Analysis – Page 119 – AfricaMidEastNgin

August 25, 2023

China’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lauren Johnston, Senior Researcher, South African Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney

China experienced a massive economic boom in the 1990s and 2000s which increased its demand for resource imports, like oil, from Africa. This led to a model of development finance in which China funded infrastructure in African countries in return for access to resources. This approach became known as the Angola model, because it all started with an infrastructure-for-petroleum partnership between China and Angola in 2004.

Within a decade, however, a shift in China’s approach was needed, for a couple of reasons.

First, African countries are vulnerable to shocks and they struggle to keep up with mounting debt repayments. For instance, in Angola’s case, the price of oil fell from a high of US$115 to below US$50 in mid-2014. More recently, the impact of COVID’s economic shutdowns and supply shocks around the war on Ukraine are taking a toll.

Second, China’s domestic needs are changing. In recent years, climate change and changing diets have put pressure on China’s domestic supply of food. This triggered interest in partnerships that could help. China is also moving away from being an exporter of heavy-industry and energy-intensive manufactured goods. Its focus is more on growth areas, such as higher value-added agriculture and manufacturing. Geopolitically, it also wants to support African development and its own food security.

My study of these shifts reveals a changing relationship between China and Africa, moving beyond a focus on mainly oil and extractive commodities. The new focus is more on industrial production, job creation, investments that lead to African exports, and productivity-enhancing agricultural and digital technology opportunities.

This model, called the “Hunan model”, is named after the province in southern China that is leading the push. African bureaucrats, researchers, trade associations and businesses should understand what’s happening in Hunan. It’ll help them to grasp new opportunities and ensure that African companies are competitively placed.

What is the ‘Hunan model’?

The Hunan model aims to support the 2035 Vision for China–Africa Cooperation by pushing for:

medical cooperation
poverty reduction and agricultural development
trade
investment
digital innovation
green development
capacity building
cultural and people-to-people exchange
peace and security.

The delivery of those goals happens under the umbrella of the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo and a pilot zone for in-depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. Both are centred on Changsha, the capital of Hunan province.

Hunan province was chosen as the new frontier of China-Africa relations partly because many of China’s competitive industries are based there. They include major agri-tech companies, a leading Chinese electronic vehicle company (BYD Changsha), and manufacturing equipment and construction industry companies. Many of these companies have a presence in, and long-run strategy for, African markets.

China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo

The China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo has many activities and events hosted in big exhibition centres. This allows new business partnerships to be forged with speed and logistical ease. At a 2023 event with 10,000 Chinese and 1,700 foreign participants, it was reported that 120 projects, worth a total of US$10.3 billion, were signed. All 53 African countries with which China has diplomatic relations were present.

The Zambia booth at the 2023 China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Hunan. Chen Hongdou/VCG via Getty Images

Pilot zone

The pilot zone for in-depth China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation is a huge area that’s been developed with the aim of expanding bilateral trade, dealing with bottlenecks in trade and cooperation and improving logistics between the two regions. Examples of typical bottlenecks include market access, finance, logistics, talent and services such as marketing and law.

Some of the initiatives that can be found in the pilot zone include vocational and education training and a digital services hub that supports Chinese companies in the efforts to economically engage Africa. The zone includes a permanent exhibition platform and a demonstration park.

Some implications of the shift

The Hunan model’s specific focus is on agriculture, heavy industry equipment, and transport such as electric automobiles and trains. These are areas where Hunan is a leader within China. And they are growth industries in many countries in Africa.

For China it may lead to new sources of food security as well as new markets for technology products and opportunities to set technology standards. The approach thus places Africa in an important position for grasping new opportunities and shaping related areas of cooperation – at home, with China and globally.

The Hunan model also seeks to support more efficient trade. New trade passageways by rail, river, air and ocean are being forged to better connect Hunan with African countries, especially trade hubs.

There are also efforts to tackle issues of access to foreign exchange and foster greater use of local currencies. At the moment a lot of international trade is done in the US dollar, because it is widely accepted across all countries. But many developing countries struggle to accumulate dollars if they don’t have a commodity like oil or gas to export. Small and medium-sized (SME) traders struggle in particular, and are less able to bear any currency risks against the value of their own local currency. The zone in Hunan includes a centre that is testing trade payment systems based on other currencies. This could become a broader model for SME-based trade in local currencies.

Ultimately, China’s Hunan agenda will mean different things for different African countries and will evolve over time. It’s a recent shift, since 2018 especially, but beyond its potential to elevate food security and production capacity in China and African countries, there will be other important implications. It may facilitate digital and communications logistics for trade between China and Africa, as well as research on technology, industry and trade standards, and trade flows and trends.

– China’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region
– https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044

August 25, 2023

Sudan’s future is being shaped by guns and money – like its past

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Like most contemporary wars, Sudan’s war cannot be reduced to a contest between two sides. It is many other things, among them a gun class of constantly shifting coalitions of specialists in violence and political trading that prey on civilians. Sudan’s peripheries have long been a lawless arena of brutal exploitation of people and natural resources by a military-commercial complex. Now the whole country is their canvas.

Four months after the fighting began, neither the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has won a decisive victory on the battlefield. That should surprise no-one. Never has a Sudanese war ended that way.

Sudan’s current war began on 15 April when the country’s most energetic and capable politician, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, tried to seize power. Despite scrupulous planning and tactical skill, the coup failed to eliminate the command of the SAF, including its chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Even if the RSF does ultimately succeed in controlling the capital, it has failed politically: RSF atrocities —- looting, killings, rape —- turned its battlefield advances into public relations disasters.

The fight began as a mobster shootout over which soldier-business cartel would run Sudan. But the two bosses are losing their grip. Hemedti appears to be physically incapacitated and has shown none of the populist energy that allowed him to set a political agenda. Trying to dispel rumours that he was dead or in intensive care, the RSF released a video of patched together clips, in which Hemedti stood, stiff and pallid, speaking for just 11 seconds.

Al-Burhan has emerged from his bunker and been more visible, but hardly more coherent. He is nominal head of a fractious cabal of generals and financiers, many of them old-guard Islamists from the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir.

I have been a scholar of Sudan for four decades. During 2005-06, I was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-13 served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, during negotiations over the independence of South Sudan and its aftermath. My most recent book, co-authored with Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch and Raga Makawi, tells the story of the civic revolution of 2019 and why it failed.

Looking at Sudan’s war in the context of the history of the Sudanese state and its wars, it’s reverting to type. It’s not an exact replica of earlier wars but if history doesn’t repeat itself, it rhymes. A cabal of generals and Islamist powerbrokers, who prospered under the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir, are managing to secure recognition as the government. But their state has even more limited territorial control and weaker institutions than before, while peripheral mode of paramilitary governance – exemplified by the RSF – is expanding in territory and capability.

The Sudanese state today betrays its history as a plunder state on the margins of the global order. The men contending for power are brokers in this extractive system, not statebuilders. For this reason, current efforts at finding a compromise between al-Burhan and Hemedti are no more than a square peg for a multi-sided hole.

Sudan’s political marketplace

The alliance of civilian forces along with some army generals in the SAF, and the majority of African and western nations, aspired for a transition to an institutionalised and democratic state following the overthrow of Al-Bashir. But on the eve of the August 2019 constitutional declaration, I wrote a paper whose pessimistic summary was at odds with the optimism of that moment.

It was my view that the issues under negotiation at the time did not include the real structures of power in the country. I saw the major question not as instituting democracy but whether Hemedti —- the dominant political entrepreneur —- could take power himself and secure an accommodation with the other political-military businesses or whether there would be an establishment counter-coup.

I also argued that because Hemedti’s model was not sustainable, the most likely scenario was an acceleration of the trend towards an unregulated and violent ‘political marketplace’ and ‘paramilitary governance.

In the event, Hemedti compromised with the SAF. First, he agreed to al-Burhan taking the chair of the collective presidency, known as the Sovereignty Council, and later with the coup in October 2021. Such collusion was workable as long as security sector hierarchies were left unresolved. But the politics of delay ran out of road with the provision in the December 2022 Framework Agreement that required the absorption of the RSF under SAF command. So Hemedti made his move.

Instead of capturing the state, Hemedti destroyed it. In the continuing war, battlefield losses and gains are less important than material capacity. Most important are the political funds of the bosses of each belligerent coalition. Now as earlier, the SAF has had more material overall but the RSF has more disposable political income, which matters more.

The square peg

In the early weeks of the war, American and Saudi mediators pushed a straightforward cessation of hostilities between the Sudanese forces. It was a justifiable immediate response. Four months on, it is unhelpful.

The mediation arena is now crowded. The African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development led by Kenya as well as Egypt are all heading initiatives. Each says it is coordinating with the others. Regardless of whether this is sincere or not, the outcome of formal commonality is that all will agree on the simplest possible analysis, a two-sided war.

For Egypt, the underlying issue is a collapsing or fragmenting state. Just as it correctly feared that the Kenyan-led peace talks twenty years ago would lead to the secession of southern Sudan, today it worries about a failed state with two rival governments that generates millions of refugees.

For Kenya, it’s a blocked transition to democracy. The Americans and Saudis are reviving their joint ceasefire plans, shying away from the question of how a Sudanese state can be made viable. Others, for example the United Arab Emirates, may yet propose new forums or insist on having a role.

The United Nations is missing in action.

In contrast to earlier conflicts in Sudan, national civil society and public intellectuals haven’t shaped a vision for how the country can escape from its death spiral. Nor indeed have African scholars and analysts. Sudanese political scientists have provided rich accounts of their country’s historical dysfunction. It’s time for those analyses to be revived and debated. In the vacuum, Sudan’s future is shaped by guns and money.

A barebones state

Thirty years ago, the Islamist minister of finance, Abdel Rahim Hamdi, argued that the central parts of Sudan constituted an economically viable miniature country. The towns and commercial farming schemes within a day’s drive of Khartoum became known as the “Hamdi Triangle”. This was a middle-income enclave and the locus of most infrastructure and investment. Hamdi argued that this area could prosper without having to administer the troublesome peripheries of southern Sudan, Darfur and other far-flung areas that served chiefly as labour reserves.

The fruit of this war may be a truncated semi-triangle in eastern Sudan. This would be run like the military-Islamist duopoly of the al-Bashir years, except more brutal and more venal. And, probably, more fractious. Different generals and Islamists have united around al-Burhan as their titular leader but are likely to stick together only as long as the RSF in Khartoum poses an existential threat.

The contest between Hemedti and al-Burhan remains an impasse. Early statements from American and Saudi Arabian mediators spoke of the SAF merely as a belligerent, putting it on an equal standing with the RSF. Lately, al-Burhan and his group are now widely recognised as the Government of Sudan. This is despite the fact that they don’t control the capital city. They administer only their de facto headquarters in Port Sudan and a handful of other cities.

The RSF is the revenge of the cannon fodder against Sudan’s political establishment that was ready to exploit them when it needed a dirty job done. Its leader, Hemedti, had a populist touch and made opportunistic alliances. His political fortunes rose because he had political energy and money. And because he promised an alternative to the old guard.

But Hemedti’s chameleon-like political stratagems couldn’t conceal the DNA of his political-military business. He is the son of the Janjaweed militias, infamous for their atrocities in the Darfur war of 2003-05. RSF is also a family affair, but none of Hemedti’s deputies – brothers, uncles, cousins – have the charisma and status to replace him.

If the RSF were to prevail, we should expect that the Sudanese government, or remnants thereof, would become a wholly owned subsidiary of the commercial-military-ethnic agenda of the Dagalo family and its most powerful backers.

The contradiction of paramilitary governance is its destructiveness. The RSF modus operandi is to attack and loot everything —- markets, farms, schools, hospitals —- leaving a wasteland. The militiamen drive out the locals but they can sustain themselves only by moving on to new victims. In due course they will run out of cities to pillage.

– Sudan’s future is being shaped by guns and money – like its past
– https://theconversation.com/sudans-future-is-being-shaped-by-guns-and-money-like-its-past-211948

August 24, 2023

Ethiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yohannes Gedamu, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett College

The federal government of Ethiopia declared a state of emergency in Amhara region on 4 August 2023. A special session of parliament endorsed this decision, placing the administration of the country’s second largest region under the military. This followed clashes between federal troops and Amhara forces resisting a government order to disarm and demobilise regional special forces.

Amhara region is the second most populous region in Ethiopia. Its northern neighbour is the Tigray region, which was the epicentre less than a year ago of the most destructive civil war in the history of modern Ethiopia. Combined with a political climate that is dominated by ethnic narratives, ethnic parties and regional militias, the current crisis in Amhara has sparked fears of another civil war.

Political tensions with ethnic undertones have been high in Ethiopia. However, forced displacements and massacres targeting ethnic Amharas have continued under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s watch since 2018.

In 2019 Ethiopia was ranked first in the world for the number of internally displaced people. This was more than those displaced by wars in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.

With ethnic polarisation higher than ever, pan-Ethiopian unity forces and political parties lost their appeal long ago. Ethnic grievances are now the main organising principles in Ethiopia, which shows why Amharas who were mostly known for supporting national political movements are now organising just as Amharas.

In the last two years alone, ethnic Amharas were displaced from suburbs surrounding Addis Ababa, the capital. Amharas also continue to face harassment by Oromia’s security forces when travelling to Addis Ababa, which is a self administrating city but geographically an enclave of Oromia region.

Then there’s the government’s reliance on ethnic-based militias, such as Amhara Fano fighters whenever it deemed necessary to ensure its survival. During the federal government’s war on Tigray, for example, the overstretched Ethiopia National Defence Force mobilised Amhara youth to fight. Following the war, the Fano emerged well-armed and much stronger with somewhat obscure but seemingly centralised command. This unsettled Abiy and led directly to the present crisis.

For the Amhara Fano fighters, however, main causes for their struggle are the continued massacres targeting their group, displacements, and discriminatory treatments that Amharas face across Ethiopia. For example, they mention that the recent mass arrest of Amharas in Addis Ababa by the federal police are examples of Abiy’s continued mistreatment of their group. To make matters worse, families who are demanding to know about the whereabouts of their imprisoned children are facing harassment.

I am a political science scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa countries. I have also authored a book on ethnic federalism and authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. Nine months into Abiy’s rise to power in Ethiopia, I warned that the persecution of ethnic Amharas could derail his then highly touted political reforms. At the time, he vowed to deal with political violence that targeted any ethnic group and impeded freedom of movement of citizens. Sadly, he failed to deliver.

Today, many in Ethiopia and especially citizens in the Amhara region believe that the incumbent Prosperity Party has lost both the credibility and the administrative capacity to lead the region. It’s my view that Abiy’s use of the military to address such a critical challenge will prove a failure. A military approach could result in more bloodshed.

Ethiopia’s increasing challenges

Once considered the lone hope to resolve Ethiopia’s problems, Abiy eluded scrutiny because of his unifying political rhetoric. But the political challenges continued to intensify. It was not long before political dissent was met with violence by his security forces.

By 2021, the media reported that 5.1 million people had been displaced internally. People from all of Ethiopia’s regional states had experienced forced displacement, mainly due to their ethnic identity. A disproportionate number of these were Amharas targeted in five regions.

The Tigray war was to follow. Two years of fighting, mainly between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, intensified the destruction in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians have died and the country needs at least US$20 billion for post conflict reconstruction.

A peace agreement was eventually signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. The political settlement brought relief in the country’s north. But Abiy’s regime did not attempt to find political solutions for all the country’s other challenges. For example, once peace in Tigray is achieved, the government did not also attempt to address the grievances of Amharas related to massacres, displacements and harassment they persistently had to endure. Even during the Tigray war, regions such as Afar and Amhara equally suffered from the destruction the war had caused. But the government seems to have ignored the suffering of Afar and Amhara Ethiopians.

As a result, the Amhara region is the centre of conflict with federal forces that has parallels with the Tigray war. The deployment of military drones – an important tool against Tigray – is responsible for the deaths of least 26 civilians in the Amhara city of Finote Selam.

Interestingly, now that the government’s peace deal with Tigray forces is holding, Abiy’s Oromo prosperity party officials are now openly inviting Tigrayans to also arm against the Amhara, which shows that the government is only steadfast to respond to violence by way of more violence.

Amhara region’s case

Amhara’s popular president and top leadership were assassinated months after they came to power in 2019. Since then, the region has not witnessed any semblance of normalcy. Successive Amhara leaders from incumbent Prosperity Party have also become failures.

Into this void stepped Amhara youth groups organised as impromptu militia units tasked with protecting and securing their localities. Over time these morphed into an Amhara popular resistance. A considerable number of disgruntled former Amhara special force members are now part of this fano led resistance after rejecting an offer to integrate with the federal defence force.

This rise in the strength of the Fano forces was cited by Ethiopia’s spy chief to be behind the federal government’s decision to dissolve regional special forces.

The order applies to all regions, but the Amhara view it as a ploy that only targets Amhara’s strong special forces while leaving others intact. They also believe that such a move could expose their region to possible attacks from Oromia and Tigray regions. These regions have claims over Amhara territory that have stoked longstanding tensions.

Amhara also see the move to disarm them as a betrayal, after they made sacrifices during the Tigray war to secure the prime minister’s survival.

What happens next?

Fears of another war that could match or even eclipse what happened in Tigray are not misplaced if a solution is not found. The international community must press all groups, especially Ethiopia’s federal government, to start political dialogue immediately and agree a ceasefire. Federal Authorities in Ethiopia must also learn that only dialogue and direct engagement with the public could help with conflict resolution.

It’s also time for Abiy to prove that Ethiopia can be at peace under his leadership. The impact of another civil war in the Horn of Africa, at the same time as Sudan’s, would be catastrophic.

– Ethiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-amhara-crisis-abiys-political-failures-threaten-a-return-to-war-211754

August 24, 2023

Ethiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yohannes Gedamu, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett College

In 2019 Ethiopia was ranked first in the world for the number of internally displaced people. This was more than those displaced by wars in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Ethiopia’s increasing challenges

Amhara region’s case

This rise in the strength of the Fano forces was cited by Ethiopia’s spy chief to be behind the federal government’s decision to dissolve regional special forces.

Amhara also see the move to disarm them as a betrayal, after they made sacrifices during the Tigray war to secure the prime minister’s survival.

What happens next?

It’s also time for Abiy to prove that Ethiopia can be at peace under his leadership. The impact of another civil war in the Horn of Africa, at the same time as Sudan’s, would be catastrophic.

– Ethiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-amhara-crisis-abiys-political-failures-threaten-a-return-to-war-211754

August 24, 2023

South Africa’s media often portrays foreigners in a bad light. This fuels xenophobia

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sikanyiso Masuku, Research Fellow at The Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Aﬀairs (TM-School), University of South Africa

The media’s huge influence comes from the fact that it’s capable of affecting public perceptions. In the light of this we set out to understand how South Africa’s print media writes about foreigners. And the implications of this representation on local attitudes towards foreign nationals.

Our recently published study looked at the representation of foreigners in some of South Africa’s biggest print and online newspapers. These included the Mail & Guardian, Sowetan, Times Live, Daily Maverick, Independent Online (IOL) and News24.

Foreigners make up about 7% (4 million people) of the country’s population. Their presence in the country receives a great deal of media attention and has sparked a number of xenophobic attacks. Between 1994 and 2021 there were 796 incidents resulting in 588 killings, 1,000 physical assaults and almost 4,700 foreigner-owned shops looted.

This xenophobia also has an attitudinal dimension. A 2013 survey noted that about 44% of South Africans didn’t agree with granting asylum to refugees, 45% said foreigners shouldn’t be allowed to live in the country and 67% didn’t trust foreigners. A more recent study asked respondents to mention the reasons behind anti-immigrant hate crimes: 51% blamed foreigners while only 23% blamed locals.

As researchers in Political Science and Sociology, we were interested in how South Africa’s print media portrays foreign nationals. And how this can influence public attitudes. Many researchers have argued that such representation can determine power relations in society. The media’s potential to influence public opinions on immigration and other social issues, is increased by its capacity to disseminate its representations at scale.

Our findings showed that the media often used language that portrayed foreigners in a bad light, and dehumanised them. We argue in our paper that this has the potential to trigger violence against the perceived invaders.

We also found that the language used was often alarmist when it came to the size of the African immigrant population in South Africa. This created the sense that the country has an overwhelming number of immigrants. This is not true.

We conclude that there’s an urgent need to find a solution. We believe that part of the solution lies in rectifying erroneous public perceptions about foreigners.

How the media portrays foreign nationals

We found a common trend in the way the South African media describes the immigrant population. For instance, without incorporating academic or other credible research, there is loose use of adjectives such as “undocumented” or “illegal” when referring to African foreign nationals.

This reinforces the impression that all foreigners are undocumented and illegal.

Our research also highlighted the use of imprecise but nonetheless suggestive quantification of the African immigrant population. The media frequently used expressions such as “huge numbers”, “many foreigners”, “thousands of immigrants”, “millions of foreign nationals”, “over 300 illegal foreigners”, and “a vast number”.

We also noticed the use of dehumanising metaphors. This is mostly done through likening African immigrants to nonliving objects such as water, cargo or natural disasters that must be controlled. Often the movement of foreigners in the country was described using terms like “massive influx”, “abnormal influx”, “flooding to South Africa’, and “trickling into”, “roaming free”, “descended”, “fled” or “flocked”.

In some instances, the threat level was emphasised through describing the immigrant population as having “taken over” and being an “added burden” to the country. Correspondingly, war terms and phrases such as “crackdown”, “leading the charge”, “operation to rid” and “protect porous borders” were used to signal a response while reinforcing the notion of an impending invasion.

Another issue our study investigated was how the media attached meanings to words. Words such as immigrants and foreigners were often accompanied by verbs such as “blame”, “arrest”, “deport”, “employ”, “suspect”, “hold”, “transfer”, “scapegoat”, “prevent”, “dislike” and “kick”.

Some of the common verbs associated with foreigners were “steal”, “overrun”, “commit”, “dominate”, “enter”, “continue” and “occupy”. The choice of these verbs perpetuates the narratives that foreigners commit crime, and have overrun, dominated, and occupied South Africa.

Us versus them

Corresponding to the negative depiction was the creation of separate identities (us versus them). Mostly, this was done by downplaying the negative traits of South Africans while emphasising their positive traits. The positive traits of African foreign nationals were minimised and their negative traits highlighted.

An example of how the negative actions of South African citizens are downplayed (or even concealed), was in media reports of xenophobic violence. These sought to conceal the agency of locals through the use of verbs as nouns and the selective use of passive and active voices.

The use of verbs to replace words that identify a class or group of people (nouns), leads to headlines like “Xenophobic attacks spread in Gauteng”, “Overnight xenophobic violence rocks Johannesburg”, and “Night of horror for Malawians as attacks on foreigners hit Durban”.

The terms “xenophobic attacks”, “xenophobic violence”, “attacks’, and “looting” were often turned into nouns in a way that hid the perpetrators of the xenophobic violence.

In contrast, we noticed how the agency of foreigners was highlighted in negative reports with headlines such as “More than half of violent crimes in Gauteng committed by illegal immigrants”.

Apart from the polarising nature of language use, one of our most important findings was that of unequal access to the media. Our study found that politicians (often critical of immigration) dominated media debates on foreigners. Reported speech from political elites was often reproduced without any critical analysis, followed by civil society and academics. Foreigners were quoted in only 14% of the reported speeches.

What should be done

The causal relations between media discourse and public attitudes have not been scientifically proven. Nevertheless it’s plausible to argue that the media has the potential to shape public attitudes.

More attention needs to be paid to how South African media practitioners portray foreign nationals in their platforms. Such portrayals are important, as they can affect how foreign nationals are treated not only by ordinary South Africans but also employers, the police and health institutions, among others.

– South Africa’s media often portrays foreigners in a bad light. This fuels xenophobia
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-media-often-portrays-foreigners-in-a-bad-light-this-fuels-xenophobia-204564

August 24, 2023

Accra’s most vulnerable residents were failed during COVID – the government didn’t understand their realities

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Seth Asare Okyere, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Arizona

Containment measures, such as the lockdowns introduced to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus, had devastating consequences for vulnerable urban populations globally.

In response, public, private, and civic organisations responded with various interventions to soften the impact, especially on the most vulnerable. Support was given in the form of cash transfers, food delivery, and personal protective equipment. In Ghana, government support also included tax waivers, and subsidies for water, electricity, and other household utilities.

Government officials claimed that the interventions reduced the impact of the pandemic on urban residents. And so we sought to analyse how COVID-19 related support from families, friends, government agencies, faith based and non-governmental organisations helped reduce the pandemic’s impact on people. We looked at the impact on four aspects of their capital: financial, human, social and physical.

Our study in the Adenta municipality of the Greater Accra region found that the interventions had limited impacts. We also found that COVID-19 related support only reduced the negative impact of the pandemic on financial capital, and not on the other forms of capital. We discovered that building the residents’ capacity to bounce back after a pandemic would have required comprehensive support, and interventions that were interconnected.

Based on our findings, we recommend that decision makers should anticipate, prepare and plan for risks by focusing on the multiple factors that expose poor people living in cities to severe impacts. This should also involve collaborating with vulnerable groups to draw on their knowledge and experiences.

The everyday life of the urban resident has many aspects. These interact to create and compound their vulnerabilities to a wide range of risks. We suggest that this complex challenge should be an opportunity to rethink planning for and responses to future risks.

The realities of poor people in cities

Accra, the capital of Ghana, is home to about 5.5 million residents. The city is characterised by poor planning, widening income inequalities and slow economic growth.

Most households, especially those in informal settlements, are exposed to poor environmental and economic conditions. City authorities are grappling with high unemployment, urban sprawl and pressure on public amenities.

The first two cases of the virus were recorded in Ghana on 12 March 2020. The virus spread quickly across the country, with Accra recording the highest number of cases.

For our study, we interviewed 400 respondents in the Adenta municipality. It is a densely populated area within the capital. We asked residents to indicate their agreement with a series of statements such as “my accessibility to food was impacted by COVID-19”, “my standard of living significantly fell during the COVID-19 pandemic” and “I received support from government or religious organisations during the COVID-19 pandemic”.

The responses suggest that the pandemic affected residents’ access to economic activities and opportunities to enhance their well-being. For example, most residents were unable to engage in economic activities. This led to a drastic reduction in their already irregular incomes. Others reported that the lockdown impeded access to regular visits to friends and relatives to express support during sickness or even bereavement. For residents, this was a huge psychological burden.

A package with no punch

Our findings point to key weaknesses in the various interventions.

Firstly, they did not help people when it came to social, physical and human aspects of everyday urban living. For some residents, the inability to continue educational and skill acquisition programmes was due to cost and limited online learning options. This affected their human capital, truncating initial progress.

Secondly, the most vulnerable people weren’t always targeted. This was due to shortcomings in the way support was given. It was also due to the way beneficiaries were selected and how distribution took place.

For example, politicians and urban bureaucrats publicly claimed and highlighted the influential role of interventions by public authorities and their partners. However, our survey showed that people on the ground actually viewed the interventions as quick fixes. Some residents reported that while free food and cash transfers were necessary, they didn’t address the root cause of their impoverishment and deprivation. They wanted functional social safety nets and access to secured jobs with regular incomes.

Also, household utility subsidies were targeted at lifeline consumers (those considered very poor) who barely made use of significant amounts of water and electricity. Consequently, these interventions appeared to have limited real impact. One community leader remarked:

We don’t need financial tokens like one-time cash transfer but other important aspects of our lives that make it possible to make our own money: productive opportunities, access to social services such as affordable and quality public transport, health care, and for those of us without high education to acquire new employable skills.

Towards multi-dimensional approaches to future risks

We outlined one approach that we argue could be beneficial – to develop community based resilient planning platforms as avenues for action oriented collaboration among public, civil society and community groups. This would help ensure that responses to current and future pandemics or uncertainties were aligned with the multiple aspects of urban living.

Stephen Leonard Mensah, PhD Student at the University of Memphis, contributed to this study.

– Accra’s most vulnerable residents were failed during COVID – the government didn’t understand their realities
– https://theconversation.com/accras-most-vulnerable-residents-were-failed-during-covid-the-government-didnt-understand-their-realities-211300

August 24, 2023

The power of needlework: how embroidery is helping South African women tell unspeakable stories

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Puleng Segalo, Chief Albert Luthuli Research Chair, University of South Africa

In June 2020, three months after South Africa entered the first of a series of hard lockdowns to slow the spread of COVID, the country’s president Cyril Ramaphosa described men’s violence against women as a “second pandemic”.

In the first three weeks of that lockdown the Gender Based Violence Command Centre, designed to support victims of gender-based violence (GBV), recorded more than 120,000 victims. Also in its 2019/2020 crimes statistics, the South African Police Services indicated that an average of 116 rape cases were reported each day.

While South Africa’s GBV crisis is not new, it was exacerbated by the COVID pandemic, which made the perpetual challenges faced by many women and gender non-conforming individuals hyper visible.

This visibility sheds light on the reality that the home is a complex space where care and violence can co-exist. Women can feel simultaneously safe and in danger in their homes. All of this happens behind closed doors, often robbing women of a voice to express their fear, suffering and pain.

That affects more than just individual women: GBV is a collective, structural challenge. When women are violated at homes, it affects familial relations, productivity at work, and overall societal functioning.

I am a psychologist who wanted to harness the power of visual artistic expression to highlight the multi-layered ways in which gendered violence is woven into everyday encounters. To do so, I turned – as I have done in previous research – to embroidery.

As I have written in my previous research into the role of embroidery in empowering women’s storytelling, for this current work, I drew again from this methodology to visually tell the narrative of GBV in colourful and creative ways, paying attention to moments of encounters where those who perpetrate and those against whom the violence is perpetrated appear in the same frame. The visual artwork invites the viewer to witness. The hope is that beyond the witnessing is a call for action.

Everyday violence

Evelyn Twala’s embroidery communicates fear and pain.

Beyond making visually appealing artwork, needlework has always been a useful tool to tell difficult or unspeakable stories. Through depicting their lived experiences of gender trauma, women can have an outlet for their pain. While their embroideries serve as a canvas for the outpouring of pain, loss and trauma, their work also tells stories of hope, resilience and resistance.

For this research I worked with the Intuthuko women’s collective. The group consists of 16 Black women based in one of the townships (these are historically Black urban residential areas) in Ekurhuleni in the Gauteng province. GBV in South Africa continues to affect Black women disproportionately, a reality rooted in history as well as in present systems.

The idea with this project was to let the visuals do the talking. So we did not focus on personal experiences, but an overview of the many ways in which GBV shows itself in our lives. I was part of the group and also contributed in making an embroidery piece. This allowed me to shift from being just a researcher and spectator to becoming a contributor in the process of thinking, reflecting and making. It was a collaborative endeavour where we came up with themes as a collective and then each focused on a particular theme for the making of the embroideries.

During the process of making the embroideries, we would share stories of how GBV constantly affects our communities, reflecting on the need to use these embroideries as a form of awareness raising, tool for community dialogues, and to challenge the patriarchal system that has rendered the world unsafe for women.

The aim was to highlight the multi-layered ways in which gendered violence is woven into everyday encounters. We sought to engage the ways in which creative meaning could be made of GBV in our communities – and how the challenges facing our society because of gendered violence could be given attention.

Perpetual fear

The embroideries depict a society where fear is manufactured, created, and produced by patriarchal and unjust structural violent systems. This in turn leads to women living in perpetual fear; they cannot feel safe within and outside of their homes.

Through our artistic visual depictions, we expressed how GBV creates a sense of women being regulated and controlled, and of not entirely owning their bodies.

Some embroideries featured women being violated and robbed in public places, reduced to kneeling down for mercy. The artworks highlighted women’s sense that the streets are not safe and that they are never sure whether they will make it back home safely.

Angela Mangte’s artwork captures women’s sense that they are not safe in the streets.

Feeling unsafe and in a constant state of fear makes it difficult for many women to exercise their agency: when society is structured in ways that make women victims, patriarchy prevails.

Staring reality in the face

These embroideries are not just pieces of visual art. They are a challenge to the viewer to stare the violence in the face with the hope that they will be compelled to reflect and to act.

The embroideries have been displayed at an art exhibition where the public could attend and engage with the pieces. We also produced a multilingual visual booklet which is being used in the women’s community and schools as a tool for opening up dialogues on GBV.

– The power of needlework: how embroidery is helping South African women tell unspeakable stories
– https://theconversation.com/the-power-of-needlework-how-embroidery-is-helping-south-african-women-tell-unspeakable-stories-211491

August 23, 2023

Zimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley College

Nelson Chamisa, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president.

A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017.

Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (81-year-old) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last.

At least 62% of the population is under 25. They are “born-frees” who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is unclear; some claim it is as high as 80%. The government claims it is 18%. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be 90% of the economy.

Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous illegal track across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring South Africa. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.

It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a total revamp of the economy. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe.

As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.

Youth appeal

According to the independent African surveys network Afrobarometer, 67% of Zimbabweans are unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking.

In its recently released election manifesto, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s battered economy at just under US$ 21 billion.

Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of isolation. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses.

Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer feed its small population of just over 16 million people.

Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, too western-leaning, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his trump card. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “Ngapinde Hake Mukomana” (let the young man enter the state house).

Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC?

Voter apathy, funding and harassment

Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote.

Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very low. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that while 85% (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35.

In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state.

Chamisa founded the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late Morgan Tsvangirai. But Tsvangirai’s death in 2018 ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard.

The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like Fadzayi Mahere. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has little money against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.

Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad.

He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is strategic ambiguity. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.

Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and violence against opponents.

In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a fractured skull. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a homemade bomb. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost their lives. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on unclear charges.

One man show

Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a million followers, he regularly only shares Bible verses or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.

His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent.

Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.

Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.

– Zimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him
– https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-election-can-nelson-chamisa-win-he-appeals-to-young-voters-but-the-odds-are-stacked-against-him-211615

August 22, 2023

Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn’t pick sides

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg

Some three decades since the end of the Cold War, the world order is undergoing a structural transformation. At the heart of it is the challenge posed to the hegemony of the US. This is primarily being led by Russia and China which are discontented with Washington’s excesses across the global stage. The most recent example of this rebellion was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Fiona Hill, a British-American foreign affairs specialist, observed that the war was a “proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the ‘Rest’ against the United States”.

The African continent is an obvious contender for major power courting as this realignment takes place. This is for at least four reasons.

Firstly, it is the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, representing some 28% of all the votes in the General Assembly. Secondly, it possesses some crucial raw minerals that are found only in the continent. Thirdly, it possesses some important sea trade routes, particularly in east Africa). Finally, the continent is home to the fastest-growing youth demographic, and will account for about 42% of the world’s youth by 2030.

I am a scholar of geopolitics and have conducted research on the continent’s trade ties to the major powers. My findings have led me to the conclusion that Africa can gain more by being neutral than by picking sides.

The drivers

Africa’s size in the UN General Assembly can’t be overstated. The continent sometimes struggles to respond in a co-ordinated way. Nevertheless, it has, in the past, been able to vote in sync in a way that has proved influential. The most notable example of this was the 1971 vote for the resolution that brought mainland China into the UN and replaced Taiwan. In total, there were 76 votes in favour, of which 27 came from African member states.

In today’s UN, having this large grouping on one’s side helps countries the most when it comes to passing – or defeating – resolutions. With the UN Security Council in gridlock because the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) have veto power, there has been a shift towards the UN General Assembly, which works on one-member-one-vote. General Assembly votes are mainly symbolic. But they are a useful indicator of where the international community stands, and are a powerful moral weapon for any major power.

Africa’s other major attraction is, of course, its resource wealth. This has become even more pronounced and taken on extraordinary importance in the push towards alternative sources of energy, both renewable and non-renewable. And in the production of products driven by the rise in technological innovation, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt, which is needed to make device screens among other things. The DRC is the world’s leading producer of this crucial mineral.

At the same time the oil reserves of Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will become increasingly important as countries look to diversify away from Russia for natural gas, and from fossil fuels more broadly.

Then there are the trade routes. The Red Sea route, which straddles northeast Africa and links it to the Indian Ocean, constitutes 10% of annual global trade .

The Red Sea route passes countries such as Eritrea and Somalia. Both have been actively courted by Russia.

For its part, China has earmarked the route through its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Its aim is to boost port infrastructure among countries with Indian Ocean coastlines.

Lastly, Africa is home to the fastest-growing youth population. This will be important in the search for future markets, particularly in sectors such as technology and education.

The US and Europe are also keen to tap this human capacity as their own populations age above the global average. Many are looking to Africa as a source of inward migratory flows.

Africa’s ties with the major powers

In 2022, the continent as a whole exported US$43.1 billion worth of goods to the US and imported goods worth US$30.6 billion.

By comparison, China exported US$164.1 billion to Africa and imported US$117.5 billion worth of African goods, in the same year. With African exports totalling US$661.4 billion, the US accounts for 6.5% and China 17.7%.

China, the notable growth story of the past half-century, has thus become the African continent’s single biggest trading partner, though the combined power of the European Union’s trading bloc of 27 countries still leads.

China’s ties with the continent are the result of decades of diplomatic and commercial efforts to woo the continent through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Part of this has been driven by its desire to counter the US. The other driving force has been to sustain its economy, given Africa’s untapped potential.

Russia has pursued a different strategy. Give that its trade with the continent is at a minimum – exports and imports were around US$18 billion in 2021 – it has rather sought to become a security partner, drawing on sentimentalised Soviet history.

Washington’s principal instrument for growing trade, and encouraging good behaviour, in Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act, set to expire in 2025. The framework is a lever. But, as the data show, trade is in evident decline.

The general picture can obscure some nuances. Some African states are more deeply intertwined with the US than others. For example, Djibouti has an American military base (along with other states, though not Russia at this point). And Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are also among the top recipients of US direct investment.

On the other hand, Eritrea, which was the only African state to brazenly vote against the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seems to have no aspirations to be in America’s good graces. This notorious outlier aside, the world is deeply intertwined, with high interdependence even among the competing major powers.

The US and China, despite their trade war, have struggled to decouple from one another, with their bilateral trade reaching new heights as recently as last year.

In light of the comparatively diminished US-Africa trade, the US may be looking to make use of third parties. It could potentially influence the EU to influence Africa. The Huawei issue demonstrates this. The US has successfully pressured quite a few of its allies to halt doing business with the Chinese technology giant. According to Unctad data, France (US$60 billion) and the UK (US$65 billion) are the principal holders of African assets.

As these and other European states seek to “de-risk” from China, there may be third-party consequences for Africa. This might include undue pressure on the continent to behave in certain ways towards China and towards Russia.

Picking sides isn’t the best option

Recent research, including my own on US-China trade “competition” over Africa, shows that the prevailing notion that smaller countries need to “pick sides” in polarised global contexts is false. Africa is best served when it conducts trade with as many partners as possible.

Indeed, as shown, the major contenders are themselves conducting record-breaking trade with one another.

All the while, Europe continues to conduct trade with Russia following the war against Ukraine (indeed, it is growing in some respects).

The continent can, therefore, afford to be neutral. What it cannot afford to do is pick sides and preclude any partnerships. In the oncoming multipolar order, there are no self-evident, African-specific needs to pick sides. All options can be on the table.

– Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn’t pick sides
– https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516

August 20, 2023

Zimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of Stirling

Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.

Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my newly published study.

As a genocide scholar, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the role of external institutional bystanders. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an analysis of official British and US government communications. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe.

My latest study explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into Operation Gukurahundi. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation.

The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe.

My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice.

The genocide

In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of Robert Mugabe, in the newly independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was both politically and ethnically motivated. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by Perrance Shiri.

Mnangagwa had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s Joint High Command. He reported directly to Mugabe.

Mnangagwa, however, has denied accusations he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.

The stated objective of the campaign was to rid the country of “dissidents”. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.

In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to extreme violence. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence continued. This included the orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele.

Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is between 10,000 and 20,000. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between 30,000 and 50,000 Ndebele may have been killed.

Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a national unity accord.

Rape and sexual violence

My research reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda made a historic judgment which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.

I gathered data for my study from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events.

The patterns I identified include:

public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults
people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members
rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing
forced intrafamilial rape
forced bestiality
forced nudity.

These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention.

The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.

One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, shared the cruelty of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused.

There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….

Such rituals of degradation are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms.

Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.

President Mnangagwa with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021. Kingston Royal

I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:

killing the foetuses of pregnant women
internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)
forced pregnancies
genital mutilation.

Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.

These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention.

Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction.

Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area.

Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.

My research establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected to this day.

Swept under the carpet

Prosecution for genocide extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its planning, preparation or execution.

In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an international political priority.

Similar reports had trickled out of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were swept under the carpet.

Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was minimised by British representatives in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in numerous diplomatic cables between Harare and London.

The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts.

Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was invited to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.

Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 April. The survivors will continue their search for justice and accountability.

– Zimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term
– https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-president-was-security-minister-when-genocidal-rape-was-state-policy-in-1983-4-now-he-seeks-another-term-211633