tradition of South African literature.

Robert Berold, after spending a decade as editor for New Coin journal, set up Deep South in 1995. For decades he has had a quiet influence on the South African poetry scene. His impulse to publish emerged from a place of need and outrage that some of the talented young black poets he was publishing in New Coin couldn’t get their books published in the new, democratic South Africa.

Deep South Books

Many of these poets had been using their words to fight for freedom, while a new generation of young poets was emerging with democracy. Ever since, Deep South has been an important arena where South African poets and their poems could speak to one another.

My work on African literary production shows the importance of small presses in creating local literary ecologies.

For Berold, the mission was always:

To publish what was considered to be innovative and risk-taking South African poetry, regardless of market limitations.

His many endeavours as a publisher, editor and teacher have been linked by the effort to rescue from oblivion, to supply context, to indicate points of continuity while insisting on the diversity of the South African experience.

Deep South Books

After 30 years of publishing, Berold is now sharing a vast catalogue and archive that would otherwise remain unknown. Even though the African Poetry Digital Portal, hosted by the University of Nebraska in the US, was created as a resource for the study of the history of African poetry from antiquity to the present, it does not give direct reference to particular communities.

In bringing this archive to the internet, Berold is revealing the process and method of how contemporary South African poetry has been shaped into being.

Behind the poems

Much of the archive material is what Berold accumulated in dealing with the poets – correspondence, manuscripts, reviews. This is also physically deposited at the Amazwi South African Museum of Literature. He explains:

I got into correspondence with everyone who sent in poems, trying to give helpful criticism, recommending poets for them to read. There was a certain inappropriateness about this at times, and some arrogance too on my part, but mostly people appreciated the feedback.

The “difficult miracle of Black poetry”, as US poet June Jordan once remarked, is that it persists, published or not, loved or unloved. In racially segregated South Africa during apartheid, publishing spaces were few and far between.

Black poets were often censored, banned or exiled as their work confronted the injustices of a racist system. This digital archive recasts the story of South African poetry as insurgent, independent and driven to define a distinct aesthetic.

Deep South Books

Deep South has, furthermore, made a particular impression by fostering a unique aesthetic in South African poetry through its investments in typography and design. As a small, independent press situated away from culture capitals – Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg – it has had the freedom to experiment.

Deep South Books and Archive is therefore a significant tribute to the persistence of South African poetry, despite many historical and structural inequalities. It is a catalogue and a digital archive that provides a unique entry point into modern South African poetry.

Inside the archive

The digital archive’s architecture is simple. The poets are indexed in alphabetical order. Some of the featured names are Vonani Bila, Mangaliso Buzani, Angifi Dladla, Mzwandile Matiwana, Isabella Motadinyane, Seitlhamo Motsapi, Khulile Nxumalo, Mxolisi Nyezwa, Lesego Rampolokeng, Mxolisi Dolla Sapeta, Dimakatso Sedite and Phillip Zhuwao.

Clicking through the carousel of finely designed book covers leads one to excerpts, book reviews, interviews available as PDF files, as well as links to other multimedia resources.

Deep South Books

Rampolokeng’s work may be iconoclastic, experimental, unclassifiable but he found a home with this press. He has published several of his groundbreaking collections with them. Defying category, they bend and shift, and culminate into a remarkable linguistic virtuoso. His interviews are an extension of his art, reflexive, autobiographical, and works in themselves.

Unrecognised poets

Then there are poets like Motadinyane and Zhuwao who died far too early, leaving behind only single collections. Luckily, even if their portraits and writings are fragmentary, we’re at least witness to the poetic geniuses that might have been. This is the superpower of this archive, to serve as a memorial for a canon (or collection of literary texts) that wasn’t even close to being fully blossomed.

Deep South Books

Historically, canon construction is the work of the few, foremost among them academics who edit anthologies and design syllabuses. Most of these poets do not feature in scholarly journals. As a result they almost exist in the underground, unremarked. Berold, now in his 70s and approaching retirement, has decided to do something about that with a digital archive that surfaces the voices of lesser-known poets.

The lack of recognition for these poets is bothersome for him:

Why nobody in academe has registered the importance of these poets is beyond me. It really makes me wonder whether these professional literary people are able to read.

This is mostly an indictment of systems that undervalue black expression.

This project may be for preservation, but there is another lesson: African literature demands constant acts of recovery. In this case, the internet serves as a kind of rear view mirror, which allows us a backward glance at poets and their works that have been overlooked or underappreciated, forgotten or misunderstood.

– South African poetry has a new digital archive – what’s behind the project
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-poetry-has-a-new-digital-archive-whats-behind-the-project-247599