Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of Maryland

The apparent assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the point man for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been sanctioned by 30 countries for the group’s destabilising activities.

Prigozhin was believed to be living on borrowed time after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority.

Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were beholden to Russian interests. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin referred to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted.

Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the entral African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some two dozen African countries.

I research the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests.

The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system.

None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests.

Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence.

Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin

The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia investing very little on the continent. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts revenues from mining operations in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions.

It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso to deliver the same message.

The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched.

The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted hybrid warfare – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however.

Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been credibly accused of human rights abuses including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and hundreds of civilian deaths. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory.

By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed.

Reassessments in Africa

What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar.

What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism.

Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of how little Russia actually brings to Africa in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent.

The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the Russia-Africa Summit at the end of July. Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it bombed the Ukrainian ports that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore.

This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to only 17 African heads of state attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019.

The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause.

Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.

– Russia in Africa: Prigozhin’s death exposes Putin’s real motives on the continent
– https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-prigozhins-death-exposes-putins-real-motives-on-the-continent-212707

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Giacomo Falchetta, Postdoctoral Research Scholar in Energy, Climate and Environment, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)

Hydropower provides clean electricity to millions in Africa. It’s the largest source of renewable energy on the continent and accounts for nearly one quarter of total electricity generation in sub-Saharan Africa. Some countries, however, have a much heavier reliance on it than others. For instance, hydropower accounts for at least 80% of electricity generation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia.

The continent has a lot more hydropower potential too. With relatively abundant water resources, sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have 1.4 petawatt hours a year of untapped, low cost potential. To put this into perspective, 1 PWh of energy could power about half a billion households for one year, assuming each household consumes an average of about 5.5 kWh per day.

However, there are political and environmental concerns that planners must consider if they want to expand hydropower. The tensions between Ethiopia and downstream countries in the Nile River basin, following the construction of the colossal Grand Renaissance Dam, are emblematic of this.

As a researcher who studies the linkages between energy systems and climate change, I’ve written a paper that highlights why using or increasing dependency on hydropower involves climate-related risks.

The global and regional climate is getting more extreme. Events such as droughts and floods are becoming more frequent. Worryingly, energy planning and management is not keeping pace with such changes in most African countries.

Climate change threat to hydropower

Hydroelectricity is generated by harnessing the kinetic energy of water. This water may come from rivers or water that’s been stored in natural or artificial basins. Water flows through turbines which spin. The kinetic energy of the moving water is converted into mechanical energy and eventually into electrical energy.

A dam’s power output is, therefore, very sensitive to extreme changes in river and water availability. It’s also sensitive to permanent changes in the weather from when it was constructed.

I carried out an extensive review of existing studies on the projected impacts of climate change on hydropower in different areas of sub-Saharan Africa. This included its impact on output, reliability and future hydropower prospects.

I found that the impact on hydropower output varies across regions. Countries in east Africa could benefit from a wetter climate in terms of hydropower output. On the other hand, there are serious concerns that countries in southern Africa and western Africa will face a drier climate. This would bring negative impacts. Drops in water levels mean turbines will operate at lower rates and therefore produce less electricity. Central Africa would be the least affected sub-region in terms of precipitation change and drought incidence.

The expected changes in precipitation levels and patterns are uncertain, however. Different climate models and scenarios offer a mixed picture of how the future might unfold, particularly over central and southwestern Africa. Still, there is consensus that extreme hydrological events will increase throughout the continent with climate change. This will make power systems less reliable, unless there’s proper planning in place.

Several countries are more at risk than others because they depend largely, or entirely, on hydropower generation and have few back-up options available. These include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Some might even increase their dependency on hydropower.

Only some countries have made progress in diversifying their energy mix. Kenya, for instance, has developed and continues to plan for significant alternative renewable capacity.

Planning and management of power supply

Several planning and management actions are needed to prepare for the effects of climate change on hydropower. This will ensure that citizens in sub-Saharan Africa benefit from a more reliable power supply.

First, hydropower-dependent countries need to accelerate their efforts to diversify their power mix. A new study demonstrated that African countries should increase investments in other renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power. The study finds that in many areas, such as in the Zambezi and Niger river basins, renewables are becoming cost competitive or even cheaper than hydropower. The objective of investing in renewable sources of electricity is in line with the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

Second, countries must address inadequate power transmission infrastructure. This contributes to the lack of resilience. Countries could benefit from transboundary power trading opportunities among different sources of renewable energy. For instance dry spells, leading to reduced river streamflow, might coincide with high solar PV outputs in neighbouring countries, or vice versa. This will require both adequate generation and transmission infrastructure in different countries. It’ll also need a high level of coordination among different power producers and countries.

Finally, it’s essential to include a nexus approach in power system planning. For example, when planning new hydropower projects, policymakers must assess the future need for water in farming and cities. They should also assess the potential risks of multiple sectors needing water simultaneously.

Overall, power system planners must work with a robust framework that accounts for the inter-dependencies between hydropower, water availability and climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Different actions can increase the resilience of hydropower infrastructure and ensure a reliable and sustainable power supply.

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Read more: Africa’s energy sector will need to transform radically – these are the five biggest challenges

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– Climate change will affect hydropower — African countries must be prepared
– https://theconversation.com/climate-change-will-affect-hydropower-african-countries-must-be-prepared-212659

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

The progress with South Africa’s land reform programme has not been properly monitored. This has resulted in an incorrect understanding of the real progress made to correct the racial distribution of farm land ownership in South Africa.

In 2012 the National Development Plan set a target to redistribute (or restore) 30% (or 23.7 million hectares) of all freehold agricultural land to black South Africans by 2030.

The general perception is that the land reform programme has failed to deliver a recognisable shift in ownership patterns. But the real situation is more nuanced. This is because land reform is made up of a number of initiatives. These include redistribution, restitution, financial compensation, private acquisition and state acquisition.

Some have progressed more than others. In this article I look at what’s happened to the state acquisition of farm land which is then, for the most part, leased to entrepreneurs wanting to become farmers. I identify the factors that stand in the way of its success. The list is drawn from reports as well as insights from farmers and based on my three decades of experience as an agricultural economist in the South African farming sector.

I have also identified steps that the government should take to fix the problems. These are informed partly by my view that the government should not be in the business of farming and should ideally simply be ensuring a conducive environment for businesses to thrive. The land should be in the hands and control of the entrepreneurs.

It is of the utmost importance that the government act on this ineffective and politics-ridden system of land leases and ensure that beneficiaries are getting secure rights to the land. If not, the question about why there are so few successful black commercial farmers (7% of all VAT registered farm businesses in South Africa will continue to be asked.

Land acquisition

In 1994 when South Africa held its first democratic elections, the 77.58 million ha of farmland in the country with registered tile deeds was mainly owned by white farmers.

Since then, by our calculations, the total area of land rights transferred away from white ownership – either to the state or black beneficiaries – or where financial compensation has been made, is equal to 19,165,891 ha. Our calculations will be published shortly by the Bureau for Economic Research in its update on the National Development Plan targets.

This is equivalent to 24.7% of all freehold agricultural land.

Although the number may look heartening, given that it is close to the 30% target set out in the National Development Plan, the issue of concern is that the state is now a major owner of agricultural land (more than 2.5 million hectares).

This is a problem for a number of reasons.

Flawed design

The Agricultural Land Holding Account Trading Entity is responsible for the acquisition of land and other property (movable and immovable), in terms of the Proactive Land Acquisition Scheme which was implemented in 2006. Through the scheme the land is then held by the state for the use by lessees of the programme.

By June 2023, the state had acquired 2.5 million hectares of productive farmland through the programme. Most of the roughly 2500 beneficiaries have a 30-year lease agreement with the state. There are several farms where no agreement has been signed.

The arrangement makes reference to the leasing of land. But there’s no mention of the transfer or sale of land to beneficiaries.

The acquisition strategy was a noble attempt at land reform. It had some clear objectives: acquire land of high agricultural potential; integrate black farmers into the commercial agricultural sector; improve beneficiary selection; improve land use planning; and ensure optimal productive land use.

But the programme has been disappointing. Virtually no land has been transferred to individuals. Most is leased to beneficiaries and in some cases the farms are illegally occupied. More than half of the current beneficiaries on the leased land have not shown any substantial agricultural production. This implies that valuable agricultural resources are not utilised and are lying fallow.

The factors behind this failure were set out in public in an article we recently co-authored. The article was based on findings which were first collated in a research report compiled by the Agricultural Research Council for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and released in 2019. However, its findings were never publicised.

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Read more: The South African government has been buying farmland for black farmers. It’s not gone well

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I have gained further insights in conversations with farmers currently leasing land from the State. Their stories corroborate the report’s findings.

Major obstacles

Firstly, land tenure is insecure. This makes it difficult – or impossible – to invest in the land or secure loans for improvements and growth. Beneficiaries have to rely on government grants to do business. The grants are often not enough. And the process is often slow.

A second problem is bureaucratic red tape. There is clear evidence of excessive layers of approval with repetitive documentation. This causes significant delays.

Thirdly, there is a lack of access to finance. Farmers have limited credit history, collateral or access to formal financial institutions because of the nature of the lease arrangement.

Fourth, the arrangement of leasing of state land and the engagement of bureaucrats in the beneficiary selection process and management of decisions on the farms are setting beneficiaries up to fail.

Action that needs to be taken

Government has bought land on behalf of beneficiaries at market value. But the government doesn’t have the capacity and resources to manage the land assets and generate any return in the form of rents, improving the capital asset base or even performing general maintenance of the physical assets that may be on the land.

There are solutions.

Firstly, the government should transfer the asset to an institution with a vested interest and capacity to provide both oversight and finance. One such institution could be the Land Reform Agency announced by the president in his State of the Nation address of February 2021.

Secondly, beneficiaries who have managed to have commercially successful enterprises on these leased farms should get priority to acquire the land and finance.

Thirdly, lease amounts that are paid should get deducted from the purchase amount. And farmers who are up to date with their lease payments should be given preference.

Fourth, the purchase amount should be pegged at 50% of productive value (as opposed to the market value) – thus around 25% of initial purchase price by the state. Selling the farms at less than half the price they were bought for would allow farmers to grow quickly and avoid any challenges and give them the breathing space to catch up with their peers.

Fifth, the purchase price (pegged value minus lease amounts paid) should be financed over 25 years at a preferential interest rate.

Sixth, a financial institution (such as the Land Bank) should take title deeds as security and register a mortgage bond on the land.

Seventh, put a moratorium on the allowed window of reselling the farm to 10 years and let government have the first right of refusal.

– South Africa’s government has been buying land and leasing it to black farmers. Why it’s gone wrong and how to fix it
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-government-has-been-buying-land-and-leasing-it-to-black-farmers-why-its-gone-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it-211938

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

It’s been a month since military guards under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani ended 12 years of democratic governance in Niger. The situation seems to have reached a stalemate as the junta has refused to restore democracy immediately.

In a national broadcast on 19 August, Tchiani stated that the military regime would organise elections and hand power back to a democratic government after three years.

Ecowas rejected the proposal. Ecowas commissioner for peace and security Abdel-Fatau Musah said the regional bloc wanted an immediate restoration of constitutional order and the release of Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum.

Beyond rejecting the proposal, Ecowas seems lost regarding what to do next.

The water has been further muddied by a 21 August statement from the African Union in which it “strongly opposed” any military intervention from countries outside the continent. Observers have noted that the statement is ambiguous and therefore unhelpful.

The AU didn’t make its position clear on an intervention by Ecowas to restore democracy.

These developments confirm my previously stated view that military intervention is unlikely because of the many complications it would invite.

Now that the junta has stated its position, and Ecowas has rejected it, what next?

As a scholar of politics and international relations I have analysed the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously highlighted the role Nigeria plays in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the Multinational Joint Taskforce in the region.

I believe there are three things Nigeria-led Ecowas can do to resolve the situation without using force or losing its credibility as an organisation. The regional bloc made a mistake when it simultaneously imposed sanctions, threatened the use of force and gave a short ultimatum for the regime to hand over power.

Ecowas now needs to re-strategise by re-evaluating and properly targeting its sanctions; negotiating a short transition period; and negotiating foreign interests in Niger.

Ecowas needs to make sure its sanctions target only leaders of the military junta and their allies. It also needs to agree that Bazoum is unlikely to be reinstated, so there should be a short transition period.

In addition, the organisation must be pro-active in helping the United States protect its security interests and France its economic interests on terms favourable to Niger. The US has invested heavily in security infrastructure in the Sahel (mainly in Niger), while France has investments in the mining sector.

Re-evaluating the use of sanctions

The sanctions issued by Ecowas are biting hard. Prices of staple foods have risen because Niger is a landlocked country and depends on its neighbours for most imports. Some of the countries have closed their borders to Niger, thereby disrupting the economy of the country. While the sanctions seem to be effective, they are affecting ordinary Nigeriens more than the junta.

In addition, Nigeria has cut off the supply of electricity. This is having an impact on small businesses and average Nigeriens.

The impact of the sanctions is fuelling resentment towards Ecowas and the organisation is accused of acting on behalf of France.

The sanctions have had the effect of forcing the junta to negotiate and reopen the possibility for dialogue. This, I believe, resulted in the announcement of the three-year transition period. It is therefore essential for Ecowas to keep some of the sanctions. But they should target members of the ruling junta and their allies.

The junta also understands that public perceptions could change quickly if the hardship continues, so Ecowas needs to use this as leverage in negotiations.

Negotiate a short transition period

It is very unlikely that Bazoum will be reinstated because of how far the junta has already gone in entrenching itself.

Ecowas should push for a short transition period. Algeria has already suggested a six month transition. This transition period must be consistent across all the four countries that have had coups: Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

The perceived inaction by Ecowas when military juntas took over in the other three countries emboldened the junta in Niger. This has been corrected with strong words and action by Ecowas after the Niger coup and must be sustained to deter other countries in the region.

A short transition period will restore stability to the country and help western partners to protect their assets and continue to support the fight against insurgency.

Negotiating foreign interests

One key issue which has been observed since the military takeover is anger and resentment towards France and perceived “foreign occupation”.

France has significant economic interests, which the people argue have not benefited them. For instance, Areva – the biggest uranium mining company in Niger – has previously been accused of not paying Niger a fair rate of tax. Bazoum was accused of being a puppet of France.

The US has security interests in the country, including one of its largest drone bases in Africa.

Any attempts to have these countries relinquish their interests will be met with stiff opposition but will also have a negative impact on the economy and security of Niger.

Ecowas will have to do two things to placate Nigeriens and stabilise the region.

First, it must ensure Niger gets a fair share of its resources from mining companies operating in the country.

Second, Ecowas needs to be more involved in working with the US and its allies in fighting terrorism in the region. Terrorism is a regional problem and Ecowas must be more proactive in helping its members.

Currently, Ecowas is seen as an enemy of Niger and the organisation needs to change this perception. It’s time for Ecowas to stop the threat of military intervention in Niger and engage in diplomacy so as not to escalate the already precarious situation of the region.

– Niger coup: Ecowas must do these 3 things to break the stalemate
– https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Chris Malley, Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment Institute York Centre, University of York

The dumping of billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere yearly is already having a devastating impact around the world. This includes widespread flooding and droughts, raging wildfires, heatwaves and record temperatures.

Africa is particularly hard hit, with temperatures and sea levels rising faster across the continent than the global average.

In Zimbabwe, unreliable rainfalls and extended droughts are affecting hydro electricity generation, resulting in rolling blackouts. Food production is also affected. A large fraction of Zimbabwe’s population is at risk of severe hunger.

In 2015, almost all countries signed the Paris Agreement, a commitment to tackle climate change. The intention was to limit global temperature increase to below 2°C, or ideally 1.5°C. To achieve this, countries submitted individual plans, called Nationally Determined Contributions, to reduce their contribution to climate change. They agreed to update them every five years.

The continent of Africa contributes 2%-3% of the global greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change. Zimbabwe contributes less than 0.1%. Despite this small contribution, all African countries submitted their plans to reduce emissions.

In 2015, Zimbabwe committed to reducing its emissions by 33% by 2030. In 2021, it updated the target to a 40% reduction by 2030 across all sectors. This significant improvement increases the fraction of emissions that Zimbabwe will reduce from all emitting sectors.

The energy sector is responsible for about 34% of Zimbabwe’s total emissions. Including other sectors, like agriculture and forestry (58% of total emissions), waste (5%) and industrial processes (3%) will substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions if Zimbabwe achieves its target.

How Zimbabwe can meet its emission reduction target

The updated target was informed by an assessment of how greenhouse gas emission could be reduced. The assessment was done by a team of researchers from Zimbabwe and the Stockholm Environment Institute at the University of York (including myself). It provided a clear plan to achieve the targets through the implementation of 28 specific policies and measures.

We assessed the benefits of these actions to mitigate climate change. We also reviewed other implications of taking each action locally in Zimbabwe.

Our research showed that by implementing its climate change plan, Zimbabwe would not only meet its international obligations, but achieve a broad set of health, social and development benefits.

The study assessed and quantified how the 28 actions to achieve Zimbabwe’s climate change plan would contribute to specific Sustainable Development Goals.

The top three benefits identified were improved public health, enhanced biodiversity, and greater access to reliable energy supplies. Each of these benefits is a priority within Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy 1 2021-2025.

Good health is a constitutional right in Zimbabwe. Air pollution and unsafe sanitation are among the top 10 risk factors for health in Zimbabwe, and can be reduced by carrying out Zimbabwe’s climate change plan.

Reducing biodiversity losses will not only address an environmental challenge in Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy, but preserve and enhance the tourism industry.

After years of unreliable energy supplies due to drought, and reliance on biomass fuels for cooking for much of the population, providing regular and reliable energy supplies is critical for alleviating poverty and economic growth.

Counting the benefits

Public health: Currently, almost 6,000 infants and over 8,000 adults die yearly from air pollution in Zimbabwe. Almost 1,600 people die from road traffic accidents, and 337 people die from unsafe sanitation. The study estimates that actions reducing greenhouse gases would also reduce air pollutant emissions by between 35% and 45% by 2030. This would lead to lower air pollution exposure, especially indoors where women and girls are most exposed while cooking.

Cleaner energy for cooking, improved transport systems and improved waste management all reduce air pollution. Increasing the use of public transport, or walking and cycling, rather than using cars can reduce road accidents and greenhouse gas emissions from transport.

Expanding access to sanitation systems would reduce the number of people dying from diarrhoeal diseases, and reduce methane emissions if the correct systems were installed.

Improved biodiversity: Zimbabwe’s climate change actions also include changes to how land is used. It aims to reduce burned areas of forest by 500,000 hectares and add 100,000 hectares of natural forest every year to 2025. The plan would also manage 250,000 more hectares of cropland using sustainable “conservation agriculture” techniques.

These actions were estimated to achieve multiple benefits, including improving soil health and protecting biodiversity, with possible reduction in the losses of both animals and plants.

Access to reliable energy: Achieving Zimbabwe’s climate change plan is built on extending electricity access to 95% of urban households and 75% of rural households. Actions in the plan include the expansion of renewable electricity generation, energy efficiency improvements, and reducing losses from electricity transmission and distribution. These steps can help ensure that access to energy is quick and effective, thereby reducing blackouts and reliance on fossil fuels.

In addition, the study shows that Zimbabwe could increase recycling rates while reducing emissions from waste. The country can equally reduce the time people – predominantly women and girls – spend cooking by switching to cleaner cooking fuels.

More than a sacrifice

Tackling climate change is often viewed as a necessary sacrifice, rather than an opportunity to improve lives.

Climate change targets are often focused solely on how they contribute to global, long-term aspirations, rather than the benefits that countries can achieve in the short term.

Our study shows the social, health and development benefits that Zimbabwe could enjoy by tackling its (small) contribution to climate change. This is not unique to Zimbabwe, nor a full list of all possible benefits from climate change action.

What is notable about the Zimbabwe study is that these local benefits were evaluated and quantified, alongside greenhouse gas emission reductions. They provide a positive case of what countries can gain from taking climate action.

Integrating quantitative assessment of local benefits when countries develop their climate change plans, following Zimbabwe’s example, could help boost national climate plans. This would in turn help the world meet necessary emission reduction timelines and avoid the worst impacts.

– Zimbabwe’s climate action plan: a win for the environment, health and energy
– https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-climate-action-plan-a-win-for-the-environment-health-and-energy-210655

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gaathier Mahed, Senior lecturer, Nelson Mandela University

All countries have a variety of water resources – some are on the surface, like rivers, and some are beneath the ground. This groundwater provides almost 50% of all global domestic use and 43% of all the water used for agriculture.

Groundwater is stored in aquifers, which come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be accessed in several ways, but mostly by drilling wells. Not all groundwater is useful to us – it depends on whether it’s fresh or mixed with salt and on how deep it is, as this will affect how easy it is to tap into.

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Read more: Africa’s aquifers hold more than 20 times the water stored in the continent’s lakes, but they aren’t the answer to water scarcity

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In Africa, groundwater is very important. It supports almost 100% of household and agricultural activities in rural areas. And, because it’s underground it’s protected from evaporation, a crucial resource in a warming climate.

These facts and figures are in a recent World Bank report which unpacks issues facing groundwater in times of climate change. As a groundwater scientist focusing on its sustainable use, I’ve picked out some of the key issues when it comes to managing groundwater from the report. It’s vital that African countries address these as pressure increases on the continent’s water resources, through growing populations, development and changing weather patterns.

Key issues

Ownership of groundwater

Figuring out ownership of groundwater is important for the management of this finite resource. Without a clear understanding of ownership, conflict can happen.

In some countries groundwater is owned by the landowner, in others by the government. Generally, it’s being poorly managed across the continent. In many cases, boreholes used to extract groundwater aren’t even being registered.

South Africa has used laws and policies to transfer the ownership of resources to the government. But this has led to issues around red tape and licensing permits, which determine how water is allocated.

The success of permit systems depends on a thorough understanding of the resources, property owners’ compliance with granted user rights, and the enforcement of this regulation. This is particularly problematic in the developing world, according to the World Bank report.

A possible solution is decentralised management, as seen by the Qanat system in the Middle East. The system consists of a network of underground canals that transport water from aquifers in highlands to the surface at lower levels using gravity. It is normally managed by the community and financed collectively. These historical pieces of infrastructure have been abandoned in recent times, but could solve many of the water shortage issues in the semi-arid to arid areas of Africa.

Recharging aquifers

Groundwater in aquifers is finite, but it can be recharged with surface water or treated wastewater. The process also sometimes helps in the removal of harmful chemicals because the aquifer’s material can act like a very large filter.

The World Bank report highlights managed aquifer recharge as a technique which can be used to recharge aquifers. Water is either injected through a well or seeps into the ground through infiltration ponds, man-made or natural depressions in the ground which allows water to soak into the earth.

Countries in southern Africa have practised this for the past 40 years.

Aquifers can also be recharged naturally when rainwater infiltrates deep into the ground. This can be encouraged through afforestation, agricultural terraces and the prevention of land clearing. These practices allow permeable surfaces to dominate the landscape, stabilise the soil through plant growth, and slow the flow of water.

Monitoring aquifers

Monitoring aquifers is vital to know how much water is left in them. Unfortunately many African countries have poor monitoring networks and infrastructure in place. The number of monitoring points in certain countries is also dwindling, owing to financial constraints.

Satellite data can be used for monitoring. One example is the GRACE (Gravity, Recovery and Climate Experiment) twin satellites which have provided insights into subsurface water storage over the past 20 years. This means that the changes in aquifer volumes can be monitored, but only at a very large scale. It’s necessary to know what’s happening on the ground. Localised monitoring networks are needed, with data loggers at multiple wells.

Effective policies

Policies and incentives play a major role in the use of groundwater. They influence the cost of energy and abstraction and the overall accounting of groundwater resources and environmental impact.

In an African context, good policies are missing in places. There are, however, some community practices which help to protect the resource, like the Qanat system. These types of systems should be encouraged and replicated.

Groundwater dependent ecosystems

Groundwater dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, play a critical role for many livelihoods in Africa and need to be more effectively managed. These ecosystems use groundwater to support plant and animal life and ecosystem services, such as fresh water and clean air, throughout the year.

But they’re exposed to major risks because they’re often close to semi-arid and arid areas. This is particularly true in the Sahel region. Groundwater dependent ecosystems are often close to border crossings and transport routes. Human activities, such as over-pumping, could adversely affect how they function and lead to a loss of biodiversity.

The conservation of these water bodies is of the utmost importance for the preservation of water resources and livelihoods. Policies which protect them – like the Ramsar convention – must be properly enforced. Governments could should also consider creating protected areas around some of these ecosystems.

Managing resources

It’s imperative that governments better monitor our water resources. Coupled with good practical solutions, such as managing pump rates, this will sustain groundwater resources for many years to come.

The monitoring network on our continent is unfortunately limited or non-existent in certain countries. In some, like South Africa, the network is slowly diminishing. This is unfortunate as the ability to measure allows better management of groundwater resources.

– Africa’s vast underground water resources are under pressure from climate change – how to manage them
– https://theconversation.com/africas-vast-underground-water-resources-are-under-pressure-from-climate-change-how-to-manage-them-209609

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Ballard, Chief Researcher: Gauteng City-Region Observatory, Wits University, University of the Witwatersrand

The fire that killed at least 76 people in a five storey building in Johannesburg on 31 August is not an isolated incident, and has elicited the usual unhelpful response from some city officials and politicians.

They have placed the blame on the informal occupation of abandoned buildings, a phenomenon known as “hijacking”. They have also blamed immigrant populations who, they say, are the primary residents of such buildings. To solve the problem, they argue, hijacked buildings should be expropriated and redeveloped by the private sector.

A politician in the city council has also called for “mass deportations” of “illegal foreigners”.

Based on my work as a researcher on how cities are built and transform at the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO), I argue that all of this is a distraction from the urgent work of reducing risks in the living environments of the poor, and reducing the risk of fire more generally. The observatory, a partnership between the Gauteng provincial government, the universities of the Witwatersrand and Johannesburg, and the South African Local Government Association, builds the data and analysis to help inform development in the Gauteng City-Region.

The rhetoric by politicians and city officials treats the latest tragedy as a freakish problem of hijacked buildings occupied by migrant populations. Yet as human geographer Nigel Clark notes, it is important to acknowledge the way in which catastrophes are a normal part of life – particularly for vulnerable groups – rather than exceptional or unusual events.

In Johannesburg, fires are not limited to “hijacked” buildings. They have also occurred in legally occupied buildings. Furthermore, fires are not a specific risk to inner city populations. They are a regular occurrence in shack settlements across the city. The use of this tragedy by some politicians to argue in favour of removing hijacked buildings is part of a longstanding pattern of blaming the poor for the conditions and justifying further suffering that they wish to heap on them.

A pervasive problem

There is no doubt that unscrupulous or negligent informal landlords bear much responsibility for failing to ensure basic fire safety. Yet this problem is not limited to hijacked buildings.

In 2018, emergency services were unable to contain a fire at the Bank of Lisbon Building in downtown Johannesburg because there was insufficient water pressure in the building and no fire suppression systems had been installed.

Three firefighters died, and the building itself was subsequently demolished. The building had not been illegally occupied; it was rented by the Gauteng provincial government, which was aware that the building was non-compliant in advance of the incident.

Three years later, emergency services were hampered in their efforts to contain the fire at a public hospital, Charlotte Maxeke, by incompatible fire hydrant couplings. As these cases show, eradicating “hijacked” buildings would not have solved failures to comply with fire regulations in legally occupied buildings in the city.

Nor would eradicating “hijacked” buildings remove the risk of fire posed to low income groups across the city as a whole. In Johannesburg more than one in ten households lives in an informal dwelling outside the city centre, either in shack settlements or in back yards. This is calculated from the Gauteng City-Region Observatory’s Quality of Life 6 survey 2020/21.

These kinds of settlements are also prone to fires as a result of the materials used to construct dwellings, the density of settlements and the risky sources of energy for heating, cooking and light.

Once again, some politicians and officials have arrived at the idea that since these settlements are not fit for human habitation, they should be eliminated. In 2006 the elected representative responsible for housing in the KwaZulu-Natal province announced legislation

to provide for the progressive elimination of slums.

It would have forced private land owners to evict shack dwellers. But the shack dwellers movement Abahlali Basemjondolo successfully challenged this initiative in the Constitutional Court.

Disposable lives

According to the geographer Martin Murray, shack fires underscore the disposability of the lives of the poor. South Africa’s acute levels of inequality and poverty mean that some people can afford to buy their way out of risks while others cannot.

Inner city occupations and shack settlements alike are the inevitable consequence of the fact that huge populations of people have to get by without a living wage. If these households earned higher wages, they would not choose to live in places that were at risk of fire, flooding and other potential disasters.

As with the push to evict shack dwellers, the impulse to evict the residents of hijacked buildings conflates unsafe living conditions with those who live in them. A similar conflation occurs on the imagined solution: eradicating the problem means eradicating communities of people in which the problem manifests. In other words, the language of eradication blames the victims of social inequality for their own suffering, and sets the stage for exposing them to further risk.

Helping without eradicating

Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s president, stated that the fire was a wake up call for the government to provide habitable housing. Government does indeed have a vital role to play in promoting the right to decent housing for all. It needs to do so in a way that takes into account the full complexity of the structural conditions at play, providing giveaway housing, or working with other stakeholders to correct for failings in the housing market that leave poor and working class people without affordable options.

A good example is the City of Johannesburg’s recent inclusionary housing policy that obliges developers to include affordable housing in all projects. Much more should be done by the state to provide housing.

Yet informal settlements and illegal occupations of inner city buildings will not be eradicated – no matter how many houses the state builds – as long as acute levels of unemployment and poverty continue. Rather than abandoning residents of such places until they can be formally accommodated, or rendering them homeless through eviction, they need to be supported where they live or provided with alternative accommodation.

The living environments of the poor can be made less risky. The epidemic of shack fires can be reduced with fire breaks and fire fighting infrastructure. Similarly, the risk of fire in inner city buildings can be reduced by enforcing tried and tested fire regulations: ensuring that fire escapes and fire fighting infrastructure are functional. Authorities should compel landlords – whether informal or formal – to implement them.

These and many other measures – rather than the impulse to “eradicate” – are the basis through which society cares for vulnerable people.

– Johannesburg fire disaster: why eradicating hijacked buildings is not the answer
– https://theconversation.com/johannesburg-fire-disaster-why-eradicating-hijacked-buildings-is-not-the-answer-212732

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Assistant professor of political science, St. Petersburg College

The Bongo family’s 56 year hold on power in Gabon was abruptly brought to an end with a military coup on 30 August. The military takeover happened hours after election results were announced that gave Ali Bongo Ondimba a third term. Gyldas Ofoulhast-Othamot, a professor of public and international affairs with published research on Gabon, explains factors that may have contributed to the ouster.

Did Gabon’s recent election stack up as ‘free and fair’?

The presidential election on 26 August was the sixth since the formal end of the one-party state in 1990. Like the others, it was contentious from the start.

The particular issue this time was that three elections (presidential, parliamentary and local) took place at once. This had never been done before. In the context of autocratic and dynastic rule in Gabon, it was bound to be problematic.

It’s no surprise that the poll was reported to be chaotic. It appears to have been a mixture of ineptitude and wilful incompetence and chaos. Polls opened late. Some opposition ballots were said to be missing. As a result voting had to be extended in some areas.

Finally, immediately after the vote, the internet was cut and a curfew put in place, rarely a sign of a regime confident that it has won at the polls.

The many constitutional, legal and electoral changes before and after the elections severely undermined the integrity of the vote.

Perhaps the most contentious change was the last-minute addition of the single ballot. This meant that voters who selected a member of parliament automatically voted for the presidential candidate in the same party – even if it wasn’t their first choice.

Collectively, all the changes seemed designed to give the incumbent the advantage. They made for flawed elections.

Finally, the result, which gave Ali Bongo Ondimba the victory with over 64% of votes cast, was announced while people were asleep. No advance notification was given as it had been in previous contests.

All signs were that it was a rigged election.

The leaders of the junta used that as a justification for their takeover.

What are the weaknesses in Gabon’s political makeup?

Gabon became independent from France on 17 August 1960. That’s 63 years ago. Except for its first president, Leon M’ba Minko (1960-1967), the Bongo family has governed the country for 56 years – (Omar Bongo Ondimba from 1967 to 2009 and Ali Bongo Ondimba from then on until 30 August 2023).

Political domination by a single family is the country’s main weakness. The political system has been tailored to serve the interests of one family only and its domestic and foreign allies.

In this context, it becomes difficult to engineer the types of reforms necessary for a country to modernise and regenerate itself.

Bongo’s father maintained control through patronage and balancing the involvement of various societal (ethnic) groups. But in the 1990s this became more difficult because of the return of multipartyism and a decline in oil reserves which made patronage more challenging.

In some ways, Ali Bongo Ondimba’s attempt to go beyond the political equilibrium created by his father doomed him. He promised reforms and a state that would improve the lives of all the people. But he failed to deliver.

With ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions and for the Bongo regime to end, it was only a matter of time before the military switched sides. It was that or continued repression with the potential for more blood being spilled, as happened in 2016.

What about the economy? How are ordinary people faring?

Well endowed in natural resources, Gabon is regarded by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country with a GDP per capita of US$8,820. This is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Gabon used to be called the “Kuwait of Africa” because of its oil and natural resources wealth and its small population of 2.3 million.

But its population remains poor. Only a small elite has benefited from the country’s wealth. Unemployment is said to be as high as 37%, with 35% of Gabonese living below the poverty line of US$2 a day.

When Ali Bongo Ondimba came to power in 2009, he promised economic reforms. But by 2016, economic stagnation was still the norm. Power cuts are frequent, running tap water has become a rare commodity, and inequalities have increased.

What history does the military have in the country’s affairs?

This is the third coup in Gabon’s history.

The first was in 1964 under President Leon M’ba Minko. France intervened to reinstate him.

The last two coups have been under Ali Bongo Ondimba. In 2019, it was led by junior officers and was short-lived. Nevertheless, it exposed the frailties of his regime, especially after he suffered a stroke in Saudi Arabia.

This time it appears that the military brass are all in, at least those who matter in the Republican Guard (GR in French).

In my view the military has been central to the Bongo regime maintaining its power for all those years.

For instance, in 1993 and 2016 when the Bongo regime was under duress, only military intervention and repression of opposition groups ensured its survival.

Also, the loyalty of the members of the state security and defence apparatus has always been well rewarded. The Republican Guard, the most equipped and well financed of all the armed forces, exemplifies that.

The difference now is that it has decided to be king rather than staying behind the scenes as the kingmaker.

Its aims are not clear yet – democratic and republican or authoritarian rule.

What difference is this coup likely to make?

General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, the leader of the junta, does not appear to be related to the Bongo family.

He entered the Bongo circle through his relationship with the long-time former commander of the Republican Guard, André Oyini. Over time, he rose through the ranks to become Omar Bongo Ondimba’s last military aide.

Given that proximity to the Bongo family, it looks like a palace revolution rather than true political change. Ali Bongo Ondimba was the heir of a political system built by his father since the 1960s. That system has not collapsed overnight.

Yet the junta, and more generally the security and defence forces, will have to take into account political, economic and social decay and popular aspirations when deciding the path forward. If not, instability will become the norm.

– Gabon coup: Bongo’s rule ended by failed promises and shifting alliances
– https://theconversation.com/gabon-coup-bongos-rule-ended-by-failed-promises-and-shifting-alliances-212672

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Neil Rusch, Research Associate, University of the Witwatersrand

Something remarkable is happening in a remote part of South Africa’s Northern Cape province, in a semi-desert area called the Karoo. In the past 15 years 64 radio receiving dishes have appeared on the landscape. These constitute the MeerKAT telescope, a precursor to the Square Kilometre Array Observatory (SKAO), which will – when it is completed and fully functional in 2030 – be the world’s largest radio telescope.

The SKAO will receive signals emanating from the dark regions between the stars and galaxies. This data, studied by radio astronomers, has the capacity to inform us about dark matter and could change our conception of the universe irrevocably.

In his new, award-winning documentary, !Aitsa, filmmaker Dane Dodds explores the intellectual background and science of the SKAO alongside indigenous conceptions of the cosmos held by ancient ǀXam San people and their Afrikaans-speaking descendants living in the Karoo today. As the film’s advisor I saw my task as bringing into focus the hidden assumptions that must be recognised in any encounter between knowledge, traditions and cosmology.

!Aitsa (a South African exclamation of praise or surprise) explores the SKAO’s approach to understanding the universe through big data made comprehensible by the techniques of empirical science, machine learning, artificial intelligence and instrumentation. The film also examines Karoo star-lore as it is shared and spread by an interwoven tapestry of oral traditions. Conventional ideas about the nature of science are challenged and the dominant structures of knowledge creation are questioned as a result.

To the ǀXam and San people, being in the world as a person includes “the sky’s things” – an understanding of and deep connection with the cosmos. In an age progressively dominated by digital and automated knowledge it was important that the film hold space for this notion.

Inflected with star-lore

Through my own research in the fields of archaeoacoustics, rock art and oral tradition I have come to understand that there is a profound multiplicity of connections within the ǀXam knowledge tradition. In a ǀXam conception of the universe there is no alienating distance between inner and outer, person, stars and space. That’s because their cultural understanding of reciprocities encourages ecological and cosmic connection.

!Aitsa strives to express astronomy as a lived-body experience. One person interviewed in the film says:

When I look up into the sky and look at how my star is positioned, and look up at the star’s direction, I know which way to walk.

Another describes the Milky Way as being “right at the centre of a person’s spirituality.”

Animism and animation

The instruments of modern science deliver facts, innovation and technical advancement. But all this comes with societal entanglements and colonial dynamics, a part of the intellectual history of scientific endeavour that assumes authority and stands aloof from the kinds of sensory perceptions and lived experience that are central to ǀXam San cosmology.

!Aitsa investigates a modern pre-disposition that considers animistic knowledge and reasoning as inherently flawed. Animism is the notion that any living thing has a distinct spiritual essence. It’s a mistake to dismiss ǀXam cultural expression as a mythology that is intrinsically animistic and therefore quaint.

The ǀXam and San people are known as “the people of the eland” and so, to illustrate the way their beliefs animate “things”, an eland antelope is a key character in !Aitsa. The animal’s presence compels the viewer to consider the importance of relationship and relatedness.

Soundscapes

Sound plays a crucial role in the film, and was another opportunity to showcase an element of |Xam San culture. The soundtrack (you can hear a preview here) draws on composer Simon Kohler’s musical creativity and the archaeoacoustic research I have done on lithophones, otherwise known as gong rocks, which produce sounds not dissimilar to that of a bell when it is struck.

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Read more: How the music of an ancient rock painting was brought to life

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Sound is the most ephemeral and transitory of presences but in the film the gong rock sound is a thread linking voices and images, past and present. Collecting the sound required two trips into the Karoo. There we recorded a variety of rock sounds – deep bass-vibrations through to light metallic tinkles. We brought these recordings back into the Cape Town sound studio where the sound was “composed” to create the soundtrack that viewers will hear throughout the film.

What next?

!Aitsa had its world premiere at CPH:DOX in Denmark in 2023, with sold out screenings and rave reviews. The film won the Grand Prize at Estonia’s Pärnu International Film Festival and was voted Best of the Fest at the Encounters Film Festival in Cape Town. !Aitsa is selected to screen in Canada at planetinfocus and in October 2023 at the Prague Science Film Fest and is up for selection at the idfa Festival in the Netherlands in November.

In 2024 !Aitsa will go on a road trip, visiting remote places in the Karoo where the film will be screened to audiences who do not have the means for or access to cinemas.

We also hope to take the film to Australia so that the Wajarri Yamaji Aboriginal people can see, listen and connect with their counterparts in the Karoo. This is an important connection because the Wajarri Yamaji live in the Murchison region in Western Australia where the low-frequency component of the SKAO is currently under construction.

– How our ancestors viewed the sky: new film explores both indigenous and modern cosmology
– https://theconversation.com/how-our-ancestors-viewed-the-sky-new-film-explores-both-indigenous-and-modern-cosmology-211604

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gavin Evans, Lecturer, Culture and Media department, Birkbeck, University of London

A new book on South African liberation struggle icons Nelson and Winnie Mandela is a masterful biography of the pair. It’s a work of scholarship involving an immense body of primary and secondary research, written with flair and panache but in an easy and compelling style, making it accessible to anyone with an interest in politics, power and South Africa and looks set to become the definitive work on them.

Jonny Steinberg’s splendid 550-page biography, Winnie and Nelson: Portrait of a Marriage, ends on a note of pathos with a poignant tale from Nelson Mandela’s deathbed.

Four days from death in December 2013, Nelson is in an advanced state of dementia and refuses to eat. Graça Machel, his third wife, invites his estranged second wife, Winnie, to be with him, noting that she was “Nelson’s great love”, and it’s Winnie who feeds him. Winnie remarks to a friend:

First he decided to leave me; now he won’t eat without me.

In a sense, their story came full circle. The estranged power couple couldn’t quite keep apart all the way to the end, and there is something of the nation’s id (instinctive inner nature) and superego (moral standards) reflected in their contradictory roles.

Nelson emerges as a man plagued by inner strife and anger, saddened about the fate of his family (including his youngest daughter Zindzi’s inability to separate herself from her volatile mother) and his inability to play his role of patriarch, and yet so keenly aware of what is required that he self-consciously puts on his impassive and sometimes avuncular mask in public. Winnie, on the other hand,

is at once the most commanding figure and a figure of terrible subjection.

Earlier Steinberg uses the adjective “diabolical” to describe her tormented, mercurial mind, which had its full expression in the murders that emerged from her household –

the violence of the world without mirrored the violence of the world within.

The story begins with a tale Steinberg says is “not entirely true” – one Nelson and Winnie spun about their courtship, 57 years earlier: he saw this beautiful young woman at a bus stop, was overwhelmed, and soon swept her off her feet. In reality, Winnie had another lover at the time (who was still on the scene several months into her relationship with Nelson) and, as Nelson reminded her in a 1970 letter from prison, it was she who courted him.

Ambition and expedience

The early Nelson is portrayed as a man consumed by insecurity and ambition. He’s discovered by the wise ANC activist Walter Sisulu, who sees immense potential in this tall, regal-looking young man, draws him into his ANC world, and sets him on his way.

Sometimes ambition and expedience get in the way of altruism and principle. He swings towards Africanism after the ANC Youth League’s launch but veers away from it when offered the leadership of the 1952 Defiance Campaign against apartheid, led by the ANC. He joins the Communist Party, but when the Pan-Africanist Congress takes off, he proposes sidelining whites and dropping the Party.

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Read more: Mandela was a flawed icon. But without him South Africa would be a sadder place

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He’s portrayed as a voracious womaniser during his first marriage to Evelyn (whom he admitted assaulting) and also while with Winnie. This book gives space to just two of his many lovers – the Women’s Federation leaders Lilian Ngoyi and Ruth Mompati.

Steinberg hints that Winnie’s inner turmoil was rooted in the lack of love in her childhood, and her need to please her overbearing father, even if her long periods of detention, imprisonment and banishment, and her resort to heavy drinking, exacerbated what was already lurking. Other accounts have taken the early influences further. Emma Gilbey’s 1993 biography The Lady portrays a psychopathic Winnie who, while still a teenager, committed a violent assault on a young woman.

Winnie defied convention by having lovers throughout her marriage. One of those was Brian Somana, who emerged as a security police informer. Winnie and Somana remained lovers after his exposure, prompting Nelson’s resolve to divorce her in 1965. However, Sisulu persuaded him against it.

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Read more: Winnie Madikizela-Mandela: revolutionary who kept the spirit of resistance alive

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Winnie seemed to have been a soft touch for security police spies. Not only did several of her young lovers emerge in this light, so did several of her friends and associates. One was her aide Jerry Richardson, who on New Year’s day 1989 cut the throat of 14-year-old Stompie Seipei who’d been accused by Winnie of being a spy. Nelson again made moves to divorce her, and once more pulled back.

Nelson and Winnie post-1990

While in prison, he had hid his angst about Winnie, who openly pursued her love affair with the young lawyer Dali Mpofu. It was in his bid to save her after the murder of Seipei that Nelson bared his teeth and emerged in the least favourable light.

First, when Winnie failed to get elected to the executive of her local ANC branch in Soweto, he got his aides to set up a new branch, which duly elected her. Then he used his muscle to get her elected to the regional executive.

Next he prompted the breakup of the International Defence and Aid Fund, cajoling them into helping fund her trial for kidnapping and assault. As Steinberg puts it:

He had corrupted the democratic processes of his organisation; he had wounded a fund to which he, personally, owed an enormous debt; he had received covert money from a private corporation.

The book suggests Nelson approved when a key witness and one of the accused were abducted and taken out of the country until the trial was over. Thus the court accepted Winnie’s false alibi that she was not in Soweto when the assaults on Seipei and others were taking place. In the end, she was convicted of kidnapping and being an accessory to assault.

Nelson did all this to save Winnie. And yet finally it all became too much for him. In 1992 he announced their marriage was over, prompting a wave of despair from her.

Four murders

The book directly implicates Winnie in the murders of two young men, Lolo Sono and Siboniso Tshabalala (both falsely accused of being informers, when the real informers were Winnie’s lover Johannes Mabotha and Jerry Richardson). It also strongly implies that she was behind the murder of her doctor Abu Baker Asvat (who’d examined Seipei) but leaves the question open as to whether she’d ordered Seipei’s murder.

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Read more: Nelson Mandela’s legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa

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Inevitably, with a book on two such immensely significant lives, the author will choose to emphasise some things and leave out others. For instance, there is no mention of her conviction in 2003 on 42 counts of fraud.

It draws to a close by looking at the denigration of Nelson and rehabilitation of Winnie, particularly after her death in 2018, her slate wiped clean by young activists frustrated by the slow pace of post-apartheid change. They came to believe that all the allegations against her were the product of state invention.

– Winnie and Mandela biography: a masterful tale of South Africa’s troubled, iconic power couple
– https://theconversation.com/winnie-and-mandela-biography-a-masterful-tale-of-south-africas-troubled-iconic-power-couple-212066