Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Morolake Josephine Adeagbo, Senior Research Associate, University of Johannesburg

For any woman, pregnancy and giving birth are major life-changing experiences. Becoming a mother brings with it a range of emotions and, in many African cultures, positive emotions are centred when talking about motherhood.

Scholarship from the eastern, western and southern parts of the continent has emphasised how motherhood is linked to notions of continuity, strength and sacrifice, unconditional love, consecration and spirituality, family ties, loyalty and happiness.

In many African cultures, mothers are expected to be resilient, happy and tenacious. But what about the often “silenced” aspect of motherhood? Generally, mothers are not expected or encouraged to share any negative emotions about their experiences and role. Those who defy this expectation are frequently stigmatised and labelled “bad mothers”.

These responses often arise from the belief that motherhood is life’s key purpose. Seen through this societal lens, becoming a mother ought to be fulfilling and overwhelmingly positive.

But human emotions are complex. People can experience joy and sadness simultaneously. This is underscored by our study among HIV-positive mothers in South Africa about their experiences of motherhood. These young women, aged between 16 and 24, told us how they grappled with harsh realities and daily challenges.

They expressed regret about their unplanned experience of motherhood and wished their circumstances were different. It was clear they were experiencing conflicting internal emotions as they considered the roles, responsibilities and difficulties of motherhood.

Such negative emotions – especially regret – are seldom expressed when talking about motherhood. This leaves little room for African mothers to be vulnerable. To change this ideology and practice, safe space must be created for these feelings.

Doing so can promote open, honest and non-judgmental discussions that will lead to changes in the narratives surrounding motherhood, influence practices and boost emotional, mental and physical health. It can allow mothers and their children to thrive and be better equipped with the necessary skills to face life, irrespective of their challenges.

Motherhood is hard

We conducted one-on-one, in-depth interviews with ten HIV-positive mothers in Johannesburg, South Africa. The women all became mothers when they were adolescents. Their children’s ages ranged from two months to seven years old. We also interviewed three key stakeholders who, through their work as academics and researchers and in the healthcare field, engaged closely with adolescent mothers and HIV-positive individuals in South Africa.

None of the young mothers had planned to become pregnant. They were dealing with intersecting psychological, socioeconomic, health, cultural and physiological dynamics. They were stepping into new, unknown realities: as young mothers, some still had school responsibilities. Others were unemployed, as is the case for most adolescent girls and young women aged between 15 and 24 in South Africa. They depended financially on others such as their grandmothers, the government’s monthly child support grant, or transactional sex partners.

Their HIV status created another layer of complexity due to the attached health responsibilities, stigma and shame. Apart from the high susceptibility of adolescent girls to unplanned pregnancy and HIV infection in South Africa, another important reason for working with this group of mothers was to give voice to their experience and to possibly inform relevant policies.

No judgment

We created a safe, non-judgmental space in which the young women could share their feelings, both positive and negative. At least half of the participants told us that this was the first time they’d felt able to freely narrate their experiences, especially negative feelings about the experience of motherhood. Away from the pressure of cultural beliefs and expectations, they opened up.

The most prominent emotions they expressed were negative: specifically, they felt regret and anger. Their reflections were sometimes painful. One said:

I will always feel like I robbed myself of my childhood, and at times I will resent my child. I would hit my child so badly, and even though she couldn’t hear what I was saying but I will always tell her that I regret being with her.

Another told us:

I don’t know whether it was worth it, but I know maybe I could have prevented it … I wish I had known how difficult it was to actually be a mother.

This is a powerful negation of society’s notion that the moment a woman becomes a mother, she has access to knowledge and systems that enable her to maintain the image of “the good mother”. The notion that the fear and doubt will be pushed aside and only positive emotions will dominate is simply false.

Most of the mothers also shared the joy and rewarding feelings of having their children. One stated that:

… at first I was scared, but now I am happy because I look at her and she inspires me a lot … now I am seeing life in another way … with the support of my aunt and friends, I feel better.

Another said:

… it is good to see my baby laughing, happy, playing, very nice … like it is very (long pause) … it is beautiful … I like him smiling cos I’m like I can no longer imagine my life without my son (laughs).

Freedom and support

It’s time to shift the conversation from conventional and rigid constructions of motherhood to a more open, inclusive picture across Africa.

This will do more than just give mothers the freedom to express the full range of their emotions about motherhood: it can also contribute to more inclusive, tailored policies and programmes that take into account the many complexities and dilemmas our participants spoke about.

These might include access to need-specific, supportive, non-judgmental counsellors and therapists, and increased peer mentorship programmes, as well as access to sexual and reproductive health information and career support programmes.

– ‘Motherhood is hard’: young, HIV-positive mums in South Africa open up about regret and anger
– https://theconversation.com/motherhood-is-hard-young-hiv-positive-mums-in-south-africa-open-up-about-regret-and-anger-192338

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adwoa Owusuaa Bobie, Research Fellow, Center for Cultural and African Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

In the 1950s and 1960s, young Africans were assisted financially by their governments to study in western countries in the hope they would return to contribute to nation building. Individuals who qualified abroad and returned home formed the educated elites of immediate post-independent Africa.

Over the years, the demography of such migrants has changed to include professionals who after graduation at home move abroad in search of employment and remain there permanently. This loss of human talent and skills – the “brain drain” – is arguably one of Africa’s key developmental challenges.

The migration of highly skilled professionals such as doctors, nurses, engineers and academics from Africa has serious economic, political and social implications for development.

But there is another side to the migration of skilled people. That is “brain gain” – the return migration of professionals – and “brain circulation” – temporary migration of professionals between countries. This is not well documented, especially in the case of African countries.

This is the gap we sought to fill, using a case study of the late Ghanaian fashion designer, Kofi Ansah.

Ansah’s impact on Ghanaian fashion was immense because of the timing and context of his return in 1992. He had built a successful career for 20 years in the UK and the future looked promising. On the other hand, the country he returned to was undergoing profound political and economic transformation. Ghana was transitioning from military rule to a civilian government. Political tension was high, linked to an economic downturn following structural adjustment programmes adopted in the 1980s. But Ansah chose to relocate his budding career to Ghana.

His case demonstrates how the knowledge and expertise migrants gather through international career mobility can be converted into assets at an individual, national and international level. Returning migrants can transform traditional industries into modern, globalised ones.

Transforming Ghana’s fashion industry

We are researchers in sociology, African studies and geography who have been studying how internal and external migration and spatial context influence cultural and creative practice in Ghana. For the Kofi Ansah case study we interviewed 31 Ghanaian fashion designers whose career journeys had been directly and indirectly influenced by him. These interviews are supplemented by information from social media dedicated to Ansah and his works.

Kofi Ansah, who died in 2014, was from a creative family. His elder sister, Felicia Abban, was the official photographer of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president. His elder brother, Kwaw Ansah, is an acclaimed film writer, director and producer.

After completing his secondary education, Kofi enrolled in the Chelsea School of Art in the United Kingdom to study fashion design. He made his first fashion headline after he designed a beaded dress for Princess Anne. Subsequently, he worked for several successful British fashion brands, including Gerald Austin and Guy Laroche, before establishing his own studio in central London in 1980.

Despite his early success on the UK fashion scene, Ansah returned to Ghana in 1992 to get fresh inspiration and “try to show people that we can use our fabrics for other things … We just have to work on it and make it commercial,” he explained during an interview.

The way cloth was produced locally, using strip loom technology, limited the volume of production. And the conventional styling of clothes limited their patronage. These were some of the features Ansah sought to change.

Ansah transformed Ghana’s fashion industry in four areas:

• Fabrics and design: His modern designs used African traditional cloth, such as kente and bogolanfini. Linked to these style changes was his collaboration with Woodin and the Ghana Textiles Production, two textile producing companies, to introduce the sale of fabric in single yards instead of the standard six yards. This made the cloth more accessible and functional. It led to the production of casual clothes, such as skirts, blouses, shirts, shorts and trousers, for men and women. He then introduced ready-to-wear clothing at Woodin.

• Accessories: Ansah was also passionate about promoting fashion accessories made with local materials. These included wood, raffia and his personal favourite, calabash. His runway designs always included stunning accessories. The use of prominent accessories has now become an integral element of African fashion shows.

• Production: Ansah was instrumental in the introduction of the Friday African wear policy in Ghana. This was aimed at promoting the wearing of local bespoke garments in workplaces on Fridays. Ansah used his friendship with then minister for trade and industry, Alan Kyeremanten, to push his idea to democratise and regularise the use of wax print. Ansah also influenced fashion production by employing international marketing strategies like fashion shows and exhibitions. He thus opened Ghanaian fashion to international audiences by using globally accepted techniques.

• Human capital: More importantly, Ansah’s vision to grow a lasting and successful industry propelled him to mentor many of Ghana’s finest contemporary designers. He partnered with international agencies to launch mentorship programmes for young designers.

One such programme was the Web Young Designers Hub, financed by the French Embassy and coordinated by Ansah and Franca Sozzani, former editor of Vogue Italia. Another project spearheaded by Ansah was the Ethical Fashion Initiative, a partnership between the United Nations and the Presidential Special Initiative programme. These programmes and the exposure that came with them positioned contemporary designers to engage in “brain circulation.”

By participating in projects, young designers had the opportunity to travel to other countries and learn about aspects of fashion such as fabric production and event organisation. Such travel was geared towards acquiring knowledge that would have an impact on Ghana’s fashion industry.

These engagements helped young fashion designers build networks with designers across the globe.

Ansah’s impact

The Ghanaian fashion industry is making its mark globally. Steve French and other young designers are recognised for their creative works and talents. Garments made by Ghanaian designers like Duaba Serwaa and Christie Brown are worn by stars such as Lupita Nyongo and Beyonce respectively. Young Ghanaians, too, proudly wear African clothes for all occasions. The current status of Ghana’s fashion industry is largely due to the efforts of Kofi Ansah.

– Kofi Ansah left Ghana to become a world famous fashion designer – how his return home boosted the industry
– https://theconversation.com/kofi-ansah-left-ghana-to-become-a-world-famous-fashion-designer-how-his-return-home-boosted-the-industry-211291

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Diana Højlund Madsen, Senior Gender Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Africa Institute

Zimbabwe’s 2023 harmonised elections have largely been depicted as a battle between the two “Big Men” – President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ruling Zanu-PF and Nelson Chamisa of the leading opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Significant media attention focused on the uneven playing field between the ruling party and the opposition.

The election results announced on the 26 August are being disputed due to reports of delayed voting, voter intimidation and ballot paper irregularities. Mnangagwa has been announced as the official winner of the presidential poll, but the CCC has rejected these results.

Another concern distinct to this election was the stark decline in the number of women candidates nominated by the main political parties for direct election.

We are working on a three year research project with a focus on the representation of women in politics in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe as well as gendered electoral violence. This project seeks to explore barriers to women’s participation in politics in Africa and pathways forward, initially researched in the book Gendered Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Africa.

Zimbabwe ranks low in measures of gender parity in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique boast 46%, 44% and 42% women’s participation in parliament, respectively. Zimbabwe’s political parties need to field more women for direct election, outside the confines of the quota, in order to reach gender parity.

Gender quota

Zimbabwe’s constitution in 2013 introduced a gender quota to ensure the equitable representation of women in parliament. Zimbabwe’s parliament is composed of a National Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). The quota requires that the lower house reserve 60 of its 270 seats (22%) for women representatives. The upper house is to appoint 60 of its 80 senators from a list that alternates between female and male candidates, called the “zebra-list”.

The purpose of the quota is to push the country towards gender parity – 50/50 female/male representation – as directed by the 2003 Maputo Protocol and the Southern African Development Community’s 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development.

However, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined since 2013, in spite of the quota. In 2013 women made up 33% of the National Assembly and 48% of the Senate. Only 12% of these women were elected directly. In 2018 the numbers in the National Assembly and Senate fell to 31% and 44%, respectively.

There was a significant decline in the number of women nominated to contest the 2023 elections. Only 68 (11%) of 633 aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women.

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In spite of these challenges, 23 women were elected into parliament (against 26 in 2013 and 25 in 2018). The 23 newly elected women will be added to the 60 women appointed through the quota, making a total of 83, or 30.7% representation of women, in the lower house. After the appointment of senators, as stipulated by the constitution, the number of women in the full parliament will increase. Though commendable, this still places Zimbabwe below average within the region.

These gains may fail to go beyond the 31% representation achieved in 2018. The women in the National Assembly will still be less than 50% of parliamentarians and have limited decision making powers. Moreover, there is little indication of the substantive impact these women will have to empower Zimbabwean women, considering their limited numbers. The country’s record of democratic deficits is another important challenge.

The newly elected women MPs may have limited room for manoeuvre to promote gender equality in this political context. But they are still important as decision makers, legislators and role models for other women to enter politics.

Looking beyond the quota

A gendered audit of the published list of nominated candidates for direct elections reveals that Zimbabwe’s political parties did not field enough women to reach gender parity in 2023.

Data shows that 633 registered candidates contested 210 seats through direct election. Of these candidates only 68 were women. That is, only 11% of aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. Of these 68, Zanu-PF fielded 23 women (34%), the CCC fielded 20 (29%), and the remaining 25 women were from small minority parties (27%) and independent candidates (10%).

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Harare and Bulawayo provinces nominated the highest number of women candidates for election. In Mashonaland Central only one woman was nominated across 18 constituencies. Only two women were nominated in Matebeleland South across 12 constituencies.

It is important to ask why political parties are not fielding more women for direct election. And what this means for the future of representative politics in Zimbabwe.

Gender bias within political parties

The data above indicates a bias against woman candidates that permeates across political parties. Apart from the women nominated through the obligations of the quota, neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF fielded enough women to make gender parity a reality in the 2023 elections.

The active exclusion of women from politics is driven by gendered prejudices. These are informed by social, cultural and religious beliefs rooted in patriarchal values that view women as inherently weak and untrustworthy.

The threat and use of violence against women candidates continues to be used to coerce and discourage women from contesting elections. As argued by Zimbabwean scholars Sandra Bhatasara and Manase Chiweshe,

patriarchy, intertwined with the increase in militarised masculinities, is producing exclusion with limited spaces for women’s participation.

A negative perception is also linked to “quota women” as they were not elected by “the people”. These women are often subjected to elite patriarchal bargaining. They primarily serve the needs of their party, rather than representing Zimbabwean women.

Gatekeeping

The presence of a gender quota system provides a facade of progress. This conceals the stark reality that neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF is committed to increasing women’s representation outside the confines of the quota. Political parties function as “election gatekeepers”. They determine the level of women’s inclusion in representative politics, outside the quota system.

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Read more: How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship

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The number of women elected indicates that, unlike in past elections, Zimbabweans seem more willing to vote for women representatives. Political parties should build on these small gains and nominate more women for elections. This will allow the country to move closer to the goals of gender parity, gender equality and democratic plurality.

– Zimbabwe’s election was a fight between men – women are sidelined in politics despite quotas
– https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-election-was-a-fight-between-men-women-are-sidelined-in-politics-despite-quotas-212131

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Namhla Matshanda, Senior Lecturer, Political Studies, University of the Western Cape

Ethiopia’s access to the coast has occupied the minds of the country’s rulers since time immemorial. This is because being landlocked undermines Ethiopia’s ability to grow its economy, develop its military (navy force) and exert influence across the Horn of Africa.

We see this preoccupation in the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1952, Eritrea – a coastal country – was controversially federated into Ethiopia. Failure to maintain this annexation led to Eritrean independence in 1993 and Ethiopia became a landlocked country once again. This was a major blow for the new administration that had taken over political power in 1991. For the new government this translated into some limitations on their economic and political goals for the country.

As a scholar of African politics, I have researched Ethiopia and its relations with its neighbours, including its civil wars, political reforms, national identity, state building and border tensions.

There is no doubt that Ethiopia’s lack of direct access to the sea has constrained its ability to cater for its large population and hindered economic growth and development. Politically, being landlocked limits Ethiopia’s geostrategic options in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Ethiopia has several options for peaceful access to the sea. All of them could have a positive economic impact not only in Ethiopia but across the region. The options include further engagement with Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland on equitable terms for the use of their ports.

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The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor with Kenya – which is still in its early phases – could also be a game-changer in the region if built to completion.

Economic motivations

Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies on the continent. It also has a large population, estimated at around 126 million and projected to grow at about 2.7% a year. This indicates a big market and many needs to be met.

Economic development became central to fiscal and economic planning and projections in the period between 2000 and 2012. But lack of direct coastal access became a notable obstacle to Ethiopia’s efforts to achieve middle-income status via export-oriented industrialisation.

At one time Eritrea’s Assab port handled 70% of Ethiopia’s trade.

At present Ethiopia’s imports and exports mainly pass via the port of Djibouti. Reliance on Djibouti has proved costly and unsustainable, however, leading Addis to search for alternatives.

Political considerations

Coastal access would give Ethiopia more political clout to help it achieve its ambition of dominating the Horn of Africa.

Peaceful access to the coast would depend on its relationships with its neighbours. Some have been strained, others harmonious.

Since 1991, Ethiopia has been on a path of regional domination, aided by its economic dominance in the region and in Africa. This was interrupted by its war with Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, which remained unresolved until 2018. The conflict limited but did not end Ethiopia’s political ambitions in the region, as seen in the country’s foreign policy since the early 1990s. Addis has appeared willing to get its own way in the region by whatever means.

Ethiopia continues to host the African Union and has been an active and dominant member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional organisation. Since 2018, the country’s foreign policy has taken a conciliatory tone. We see this in the rapprochement with Eritrea following a peace deal that restored relations between the two states after two decades of conflict. This suggests a shift from a rigid security-focused foreign policy to a more pragmatic approach to issues that include diplomacy, climate change, migration, terrorism and access to the sea.

Because of its history and geopolitical position, Ethiopia has the potential to be a force for either stability or instability in the region. Finding a peaceful way to improve coastal access would make it a force for stability.

Agreement would benefit all countries

If Ethiopia opted for a forceful approach this would add fuel to a fire. Countries in the region, including Ethiopia, are currently battling various internal conflicts, with real potential to spill over.

Despite the fact of being landlocked, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has sought to revive the country’s navy, suggesting grand ambitions for the country’s armed forces.

There is no way forceful access to the coast would be a feasible option for Ethiopia.

The country is already engaged in negotiations with Djibouti and Kenya for more equitable terms for the use of their coasts. Peaceful and mutually beneficial agreements with any of the neighbouring countries will have positive outcomes for all. Ethiopia would still emerge stronger, and would continue on its economic growth path.

– Landlocked Ethiopia wants better sea access: a port deal with neighbours could benefit the region
– https://theconversation.com/landlocked-ethiopia-wants-better-sea-access-a-port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria

South Africa recently hosted a Brics summit. The event attracted international attention because the group has recently begun to emerge as a possible rival against US dominance of world affairs. The US and China lie at the heart of this debate. They are the two biggest trading partners of most African countries and both have strategic interests that they are determined to protect. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international relations expert Christopher Isike to explain.

How might Brics affect US-African ties?

Altering diplomatic relations between African countries and the US on account of Brics would have its pros and cons for the continent. Some potential gains from alienating the US would include:

• Increased autonomy for African countries in their foreign policy decisions. They might be able to align more closely with their own interests and priorities without the perceived influence of a major global power.

• The potential of diversifying partnerships and alliances with other countries or regional blocs that Brics presents. This could lead to more economic, political and security relationships, reducing reliance on any single nation.

• Stronger regional cooperation and integration. This could unify efforts to address common challenges such as security, infrastructure development and economic growth. Such regional cooperation offers more fertile ground for the African Continental Free Trade Areato thrive.

However, a strained relationship with the US could also come at a cost. Some of the losses would include:

• Reduced trade opportunities, foreign direct investment and economic aid, potentially leading to economic setbacks for the continent. Beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), which provides preferential access to the US market, would be hit the hardest.

• The US has been accused of militarising the continent to advance its own interests. But it plays a significant role in supporting peacekeeping efforts and counterterrorism initiatives in various African regions. Alienation could therefore affect security and stability, leaving a void in terms of resources, expertise, and coordination in these critical areas.

• Alienating a major global player like the US could also lead to diplomatic isolation for many African countries on the international stage. This could weaken their influence in international organisations, negotiations and decision-making processes.

What if African countries alienated China?

On gains, African countries would be able to diversify their economic and political partnerships by reducing dependence on China. This could lead to increased engagement with other countries and regions, potentially resulting in a more balanced and varied international relations portfolio.

African countries could also enhance their bargaining power in negotiations. This could lead to more favourable terms in trade deals, investment agreements and development projects. Other countries including the US, EU members and Australia might see an opportunity to fill the void.

Some Africans see China’s influence as overly dominant, potentially leading to concerns about sovereignty and autonomy. Alienating China could be seen as a way to assert national interests and prevent over-reliance on a single foreign partner.

That said, African countries can ill afford to alienate China.

China is a major economic partner for many African countries, providing investments, trade opportunities and infrastructure projects. Alienating it could lead to economic setbacks, including reduced trade and foreign direct investment.

Second, China is involved in various infrastructure development projects across Africa. These include roads, railways, ports and energy facilities. A strained relationship with China might hinder the completion of these projects or slow down future infrastructure development, potentially affecting economic growth and connectivity.

Third, China is a significant player in international diplomacy and geopolitics. So, alienating it could lead to reduced influence in global forums where China has a presence. These include the United Nations and various other international organisations. This might limit African countries’ ability to advance their interests on the global stage.

However, it must be noted these gains and losses from alienating either the US or China are speculative and would depend on a wide range of factors. For example, the relationship between African countries and both of these superpowers is multifaceted and complex. Any decision to alienate either of them should involve careful assessment of both the short-term and long-term consequences, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The trick is for Africa to articulate its own interests and pursue them consistently.

Is there a common African position on the US and China?

African countries have diverse foreign policy priorities and alliances. Their responses to international conflicts can vary widely. Some might choose to align with major powers like the US, China, the European Union or Russia. Others might opt for neutrality or noninterference in the conflicts of other regions.

These strands have played out in the voting patterns on the three UN General Assembly votes to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent. They should act consistently in line with that common position. They could also have a common position on Brics instead of leaving it entirely to South Africa to define an African agenda for Brics.

– Brics: African countries face opportunities and risks in alienating China or the US – an expert weighs in
– https://theconversation.com/brics-african-countries-face-opportunities-and-risks-in-alienating-china-or-the-us-an-expert-weighs-in-212273

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zelna Booth, Pharmacist and Academic Lecturer (Pharmacy Practice Division, Department of Pharmacy and Pharmacology, University of the Witwatersrand), University of the Witwatersrand

Traditional medicines are part of the cultural heritage of many Africans. About 80% of the African continent’s population use these medicines for healthcare.

Other reasons include affordability, accessibility, patient dissatisfaction with conventional medicine, and the common misconception that “natural” is “safe”.

The growing recognition of traditional medicine resulted in the first World Health Organization global summit on the topic, in August 2023, with the theme “Health and Wellbeing for All”.

Traditional medicines are widely used in South Africa, with up to 60% of South Africans estimated to be reliant on traditional medicine as a primary source of healthcare .

Conventional South African healthcare facilities struggle to cope with extremely high patient numbers. The failure to meet the basic standards of healthcare, with increasing morbidity and mortality rates, poses a threat to the South African economy.

In my opinion, as a qualified pharmacist and academic with a research focus on traditional medicinal plant use in South Africa, integrating traditional medicine practices into modern healthcare systems can harness centuries of indigenous knowledge, increasing treatment options and provide better healthcare.

Recognition of traditional medicine as an alternative or joint source of healthcare to that of standard, conventional medicine has proven challenging. This is due to the absence of scientific research establishing and documenting the safety and effectiveness of traditional medicines, along with the lack of regulatory controls.

What are traditional medicines?

Traditional medicine encompasses a number of healthcare practices aimed at either preventing or treating acute or chronic complaints through the application of indigenous knowledge, beliefs and approaches. It incorporates the use of plant, animal and mineral-based products. Plant-derived products form the majority of treatment regimens.

Traditional medicine practices also have a place in ritualistic activities and communicating with ancestors.

South Africa is rich in indigenous medicinal fauna and flora, with about 2,000 species of plants traded for medicinal purposes. In South Africa the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga and Limpopo are trading “hotspots”. The harvested plants are most often sold at traditional medicine muthi markets.

Uses of medicinal plants

Medicinal plants most popularly traded in South Africa include buchu, bitter aloe, African wormwood, honeybush, devil’s claw, hoodia, African potato, fever tea, African geranium, African ginger, cancer bush, pepperbark tree, milk bush and the very commonly consumed South African beverage, rooibos tea.

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The most commonly traded medicinal plants in South Africa are listed below along with their traditional uses:

Buchu – Urinary tract infections; skin infections; sexually transmitted infections; fever; respiratory tract infections; high blood pressure; gastrointestinal complaints.

Bitter aloe – Skin infections; skin inflammation; minor burns.

African wormwood – Respiratory tract infections; diabetes, urinary tract disorders.

Honeybush – Cough; gastrointestinal issues; menopausal symptoms.

Devil’s claw – Inflammation; arthritis; pain.

Hoodia – Appetite suppressant.

African potato – Arthritis; diabetes; urinary tract disorders; tuberculosis; prostate disorders.

Fever tea – Respiratory tract infections; fever; headaches.

African geranium – Respiratory tract infections.

African ginger – Respiratory tract infections; asthma.

Cancer bush – Respiratory tract infections; menstrual pain.

Pepperbark tree – Respiratory tract infections; sexually transmitted infections.

Milk bush – Pain; ulcers; skin conditions.

Rooibos – Inflammation; high cholesterol; high blood pressure.

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There are many ways in which traditional medicine may be used. It can be a drop in the eye or the ear, a poultice applied to the skin, a boiled preparation for inhalation or a tea brewed for oral administration.

Roots, bulbs and bark are used most often, and leaves less frequently. Roots are available throughout the year. There’s also a belief that the roots have the strongest concentration of “medicine”. Harvesting of the roots, however, poses concerns about the conservation of these medicinal plants. The South African government, with the draft policy on African traditional medicine Notice 906 of 2008 outlines considerations aimed at ensuring the conservation of these plants through counteracting unsustainable harvesting practises.

Obstacles to traditional medicine use

The limited research investigating interactions posed should a patient be making use of both traditional and conventional medicine is a concern.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many patients used traditional remedies for the prevention of infection or treatment.

Understanding which traditional medicines are being used and how, their therapeutic effects in the human body, and how they interact with conventional medicines, would help determine safety of their combined use.

Certain combinations may have advantageous interactions, increasing the efficacy or potency of the medicines and allowing for reduced dosages, thereby reducing potential toxicity. These combinations could assist in the development of new pharmaceutical formulations.

Sharing information

The WHO in its Traditional Medicine Strategy for 2014-2023 report emphasised the need for using traditional medicine to achieve increased healthcare.

Key role players from both systems of healthcare need to be able to share information freely.

The need for policy development is key. Both conventional and traditional medicine practitioners would need to be aware of and engage with patients on all the medicines they are taking.

Understanding the whole patient

Patients often seek treatment from both conventional and traditional sources, which can lead to side effects or duplication in medications.

A comprehensive understanding of a patient’s health profile makes care easier.

This could also prevent treatment failures, promote patient safety, prevent adverse interactions and minimise risks.

A harmonious healthcare landscape would combine the strengths of both systems to provide better healthcare for all.

– South Africa’s traditional medicines should be used in modern health care
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-traditional-medicines-should-be-used-in-modern-health-care-211382

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye Ekiti

Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was detained and deposed on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani.

The unconstitutional change of government has been widely condemned internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and threatened military intervention.

However, other military juntas in the region have been sympathetic to the cause of the coup leaders.

The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.

Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than 300,000 children and displaced five million people in the region.

At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents controlled about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory.

Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria.

Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.

From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London conferences further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.

Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over 3,000 troops to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic granted the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border.

Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed 3,000 troops to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015.

Chad deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon raised their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively.

In July 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.

To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of military presence in Niger.

This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger.

I have researched Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my research and understanding of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:

• Ecowas’s attention is divided

• Niger’s attention is diverted

• the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise

• suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.

Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram

The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta.

Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has sanctioned Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country.

This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.

The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention.

The junta has thus prioritised defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat.

Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, 17 Niger soldiers were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year.

Many western countries have suspended critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity.

Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has severed defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces.

Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently reported.

The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region.

The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.

– Niger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why
– https://theconversation.com/nigers-coup-weakens-regional-fight-against-boko-haram-four-reasons-why-212202

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christopher P. Davey, Charles E. Scheidt Visiting Assistant Professor of Genocide Studies and Prevention, Clark University

The three-decade conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to the proliferation of hundreds of armed groups. With the violence appearing to take an ethnic slant, several groups have emerged claiming to be protecting their communities from attacks. One such group is the Twirwaneho, which has become more active since 2019. Christopher P. Davey, who has extensively studied the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, explains how the Twirwaneho’s claim of communal self-defence highlights the fractured nature of Congolese politics.

What is the conflict in the DRC all about?

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a theatre of increasingly violent conflict since the Rwandan genocide of 1994 pushed over a million refugees across the common border. Rwanda’s efforts to capture those responsible for the genocide sparked two wars in two wars. Violence, driven by armed groups, has been persistent since.

Central to Congo’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa, the underrepresented social and economic groups in the eastern region, and external parties. Added to this mix are transnational armed groups, foreign militaries, the UN peacekeeping mission and Congolese state actors like the military.

This has resulted in the world’s longest-standing refugee crisis. It has also led to the proliferation and fragmentation of dozens of armed groups in the eastern region.

One of these groups is the Twirwaneho, a Banyamulenge – or South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsi – self-defence/armed group.

This group is important to understand because its rising profile demonstrates the unending nature of Congo’s war.

Who are the Twirwaneho?

The Banyamulenge are a minority group in South Kivu, eastern DRC, who have faced attacks based on their ethnicity. Formed in the early 2010s, Twirwaneho (meaning “let’s defend ourselves” in the Banyamulenge language) is a contemporary response by mutinying national army officers to continued conflict and local self-defence needs within the Banyamulenge community.

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Read more: The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government

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The overlap between self-defence and armed groups is not unique to the DRC. My research on the history of Banyamulenge soldiers shows that the gumino (“let’s stay here”) self-defence tradition was part the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s international campaign in the late 1980s. It was used to raise funds and recruit for the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994).

This led to a generation of fighters trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front who got into the ranks of various armed groups across both Congo wars.

These groups include Twirwaneho. Its leader is Michel “Makanika” Rukunda, who was once in the Congolese national army before he mutinied in 2019. He transformed Twirwaneho militias into a militarily coordinated, and internationally represented and funded, fighting force. But he is also accused of human rights violations that have placed him on the European Union sanctions list.

The Twirwaneho’s direct role in national politics is minimal. However, the group has become a symbol of defiance for both the community it claims to defend and those who see Tutsis as foreign invaders. Also, a report from the UN group of experts on the DRC hints towards collaboration between Twirwaneho and the Rwanda-supported M23.

Is the group keeping the peace or fuelling conflict?

The Twirwaneho claim that neighbouring armed groups and the national army make up a coalition launching counterattacks on Banyamulenge villages. This is in reprisal for Twirwaneho operations against the military and other armed groups and connected populations.

My research shows that the Twirwaneho are related to, but distinct within, an array of armed groups in DRC engaged in a complex political, economic and at times existential struggle.

During Nairobi fieldwork, to understand more about the international side of the movement I met three young former rebels who had fled the Twirwaneho. They joined the group after their schools closed following increased local conflict. Graduating from students to soldiers, they fought this anti-Twirwaneho coalition. Echoing his community’s sentiment, one former Twirwaneho officer told me they are “not an armed group”. He emphasised this point:

… I was seeing myself as a civilian who decided to come and protect my community.

Inherent in the Twirwaneho’s fight are claims of stopping a Tutsi genocide in the DRC, also made by the M23. However, increased fighting across North and South Kivu has exacerbated violence against all civilians.

What’s behind the group’s rising profile?

Makanika as the emerging leader of the group has instilled discipline and “patriotism”. In my fieldwork I heard consistent claims of insufficient promotion and pay for Banyamulenge soldiers in the national army and persecution of their people. These claims became reasons for joining, along with a narrowing of options for traditional livelihoods.

As command centred under Makanika, his diaspora reputation grew. Many Banyamulenge in the US and African Great Lakes region credit him with preserving the community. Young Banyamulenge men have left families and careers to join the Twirwaneho. The group recruits school children, pressures community members to join and draws on existing self-defence groups.

Coordinated by the Mahoro Peace Association, the Banyamulenge diaspora has contributed hundreds of thousands of US dollars to displaced families in South Kivu. This is not an uncommon practice across other groups in the country.

The peace association asserts it does not actively raise money for Twirwaneho, but its leadership advocates for fighting to reclaim the homeland. This implicitly encourages support.

Many Banyamulenge do not consider any funds sent as support for an armed group. Rather, it is seen as mobilisation for the survival of the community.

What’s the end game?

What the Twirwaneho want is a complex question. Their social media posts broadcast goals of Banyamulenge peace and security in Congo. Yet, violence in the DRC is not a simple ethnic conflict. Although many Banyamulenge support the group, they are divided on how its goals are to be accomplished.

It is easy to see how a diaspora is willing to support the survival of their community. However, armed groups typically result in continued violence and military competition: rebels fight for material gains that do not translate into increased security for civilians.

This piece was written in collaboration with researchers at the Conflict and Human Security Research Group (GEC-SH/CERUKI).

– DRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east
– https://theconversation.com/drc-rising-twirwaneho-rebel-group-highlights-the-unending-volatility-of-the-countrys-east-211539

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yogan Pillay, Extraordinary Professor in the Division of Health Systems and Public Health, Stellenbosch University

For centuries, we have known that tuberculosis is a social disease. It thrives on poverty and social factors such as malnutrition, poor housing, overcrowding, unsafe work environments and stigma.

Globally in 2021 an estimated 2.2 million cases of TB were attributable to undernourishment, 0.86 million to HIV infection, 0.74 million to alcohol use disorders, 0.69 million to smoking and 0.37 million to diabetes.

But knowledge about social determinants alone does not always translate into tangible action and progress. A new trial in India, called RATIONS, aimed to determine the effect of nutritional supplementation on new cases of tuberculosis in households of adults with pulmonary TB. The research found that providing food baskets to people with TB and their households could go a long way to prevent and mitigate the disease.

No easy silver bullets

The TB community has typically looked for biomedical solutions, or “silver bullets”, for a social pathology, and we are struggling to make progress.

Since the COVID pandemic, TB mortality and incidence have increased globally, putting TB back on top as the single most deadly infectious killer of humankind.

In 2021, 1.6 million people died of TB. In Africa, TB incidence is high (212 per 100,000 population) with a high case fatality rate because of the HIV epidemic.

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Read more: Tuberculosis on the rise for first time in decades after COVID-19 interrupted public health interventions and increased inequality

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Undernutrition is the most important cause of TB. This has been shown in studies in many countries, including South Africa, where researchers found poor levels of nutrition in patients admitted to a specialised TB hospital.

Malnutrition refers to all forms of deficiencies in nutrition, including over-nutrition and obesity. Undernutrition refers more specifically to a deficiency of nutrients.

While we know that many patients with TB have poor nutrition, the latest evidence is that undernutrition also plays a key role in TB within households.

The results of the Reducing Activation of Tuberculosis by Improvement of Nutritional Status (RATIONS) trial show that improved nutrition in family members of patients with lung TB reduced all forms of TB by nearly 40%, and infectious TB by nearly 50%.

This trial recruited 10,345 household members of 2,800 patients with lung TB.

• All TB patients received a monthly 10kg food basket (rice, pulses, milk powder, oil) and multivitamins for six months.

• In one group family members received 5kg rice and 1.5kg pulses per person per month, while the other group of family members did not get food baskets.

Food worked like a vaccine in this trial, cutting the risk of household members developing TB.

Nutrition could also protect against other conditions such as anaemia, diarrhoea and respiratory infections, but these were not not the main focus of the trial.

An accompanying paper, based on the results of the RATIONS trial, showed that severe undernutrition was present in nearly half of all patients.

An early weight gain in the first two months was associated with 60% lower risk of TB mortality. The other benefits were higher treatment success and better weight gain. During the six-month follow-up period, a remarkable treatment success rate of 94% was achieved.

Getting food to patients

How expensive was the intervention? The cost of a food basket was US$13 per TB patient per month and US$4 per household member per month and could be delivered, even in rural areas, using field staff.

Even before the RATIONS trial, the Indian government had recognised the need for nutrition support for people with TB, and in 2018 launched “Nikshay Poshan Yojana”, a direct benefit transfer scheme. Under this scheme, each TB patient receives a financial incentive of US$6 per month for the duration of the anti-TB treatment (typically, six months for people with drug-sensitive TB).

Emerging data suggests that while the scheme improves the treatment completion rates among patients with TB in India, they often receive their payments late. There is a need to improve the efficiency and provide timely payments.

The new RATIONS trial suggests that directly providing food baskets may be another effective strategy.

Many countries, including India, have other social security programmes, including public distribution systems to provide food grains at subsidised prices. Using existing channels to provide extra food rations to people with TB, and expanding the menu to include proteins such as pulses and millets, is a strategy worth exploring. This could also have positive effects on other diseases such as diabetes.

Implications for South Africa

South Africa is one of the countries labelled by the World Health Organization as a “high TB burden country”.

What does this latest research mean for South Africa? Statistics South Africa reported that in 2021 2.6 million people had inadequate access to food and a further 1.1 million stated they had “severe” inadequate access to food. More than 683,000 children five years and younger experienced hunger.

This toxic mix requires prevention of TB by nutritional support, drugs to prevent TB infections and early diagnosis with molecular tests and treatment.

With high levels of food insecurity and undernutrition in South Africa, fuelled by the highest levels of inequality, it is critical that South Africa includes social benefits for people with TB and those in their households to reduce the prevalence of TB in the country and to meet the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.

Regardless of how social benefits are distributed, action must be based on evidence. We need better tests, cures and vaccines for TB, but they alone cannot end the epidemic.

TB patients must be provided with the social benefits that they need and deserve, as a basic human right.

– TB research shows a good diet can cut infections by nearly 50%
– https://theconversation.com/tb-research-shows-a-good-diet-can-cut-infections-by-nearly-50-211377

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg

One key outcome of the 15th Brics summit, hosted by South Africa, is the decision to invite six more countries to join the group with effect from January 2024. They are Argentina, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. All six had applied for membership. The enlargement will grow the association’s membership to 11, and increase its envisaged role as a geopolitical alternative to global institutions dominated by the west.

The five current member countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have argued that their size, in economic and population terms, was not represented in the world’s institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Brics five represent about 42% of the world’s population and more than 23% of world GDP.

The enlarged grouping will account for 46.5% of the world population. Using the IMF’s 2022 GDP data, we can deduce that it will account for about 30% of global GDP.

The disparate nature of the six new members is bound to spark debate about the real nature of Brics.

In his welcoming remarks at the summit (22-24 August), the host, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, stated:

Brics stands for solidarity and for progress. Brics stands for inclusivity and a more just, equitable order. Brics stands for sustainable development.

The group has been remarkably consistent on these values and aspirations.

Understanding the nature of Brics

One of the first questions about Brics is often “what is it?”. This is telling. This question does not come up, for example, about the European Union or even the G20.

Brics is not an organisation (it has no headquarters, secretariat or treaty). But it does have a formal institution that is jointly owned – the New Development Bank. Confusion about Brics’ precise nature is understandable.

At various points it has referred to itself as a forum, a platform, a mechanism, a partnership ‘’) or a strategic partnership, to name a few. Others have called it an alliance or a bloc. It is neither.

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Read more: South Africa’s role as host of the BRICS summit is fraught with dangers. A guide to who is in the group, and why it exists

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In international relations, both terms are strictly defined. The term “alliance” refers to a mutual defence pact and implies military cooperation. A “bloc” refers to ideological consistency (political bloc) or a free trade agreement (trade bloc). Brics has none of these characteristics.

The members also disagree on some key issues. China and Russia are noncommittal (at best) on the aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa to become members of the UN Security Council. Their declarations have over the years reiterated the same phrase:

China and Russia understand and support the aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa to play a greater role in the United Nations.

This shows there is some serious disagreement within the group.

As a political scientist interested in global politics, I have written about Brics and its potential for changing the status quo. With hindsight, I can assert that certain principles have informed it since its establishment and first summit in 2009. In my view, at a material level, the 15 years of summit declarations point to four fundamental values:

• mutual development

• multilateralism

• global governance reform

• solidarity.

The association self-reportedly seeks secure sustainable development for itself and the global south, to safeguard and advance multilateralism, to institute reform for the goal of representative institutions, and to achieve solidarity among members.

Economic development

Economics comes first in the group; at its root, it is a collective of emerging economies eager to sustain and improve their economic trajectory. Their insistence on reform is, after all, based on their perceived disproportionate under-representation in global financial institutions.

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Read more: China’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region

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The group’s first, and so far only, notable establishment is the New Development Bank, primarily to finance infrastructure development. There’s also a contingent reserve that members can draw from in emergencies. It is valued at US$100 billion.

Multilateralism

The second value refers to the group’s concern about the use of entities outside the UN to pursue global objectives. Most notable is the use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) to invade Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks in the US, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and the UK, circumventing the UN Security Council.

Russian president Vladimir Putin expressed this concern in his speech to the 2007 Munich Conference on Security:

The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.

Global governance reform

Thirdly, the Brics countries have long pushed for leaders of global institutions to be elected in a transparent and democratic way. For example, the president of the World Bank has always been an American, and the managing director of the IMF a European. The World Bank has 189 member states and the IMF 190.

The idea of the New Development Bank was not to substitute the World Bank but to “supplement” existing international financial institutions. Brics still envisions a World Bank in which its members have voting rights proportional to their economic weight, and with staff drawn from across the world in a geographically balanced way.

Solidarity

Finally, the members have articulated solidarity with one another in a number of declarations, beginning in 2010. It comes down to mutual assistance in times of humanitarian disasters, respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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Read more: When two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries

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In light of criticism and sanctions plans against China, for its alleged suppression of the Uyghur-Muslim population, and Russia, for invading Ukraine, solidarity has come to mean silence or nonalignment.

A blank slate

Brics is a nebulous entity. This has proved beneficial for member countries hosting Brics summits. They get to set the agenda and use it for their ends – without upsetting the consensus. One common pattern has been the use of summits to set overarching themes that are favourable to the host country’s domestic policy and regional leadership or foreign policy stance.

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Read more: Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn’t pick sides

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Thus, for example, all Brics summits hosted by South Africa foregrounded Africa in their names: “Brics and Africa: Partnership for mutually accelerated growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism” in 2023. Brazil and Russia have inserted issues that are important to their region, and often invited leaders of neighbouring countries to retreats.

This shows how much clout they enjoy, as they get to funnel access to a now-renowned association that is simultaneously well established but also evades easy definition. With the addition of the six new members, such evasiveness is set to only continue.

– Brics expansion: six more nations are set to join – what they’re buying into
– https://theconversation.com/brics-expansion-six-more-nations-are-set-to-join-what-theyre-buying-into-212200