Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rebecca Ackermann, Professor, Department of Archaeology and Human Evolution Research Institute, University of Cape Town

Here’s how the story of the Taung Child is usually told:

In 1924 an Australian anthropologist and anatomist, Raymond Dart, acquired a block of calcified sediment from a limestone quarry in South Africa. He painstakingly removed a fossil skull from this material.

A year later, on 7 February 1925, he published his description of what he argued was a new hominin species, Australopithecus africanus, in the journal Nature. It was nicknamed the Taung Child, a reference to the discovery site and its young age.

The international scientific community rebuffed this hypothesis. They were looking outside Africa for human origins and argued that the skull more likely belonged to a non-human primate. Dart was vindicated decades later after subsequent similar fossil discoveries elsewhere in Africa.

Dart is portrayed as prescient in most retellings. He’s hailed for elevating the importance of Africa in the narrative of human origins.

But is this a biased and simplified narrative? The discovery played out during a period marked by colonialism, racism and racial segregation and apartheid in South Africa. The history of human origins research is, therefore, intertwined with inequality, exclusion and scientifically unsound ideas.

Viewed against this backdrop, and with a contemporary lens, the figure of Dart, and palaeoanthropology on the African continent more broadly, is complex and worthy of reflection.

The South African Journal of Science has published a special issue to mark the centenary of Dart’s original paper.

A group of African researchers and international collaborators, ourselves among them, contributed papers offering perspectives on the science, history and legacy of palaeoanthropology in South Africa and beyond.

We were particularly interested in exploring how the history of the discovery of early hominins in South Africa influenced the scientific field of palaeoanthropology. Did it promote or limit scientific enquiry? In what ways? What were its cultural effects? And how do they play out now, a century later?

The papers in the special issue unpack a number of issues and highlight ongoing debates in the field of human evolution research in Africa and beyond.

Our goal is to celebrate the remarkable science that the discovery of A. africanus enabled. At the same time we are probing disciplinary legacies through a critical lens that challenges researchers to do science better.

The marginalisation and erasure of voices

Several key themes run through the contributions in the special issue.

One is the unheard voices. The colonial framework in which most palaeoanthropological research in South Africa took place excluded all but a few groups. This is particularly true for Indigenous voices. As a legacy, few African researchers in palaeoanthropology are first authors on prominent research or leading international research teams.

Too often, African palaeoanthropological heritage is the domain of international teams that conduct research on the continent with little meaningful collaboration from local African researchers. This is “helicopter science”. More diverse teams will produce better future work and those of us in the discipline must actively drive this process.

---

Read more: Archaeology is changing, slowly. But it’s still too tied up in colonial practices

---

The dominance of western male viewpoints is part of the colonial framework. This theme, too, threads through most of the work in the special issue.

In a bid to redress some of the imbalances, a majority of the authors in the special issue were women, especially African women, and Black Africans more broadly. Many of the papers call for a more considered and equitable approach to the inclusion of African researchers, technicians and excavators in the future: in workshops and seminars, on professional bodies, as collaborators and knowledge creators, and in authorship practices.

Community and practice

Colonial legacies also manifest in a lack of social responsiveness – the use of professional expertise for a public purpose or benefit. This is another theme in the special edition. For example, Gaokgatlhe Mirriam Tawane, Dipuo Kgotleng and Bando Baven consider the broader effects of the Taung Child discovery on the Taung community.

Tawane is a palaeoanthropologist and grew up in the Taung municipality. She and her co-authors argue that, a century after the discovery of the fossil, there is little (if any) reason for the local community to celebrate it. They argue that more must be done not only to give back to the community, which is beset by socio-economic struggles, but also to build trust in science and between communities and scientists.

Researchers need to understand that there is value in engaging with people beyond academia. This is not merely to disseminate scientific knowledge. It can also enrich communities and co-create a scholarship that is more nuanced, ethical and relevant. Researchers must become more socially responsive and institutions must hold researchers to higher standards of practice.

Resourcing

Another theme which emerges from this special issue is the value of and the need for excellent local laboratory facilities in which to undertake research based on the fossils and deposits associated with them.

Increased investment in local laboratory facilities and capacity development can create a shift towards local work on the content being led by Africans. It can also increase pan-African collaboration, dismantling the currently common practice of African researchers being drawn into separate international networks.

It is important for international funding bodies to increase investment within African palaeoanthropology. This will facilitate internal growth and local collaborative networks. International and South African investment is also needed to grow local research capacity. Fossil heritage is a national asset.

This is an edited version of an article in the South African Journal of Science. Yonatan Sahle (Department of Archaeology, University of Cape Town, South Africa and Department of History and Heritage Management, Arba Minch University, Ethiopia) co-authored the academic article.

– The fossil skull that rocked the world – 100 years later scientists are grappling with the Taung find’s complex colonial legacy
– https://theconversation.com/the-fossil-skull-that-rocked-the-world-100-years-later-scientists-are-grappling-with-the-taung-finds-complex-colonial-legacy-248605

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Catriona Waitt, Professor of Clinical Pharmacology and Global Health, University of Liverpool

Breastfeeding is so important for child health that the World Health Organization (WHO) and Unicef recommend that babies should be breastfed within an hour of birth, be exclusively breastfed for the first six months of life, and then continue breastfeeding in combination with other foods for two years or more.

Infectious disease emergencies can threaten breastfeeding and the lives of mothers and babies. Depending on the disease, there is a risk of passing infection to the baby by close contact or (rarely) through breastmilk. There is also the risk of harm to breastfed infants from medication or vaccination of their mothers.

But separating mothers and babies or stopping breastfeeding also poses risks.

Mothers need proper guidance on the best course of action during an Ebola outbreak.

Threat to mothers and babies

The symptoms of Ebola include fever, tiredness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash and, later, bleeding from any part of the body.

Ebola viruses are extremely contagious and people who become infected are at very high risk of death. Pregnant women and infants are more vulnerable and at greater risk than others.

Ebola outbreaks most often occur in countries where breastfeeding is vital for child survival. They have occurred in several African countries and on 30 January 2025 Uganda declared an outbreak, the latest in several the country has endured.

Breastmilk contains many ingredients that help to prevent and fight infection and that strengthen the baby’s own immune system. Replacing breastmilk with other foods or liquids (including infant formula) removes this protection from babies and makes them more likely to become seriously ill.

---

Read more: Ebola: how a vaccine turned a terrifying virus into a preventable disease

---

Protection or harm?

It’s important to know which actions protect or harm babies and their mothers during outbreaks. Recommendations on infectious diseases must weigh up the risks related to the disease, medical treatments and the risks of not-breastfeeding.

The World Health Organization has published guidelines on how to care for breastfeeding mothers and their infants when one or both have Ebola, but these recommendations are based on “very low quality” evidence, they are mostly expert opinion rather than research-based knowledge.

Women and children have been largely neglected in Ebola research. More is known about Ebola and semen than Ebola and breastmilk.

In a paper just published in the Lancet Global Health, we have outlined a roadmap for research on Ebola and breastfeeding so that mothers and babies can be protected.

---

Read more: Ebola in Uganda: why women must be central to the response

---

What we don’t know

We know that Ebola is easily transmitted by close contact between people. So the close contact of breastfeeding is a risk to an uninfected baby or mother if one of them has Ebola.

However:

• We don’t know if breastmilk can be infectious and, if it is, for how long.

• We don’t know whether expressed breastmilk can be treated so that it is safe.

• We don’t know whether, if both mother and baby are infected, it is better for the baby if the mother keeps breastfeeding, if she is able to.

• We don’t know if vaccinating mothers against Ebola helps to protect their breastfed infants from the virus.

• We don’t know if there are any risks for breastfed infants if their mothers are infected.

The result of this lack of knowledge is that decisions may be taken that increase risk and suffering for mothers and their babies.

For example, mothers may refuse vaccination because they are fearful that it is risky for their baby. But by refusing vaccination they’d be making themselves vulnerable to Ebola.

Alternatively, they may get vaccinated and stop breastfeeding, making their baby vulnerable to other serious infections.

If mothers and babies who both have Ebola are separated and breastfeeding is stopped, it could reduce the chances of survival.

Mothers and babies deserve better than this.

No more excuses

For many years people have called for more research on Ebola, breastmilk and breastfeeding, but this research has not been undertaken. It is not acceptable that women and children are deprived of breastfeeding because the needed research has not been done.

Our experience providing medical care in Ebola outbreaks, developing guidance for breastfeeding mothers in emergencies and researching medications and breastfeeding prompted us to develop a plan to fill this research gap.

In our paper, we describe the different groups of breastfeeding women affected by Ebola who must be included in research:

• vaccine recipients

• mothers who are ill with Ebola

• mothers recovering from Ebola

• mothers who are infected with Ebola, but have no symptoms

• the wider population of breastfeeding mothers in communities experiencing Ebola outbreaks.

The roadmap also includes the research questions that need answering and the study designs that would enable these questions to be answered.

It is up to governments, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, funders and health organisations to act.

Following the Ebola and breastfeeding research roadmap will not necessarily be easy. It is difficult to do research in the middle of an emergency.

But research on vaccination safety can be done outside outbreaks. Putting research plans in place and gaining approvals before outbreaks will also make things easier.

Closing the female data gap

Women have the right to societal, family and health support to enable them to breastfeed.

Lack of research is part of a problem called the “female data gap”, where knowledge of women’s bodies, experiences and needs is lacking.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says, “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.”

There just needs to be a commitment to make this research happen.

– Breastfeeding and Ebola: knowledge gaps endanger mothers and babies
– https://theconversation.com/breastfeeding-and-ebola-knowledge-gaps-endanger-mothers-and-babies-248356

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Patrick Hajayandi, Research Affiliate, University of Pretoria

The crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) escalated at the end of January 2025 when Goma, the capital of the province of North Kivu, fell to Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.

The civilian population is paying a heavy price as a result of ongoing violence, despite a series of initiatives aimed at creating conditions for peace. Since the re-emergence of the M23 in November 2021, violent clashes with the Congolese army have led to thousands of deaths and displaced more than one million people in North Kivu province alone.

Patrick Hajayandi, whose research focuses on peacebuilding and regional reconciliation, examines previous attempts at finding peace in eastern DRC – and what needs to happen next.

What efforts have been made by the DRC and Rwanda to ease tensions?

The eastern DRC has become the site of renewed tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwanda lies to the east of the DRC. The two nations share a border of about 217 kilometres.

Kigali accuses the DRC of hosting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the largest illegal armed group operating in the conflict area. Better known by its French acronym, FDLR, the group has stated its intention to overthrow the Rwandan government.

On the other hand, Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting and arming the M23, which seeks to control the two Kivu provinces, North and South. The involvement of the Rwandan Defence Forces in direct combat alongside the M23, corroborated by UN experts, has escalated the spread of violence.

Despite current tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali, a few years ago the two governments engaged in collaborative efforts to solve the problem posed by the numerous armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

Such efforts included two joint operations with Congolese and Rwandan forces aimed at neutralising the FDLR. These joint operations in 2008 and 2009 were known as Operation Kimia and Umoja Wetu. In 2019 and 2020, soon after he took power, President Felix Tshisekedi allowed the Rwandan army to conduct operations against the FDLR in Congolese territory.

However, in recent years, relations have soured badly between Kinshasa and Kigali. This has led to regional efforts to broker peace.

Why has it been so difficult for regional actors to broker peace in the DRC?

The first complicating factor relates to the different roles that regional actors play in the DRC.

The involvement of a multitude of countries points to the complexity underlying the conflict and the diverse geopolitical interests. The DRC shares a border with nine countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

In 2022, the African Union asked Angolan president João Lourenço to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda. The process he oversees is known as the Luanda Process and seeks to defuse the escalation of violence across the region. In particular, it has sought to reduce tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa.

The East African Community is directly involved in peace initiatives to restore peace in DRC. It has appointed former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta to lead what is called the Nairobi Process.

---

Read more: DRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war

---

The DRC has rebuffed the East African Community’s reconciliation efforts. And Rwanda recently criticised both processes, suggesting the country had lost confidence in the ability of Lourenço and Kenyatta to find a solution.

In May 2023, the Southern African Development Community, of which the DRC is a member state, deployed a peace mission. This followed the exit of troops from the East African Community.

Other countries play different roles directly or indirectly in various missions in the DRC. Burundi is supporting military operations there under the framework of bilateral agreements in the defence sector. Uganda also deployed troops, ostensibly in pursuit of jihadist-backed armed rebels three years ago. However, this deployment has been a destabilising factor, with Kampala facing accusations of supporting the M23.

What have been the main hurdles in the way of these initiatives?

The East African Community Regional Force was deployed to pursue peace in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi Process. However, this mission was cut short due to four main challenges:

• differences over mission objectives: the DRC government believed that the East African Community Regional Force would militarily confront M23 rebels. But the force had different objectives. As indicated by its commander, the deployment was to focus on overseeing the implementation of a political agreement, not run a military confrontation.

• contrasting views among the leaders of the East African Community member states on how to address the DRC’s crisis: the DRC and Rwanda are both members of the community. Rwanda is vocal about stopping the persecution of Congolese Tutsi in the DRC. However, there is a growing perception that Rwanda is supporting the M23 as a proxy force to allow it to control mineral resources. This has stalled reconciliation efforts.

• a lack of financial support for the talks: the African Union and regional bodies don’t have enough funding to support the interventions required to make meaningful progress.

The Luanda Process has not been able to bring tangible results either. The reasons for this failure include bad faith from the parties involved. This was reflected in the continued capture of territories by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, despite a July 2024 ceasefire.

After the January 2025 seizure of Goma and wave of deaths and displacement that followed, the M23 declared another ceasefire. Whether it will hold remains to be seen.

Rwanda’s behaviour in the ongoing conflict is complicating peace efforts. Kigali continues to deny supporting the M23 armed group. But it is participating in negotiations that involve the M23 and the DRC government. These contradictions make it difficult to know exactly who must be held responsible when, for example, a ceasefire is violated.

What’s required to give peace in the DRC a chance?

The current peace initiatives have been ineffective; they are routinely violated. What is needed is real pressure on the actors involved in spreading violence, forcing them to halt their destructive activities.

Congolese Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege, for example, has called for diplomatic and economic measures to end the aggression in the DRC. This would mean implementing sanctions and aid conditionalities in both Kigali and Kinshasa against the military and political leaders orchestrating violence against civilian populations.

Interventions should also include addressing structural causes of the conflict in the DRC, including resource exploitation.

There is also a need to address impunity as an essential step towards lasting peace. Rwanda must not continue to support an armed group that is attacking a neighbour. Kigali needs to be held accountable. International pressure is essential in halting attacks. The DRC government must also play its role as a guarantor of security for all its citizens.

– DRC conflict: talks have failed to bring peace. Is it time to try sanctions?
– https://theconversation.com/drc-conflict-talks-have-failed-to-bring-peace-is-it-time-to-try-sanctions-248792

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts University

Sudan, which included South Sudan up to 2011, has never known peace and stability since independence in 1956. The country’s instability stems from the absence of democratic rule; failure to manage its diversity; military coups; civil wars; and its fragmented and bloated security sector.

Numerous political processes to mediate the peaceful resolution of conflicts started in the first decade of independence and continue today. None of these have delivered anything. The earliest peace efforts – in 1965 – sought to internally resolve the country’s north-south divide, which eventually triggered Africa’s longest civil war.

Since then, there have been at least a dozen attempts driven by local or external actors to resolve political crises. Among them were:

• the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the first civil war, mediated by Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie

• a 1988 agreement to silence the guns, made by John Garang of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani of the Democratic Unionist Party

• the 2019 Khartoum Declaration, mediated by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Britain, which provided a road map for the transition of Sudan into an elected and democratic government.

More recent talks have centred on the war that broke out in April 2023 pitting the Sudan Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful paramilitary group. The two protagonists and various civilian groups have been called to Jeddah, Cairo, Bahrain, Djibouti, Addis Ababa, Geneva, Ankara and other locations for talks under different auspices and with different formats. Multilateral organisations like the UN, AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and League of Arab states have been engaged directly or through their support in some of the mediation efforts.

I have two decades of research and practice in conflict prevention, management and resolution with a focus on east Africa and the Horn. It’s my view that mediation processes in Sudan are destined to fail for three main reasons. The first is the lack of an accurate definition of the problems of Sudan, and a lack of broader direction of its resolution and areas of consensus. The second is lack of agreement on who should get everyone together to discuss and resolve it. Finally, the lack of public participation.

What’s missing

Sudan needs to find the right formula to manage its diverse political, economic and cultural interests under a viable state. It must bring peace, democracy, justice and genuine reconciliation among Sudanese.

The most robust attempt to define the problem was the process convened in the years of 2009-2012 by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel led by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity as a Special Envoy of the AU PSC. The panel’s final report defined the problems of Sudan as:

• diversity management (differences between groups based on religion and on socioeconomic power)

• absence of a viable state that values peace, democracy, justice and reconciliation

• lack of a consultative forum or process for all Sudanese to contribute to important issues.

The panel report suggested that the Sudanese needed to arrive at a consensus through inclusive consultation. This has never taken place.

The second overriding problem is related to the architecture of mediation processes. Before South Sudan’s secession, Sudan shared a border with nine African countries. Even after the south left, Sudan remains a huge nation linking regions, and located at the strategic maritime route of the Red Sea.

Sudanese conflicts have been entangled in multiple regional and international cross-cutting interests. Outside actors have had various agendas: stability, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian action.

The existence of multiple interests by itself is an asset towards peace making in Sudan. But failure to coordinate them properly has been generating competing processes. This gives the Sudanese parties a chance to “shop for forums”, enabling them to procrastinate and avoid real engagement.

Key steps to effective Sudanese mediation

The key task of a mediator is assisting the Sudanese to define the problems of Sudan correctly, arrive at a consensus on it, and agree on a mechanism to resolve it.

Defining the problem and building consensus: Any mediation process begins with conflict parties defining the problem and developing the options for their resolution. The parties should have confidence in the neutrality of the mediator.

At this stage, the conflict parties are usually not represented by the top decision makers but by second level players with the expertise to develop options for decision making. This is because decision makers typically do not want to take positions from which they cannot backtrack.

Understanding this is important in creating a coordination mechanism for external stakeholders.

Neutral arbiter: The lead mediator needs to demonstrate neutrality to the conflicting parties as much as possible. Given the conditions in Sudan, a multilateral organisation such as the UN is most suited for the task. The UN has the ultimate responsibility. The AU, the Arab League and IGAD can also be engaged in support of the mediation by using their leverages on the conflicting parties. The choice of focal point must be accessible to all parties and perceived as neutral.

Foreign power influence: Creating the right mix of incentives for the warring protagonists is vital. This is a task for the external powerbrokers, which have the leverage on the warring parties. The protagonists will make decisions framed by their security, political and economic interests in the wider region.

But they may also be influenced by the fact that the humanitarian cataclysm in Sudan will have an impact on their interests. And failure to prevent that disaster will damage their reputations.

The US can use its relationships with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other external powerbrokers so that they refrain from supporting one or the other actor. The front-line states can use their influence on the warring parties to encourage them to work for peace.

The UN, the African Union, IGAD, and the League of Arab States are the sources for any international legitimacy to the parties. The Sudanese actors will need to respond positively to the demands of these institutions in search of international legitimacy given that the institutions act in a complementary manner.

With the right architecture for peacemaking, a peace process can be achieved in Sudan.

– Peace in Sudan: what it’s going to take
– https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-what-its-going-to-take-248328

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sylvie Ayimpam, Chercheur à l’IMAf et Chargée de cours, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)

In the two Congos, there’s a cultural movement by the Society of Ambience-Makers and Elegant People (Sape), known as “sapeurs”, who blend fashion, culture and social resistance. Though it was rooted primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo, the movement is now spreading worldwide, through Congolese migration.

As a researcher, I have studied Sape in its cultural, social and symbolic dimensions.

Sape is far more than a fashion trend. Here are five key things to know about this movement.

1. The history of Sape

Sape emerged during the colonial era, first in Brazzaville and later in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), when young Congolese began adopting and reinterpreting the clothing style of colonisers. This movement was not merely about fashion. It served as a way for people to express their self-worth and respectability in a context where it had been denied or diminished. Over time, it also became a subtle, yet powerful, form of resistance against colonial domination.

This process continued after independence. It became a symbol of resistance to dictatorship, particularly under the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now DR Congo). He advocated for the rejection of western clothing in favour of traditional attire, but Sape persisted as a counter-cultural statement.

The movement expanded to Europe with Congolese migration, in the 1970s and 1980s, where sapeurs reinterpreted European fashion — often incorporating vibrant colours and eccentric details — turning style into a tool of subversion. From the outset, it drew on diverse influences, including European culture, but transformed them to create a distinctly Congolese style.

By adopting the clothes of the colonialists, young Congolese appropriated symbols of power and social status, while hijacking them to assert their own identity. Sape thus became a means of uplifting the value of Congolese culture under imposed cultural domination.

2. The rules of Sape

Sape is often compared to 19th-century European dandyism – a 19th-century fashion trend that emerged in England for men who aspired to refinement and elegance. Sapeurs, with their designer clothes, bold colours and preoccupation with sartorial elegance, embody a modern, African version of this tradition.

For them, Sape is more than just a way of dressing. It is a philosophy based on several fundamental principles: an expression of identity, the quest for excellence or refinement and cultural and social resistance.

“Sapology” imposes strict rules. These include respecting the colour trilogy – which stipulates that no outfit should feature more than three different colors (to ensure harmony and avoid discordant colour combinations), maintain rigorous clothing hygiene, and commit to constant elegance. For sapeurs, appearance is a powerful way to make an impression and stand out in an environment often defined by hardship.

Elegance in dress isn’t just about wearing expensive clothes, it also extends to behaviour. Sapeurs have a particular attitude – they use sophisticated language and refined gestures, and maintain an attitude of courtesy and respect. Some of their public posturing echoes that of European dandies, like a specific gait, often slightly stooped with crisscrossing steps, used to highlight the details of their attire, such as clothing seams, shoes and socks. Their way of moving and speaking is just as important as the clothes they wear.

This performative aspect makes Sape a true living spectacle. At gatherings of sapeurs, participants compete in elegance and creativity, strutting as if on a runway. This transforms the streets where they gather into an open stage where everyone can express themselves and showcase their style.

3. Expansion via the diaspora

The Sape movement isn’t confined to the streets of Brazzaville and Kinshasa. It has evolved into a global phenomenon, spreading first within the Congolese diaspora in Paris. It then expanded to other European cities where these migrants reside, such as Brussels. The movement has even reached American cities, like New York and Montreal.

For Congolese living in western countries, Sape is a way of reconnecting with their roots and asserting their identity, in often challenging circumstances. It enables these members of the diaspora to create a positive identity at a time when discrimination and social precariousness are commonplace.

In Europe’s major cities, Sape serves as a way to resist social invisibility. Congolese migrants, often pushed to the margins of society, use Sape to make themselves visible, drawing attention to their presence and asserting their place by wearing flamboyant costumes.

Sape is therefore a form of social protest, a way of defying the expectations of the host society.

4. The role of music

A key factor in the success and global recognition of the Sape movement is its strong connection to Congolese popular music.

Artists like Papa Wemba and Aurlus Mabélé have played crucial roles in promoting “the Sape”. They incorporated its aesthetic into their public personas and performances. In France and Belgium, Papa Wemba’s concerts became major events for the Congolese community. These concerts provided an opportunity to showcase and celebrate the Sape movement.

Congolese popular music has served as a vehicle for spreading the Sape ideals, popularising this lifestyle as a symbol of success.

Within the world of Congolese popular music, Sape has risen to the status of a religion – Kitendi, the “religion of fabric”. This religion has its pope, high priests, priests, priestesses, and countless devoted followers.

Papa Wemba, often referred to as the “King of Sape”, was a charismatic figure who masterfully combined music and fashion to craft a powerful cultural identity. Every outfit he wore was meticulously selected to embody the elegance and prestige of Sape.

---

Read more: Papa Wemba: musical king of the Society of Ambianceurs and Elegant People

---

By wearing clothes from prestigious brands, Papa Wemba made Sape a symbol of success for many young Congolese. He also contributed to the export of Sape beyond African borders.

5. Preserving the dignity of the poor

Sape is marked by an interesting paradox: it combines luxury clothing and a flamboyant lifestyle with often precarious living conditions. For many sapeurs, elegance is a goal that takes precedence over material comfort. Sapeurs invest a large part of their income in designer clothes, sometimes to the detriment of their daily quality of life. This sacrifice is seen as necessary to maintain their status within the sapeur community.

For sapeurs, visibility and recognition are paramount. An invisible “sapeur”, they say, ceases to be a “sapeur”. This highlights the movement’s complexity.

Sapeurs view themselves as kings without crowns, street aristocrats who use their appearance to challenge conventional ideas of wealth and status. Through Sape, they subvert traditional social hierarchies, emphasising that elegance and personal worth are not solely tied to economic means. Instead, these qualities are defined by one’s ability to stand out through style, creativity and charisma.

– Congo’s stylish sapeur movement goes beyond fashion – 5 deeper insights
– https://theconversation.com/congos-stylish-sapeur-movement-goes-beyond-fashion-5-deeper-insights-246919

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Heather D. Flowe, Professor of Psychology, University of Birmingham

Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) is a deeply entrenched cultural practice that affects around 200 million women and girls. It’s practised in at least 25 African countries, as well as parts of the Middle East and Asia and among immigrant populations globally.

It is a harmful traditional practice that involves removing or damaging female genital tissue. Often it’s “justified” by cultural beliefs about controlling female sexuality and marriageability. FGM/C causes immediate and lifelong physical and psychological harm to girls and women, including severe pain, complications during childbirth, infections and trauma.

We brought together our expertise in economics and gender based violence to examine excess mortality (avoidable deaths) due to FGM/C. Our new research now reveals a devastating reality: FGM/C is one of the leading causes of death for girls and young women in countries where it’s practised. FGM/C can result in death from severe bleeding, infection, shock, or obstructed labour.

Our study estimates that it causes approximately 44,000 deaths each year across the 15 countries we examined. That is equivalent to a young woman or girl every 12 minutes.

This makes it a more significant cause of death in the countries studied than any other excluding infection, malaria and respiratory infections or tuberculosis. Put differently, it is a bigger cause of death than HIV/Aids, measles, meningitis and many other well-known health threats for young women and girls in these countries.

Prior research has shown that FGM/C leads to severe pain, bleeding and infection. But tracking deaths directly caused by the practice has been nearly impossible. This is partly because FGM/C is illegal in many countries where it occurs, and it typically takes place in non-clinical settings without medical supervision.

Where the crisis is most severe

The practice is particularly prevalent in several African nations. In Guinea, our data show 97% of women and girls have undergone FGM/C, while in Mali the figure stands at 83%, and in Sierra Leone, 90%. The high prevalence rates in Egypt, with 87% of women and girls affected, are a reminder that FGM/C is not confined to sub-Saharan Africa.

For our study, we analysed data from the 15 African countries for which comprehensive “gold standard” FGM/C incidence information is available. Meaning, the data is comprehensive, reliable and widely accepted for research, policymaking and advocacy efforts to combat FGM/C.

We developed a new approach to help overcome previous gaps in data. We matched data on the proportion of girls subjected to FGM/C at different ages with age-specific mortality rates across 15 countries between 1990 and 2020. The age at which FGM occurs varies significantly by country. In Nigeria, 93% of procedures are performed on girls younger than five years old. In contrast, in Sierra Leone, most girls undergo the procedure between the ages of 10 and 14.

Since health conditions vary from place to place and over time, and vary in the same place from one year to the next, we made sure to consider these differences. This helped us figure out if more girls were dying at the ages when FGM/C usually happens in each country.

For example, in Chad, 11.2% of girls undergo FGM/C aged 0-4, 57.2% at 5-9 and 30% at 10-14. We could see how mortality rates changed between these age groups compared to countries with different FGM patterns.

This careful statistical approach helped us identify the excess deaths associated with the practice while accounting for other factors that might affect child mortality.

Striking findings

Our analysis revealed that when the proportion of girls subjected to FGM in a particular age group increases by 50 percentage points, their mortality rate rises by 0.1 percentage points. While this may sound small, when applied across the population of affected countries, it translates to tens of thousands of preventable deaths annually.

The scale is staggering: while armed conflicts in Africa caused approximately 48,000 combat deaths per year between 1995 and 2015, our research suggests FGM/C leads to about 44,000 deaths annually. This places FGM among the most serious public health challenges facing these nations.

Beyond the numbers

These statistics represent real lives cut short. Most FGM/C procedures are performed without anaesthesia, proper medical supervision, or sterile equipment. The resulting complications can include severe bleeding, infection and shock. Even when not immediately fatal, the practice can lead to long-term health problems and increased risks during childbirth.

The impact extends beyond physical health. Survivors often face psychological trauma and social challenges. In many communities, FGM/C is deeply embedded in cultural practices and tied to marriage prospects, making it difficult for families to resist the pressure to continue the tradition.

Urgent crisis

FGM/C is not just a human rights violation – it’s a public health crisis demanding urgent attention. While progress has been made in some areas, with some communities abandoning the practice, our research suggests that current efforts to combat FGM/C need to be dramatically scaled up.

The COVID-19 pandemic has potentially worsened the situation, owing to broader impacts of the pandemic on societies, economies and healthcare systems. The UN estimates that the pandemic may have led to 2 million additional cases of FGM/C that could have been prevented. Based on our mortality estimates, this could result in approximately 4,000 additional deaths in the 15 countries we studied.

The way forward

Ending FGM/C requires a multi-faceted approach. Legal reforms are crucial – the practice remains legal in five of the 28 countries where it’s most commonly practised. However, laws alone aren’t enough. Community engagement, education, and support for grassroots organisations are essential for changing deeply held cultural beliefs and practices.

Previous research has shown that information campaigns and community-led initiatives can be effective. For instance, studies have documented reductions in FGM/C rates following increased social media reach in Egypt and the use of educational films showing different views on FGM/C.

Most importantly, any solution must involve the communities where FGM/C is practised. Our research underscores that this isn’t just about changing traditions – it’s about saving lives. Every year of delay means tens of thousands more preventable deaths.

Our findings suggest that ending FGM/C should be considered as urgent a priority as combating major infectious diseases. The lives of millions of girls and young women depend on it.

– Female genital mutilation is a leading cause of death for girls where it’s practised – new study
– https://theconversation.com/female-genital-mutilation-is-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-girls-where-its-practised-new-study-249171

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Guy Lamb, Criminologist / Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University

Crime researchers use murder (or homicide) rate per 100,000 as a crude measure of the general level of violent interpersonal crime globally. According to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, South Africa’s murder rate of 45 per 100,000 (2023/24) is the second highest for countries that publish crime data.

The South African Police Service crime data shows that levels of attempted murder, armed robbery and robberies at homes have soared over the past 10 years. Other categories of violent crime, such as assault and sexual violence, also remain high.

High crime rates have had considerable negative effects on the country’s economy. The destructive impact of violent crime is estimated to cost the equivalent of 15 % of GDP.

In 2019, President Cyril Ramaphosa indicated that government would seek to reduce violent crime by 50% within a decade. The police budget increased by 24% from 2018/19 to 2024/25. But the murder rate increased by 25%, from 36 per 100,000 in 2018/19 to 45 per 100,000 in 2023/24.

I have spent 25 years researching violent crime and policing in South Africa. I also wrote a 2022 book, Policing and Boundaries in a Violent Society, and conducted various studies for the Institute for Security Studies.

In my view, the logical approach for government is to attend to the top 100 high crime areas. I’ll show why below. It must use the resources of the departments in its justice, crime prevention and security cluster to intervene in targeted, evidence-based ways, to combat and prevent crime.

Where crime is happening and what police are doing

Violent crime in South Africa has consistently been highly concentrated in a small number of urban areas. For example, 20% of all reported murders occur in just 30 policing areas (2.6% of the 1,149 policing areas). About 50% of all violent crime occurs in 100 policing areas (9% of the precincts).

Place-based crime reduction interventions have yielded positive results in high crime cities in a variety of countries, such as the US, Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago.

But in South Africa, the approach to fighting crime has focused instead on arrests and on force. This is why increasing the funding hasn’t had results.

The police arrested around 1.5 million criminal suspects a year between 2019/20 and 2023/24. (The exception was 2020/1, with 2.8 million arrests due to COVID-19 lockdown violations.)

A negative outcome of this police action has been rising civil claims against police, amounting to R67.4 billion (US$3.6 billion) as of March 2024 (47,818 claims).

The police have also used militarised approaches, such as Operation Shanela. Officers have been encouraged to be more forceful against alleged criminals.

There is very little evidence to suggest that militarised policing reduces violent crime. It can actually contribute to declining public trust in the police. Only 27% of the population consider police trustworthy (from 47% in 1999).

Despite the police budget increasing in recent years, their effectiveness has been undermined by declining personnel numbers. In 2018, there were 150,639 police personnel. This has dropped to 140,048 in recent years. There has also been a substantial reduction in the police reserve force.

A further challenge is the high rate of recidivism (re-offending). An estimated 90% of offenders commit crime again after leaving prison.

Six actions for 100 worst areas

I argue that six things need to happen in the 100 worst crime areas:

• reduce the number of firearms in circulation

• improve the number of court-ready police dockets

• improve place-based crime intelligence

• reduce alcohol harms

• provide rehabilitation and support services for offenders

• boost community safety organisations.

Firearms control

Firearms are the leading weapon used in murders and in several categories of robberies. They are also commonly used in sexual violence, and feature in gangsterism and organised crime.

Confiscating illegal firearms and ammunition, and securing convictions for those found in possession of illegal firearms, will have a positive impact in the target areas.

This requires a close working relationship between police and the National Prosecuting Authority to collect appropriate evidence and prepare court dockets adequately.

Rulings by magistrates that declare certain people unfit to possess licensed firearms must be monitored regularly.

Court-ready police dockets

The National Prosecuting Authority has undergone reforms over the past six years to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system. As a result, it has secured high conviction rates for several categories of violent crimes. However, many police dockets lack sufficient reliable evidence for the prosecutors to present so as to secure convictions in court.

As the table below shows, the vast majority of recorded violent crime cases do not result in a court conviction.

Police officials in high crime areas are typically overwhelmed by the large number of criminal cases they need to investigate. That means only a small number of dockets that have a likelihood of securing a conviction are prepared.

More resources are needed to increase cooperation between the police and prosecutors.

Place-based crime intelligence

Better crime intelligence could result in better control of illegal firearms and higher quality police dockets.

Police crime intelligence and other departments in the justice and security cluster must cooperate and share information.

Alcohol harms

Several forms of violent crime are linked to excessive alcohol consumption. Unregulated alcohol outlets present the most risky context for committing violence. There is an opportunity for police, prosecutors (especially through the Community Prosecutions Initiative) and municipalities to collaborate to reduce alcohol related crime and harms in the top 100 high crime areas.

This requires more effective monitoring and policing of alcohol outlets to ensure better compliance with liquor laws.

Rehabilitation and support services for offenders

It is likely that recidivism rates would be reduced if former prisoners and their families had better rehabilitation services in the top 100 high crime areas. Studies suggest that the most effective and practical programmes are those that focus on substance abuse, restorative justice, mental health, education and income generation.

Such services could give former inmates a means to generate an income legally.

Community safety organisations

Studies have shown that crime can be reduced when police and other government entities work closely with community organisations to devise solutions.

Community police forums and neighbourhood watches are examples of these kinds of arrangements.

They can collect intelligence and help the authorities design and implement evidence-based crime prevention actions that focus on the areas where crime is concentrated, and on the situations that tend to drive crime.

– Violent crime in South Africa happens mostly in a few hotspots: police resources should focus there – criminologist
– https://theconversation.com/violent-crime-in-south-africa-happens-mostly-in-a-few-hotspots-police-resources-should-focus-there-criminologist-248233

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Oyewale Tomori, Fellow, Nigerian Academy of Science

US president Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the World Health Organization is threatening funding for critical health programmes like HIV/Aids and tuberculosis in different parts of the world, including Nigeria.

The Conversation Africa’s Adejuwon Soyinka asked professor of virology and former WHO Africa regional virologist Oyewale Tomori why Nigeria is heavily dependent on US funding for some of its health programmes, what’s at risk and how to mitigate the impact.

How dependent is Nigeria on US funding for health?

Sadly, Nigeria and many African countries are too dependent on US funding and other donor funding for basic health activities and interventions. These activities are the normal function of a good and responsive government which is committed to the welfare of citizens.

According to a US embassy publication, since 2021, the US has committed to providing nearly US$20 billion in health programmes in Africa. The report says in 2023 alone, the US invested over US$600 million in health assistance in Nigeria. That is about 21% of Nigeria’s 2023 annual health budget.

Nigeria has, over the years, allocated on the average about 5% of the national budget to health. Three quarters of that covers recurrent expenditure like salaries.

Nigeria’s proposed 2025 budget is ₦49.74 trillion (US$33 billion), of which ₦2.4 trillion (US$1.6 billion) (4.8%) is allocated to health. This is lower than the 5.15% allocated to health in the 2024 budget.

The private sector plays a significant role in the Nigeria’s healthcare system, providing close to 60% of healthcare services.

In recent years, traditional medicine is increasingly offering complementary and alternative medicine in support of the services provided by the federal, state and local government areas levels.

What health programmes does the US fund in Nigeria?

The US support is focused on preventing malaria, under the US President’s Malaria Initiative; ending HIV, through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; and delivering vaccines (COVID, polio, rotavirus, IPV2 and HPV).

Malaria is a major public health concern in Nigeria. In 2021, there were an estimated 68 million cases of malaria and 194,000 deaths. Nigeria has the highest burden of malaria globally, nearly 27% of the global malaria burden.

Nigeria has a high burden of HIV – fourth in the world. A large number of Nigerians live with the virus. The national agency responsible for AIDS control reported a rate of 1,400 new HIV cases per week in 2023.

Nigeria has experienced outbreaks of yellow fever, meningitis, cholera, Lassa fever and COVID-19.

In addition to helping with managing these major diseases, the US government also provided funds to strengthen the country’s ability to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from emerging public health threats.

With these funds, a Public Health Emergency Management Programme was established and national disease surveillance systems were upgraded. Nigeria’s laboratory diagnostics were enhanced to test for Ebola, mpox, yellow fever, measles, Lassa fever, cholera and cerebrospinal meningitis.

Other countries (Japan, Germany, Canada, the UK) also provided support through building and equipping laboratories and training health workers.

What’s most at risk?

Interventions most at risk are those of which the Nigerian government has abdicated its responsibilities to the donors. They include provision of rapid diagnostic tests for malaria, insecticide-treated bed nets, malaria preventive treatments in pregnancy, provision of fast acting malaria medicines and insecticide for home spraying.

The following HIV interventions are likely to be adversely affected: HIV counselling and testing services, especially for pregnant women to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and the care of people living with HIV with TB/HIV services, as well as care and support for orphans and vulnerable children.

Sustaining laboratory capacity for rapid disease diagnosis will suffer a major setback with reduced or lack of reagents and consumables.

A huge amount of laboratory equipment is provided by donors. Servicing and replacement of equipment will be affected.

The Nigerian health sector’s challenges include inadequate funding, shortage of healthcare professionals, poor access to healthcare due to cost, poor infrastructure, and high prevalence of preventable diseases.

Cutting off US money is not likely to affect the shortage of healthcare professionals, as the major reason for the shortage is their deteriorating work environment and unsafe social environment. This environment was created by years of economic downturn and social insecurity in Nigeria.

Why is Nigeria still so reliant on US funding?

I think Nigeria lacks national pride as it begs for assistance to provide what it already has the resources for. The government seems to place the well-being of the citizens on a secondary status.

Many African governments assume the world owes Africa compensation for colonial activities. But to me, the danger to Nigeria’s freedom from dependency is not truly knowing what we are, who we are, and how endowed we are.

The world describes Nigeria as “resource limited” and, without thinking, Nigerians accept such name calling. Nigeria is not resource-limited, it is resource wasteful. Nigeria is not resource constrained; it is corruption constrained. Until Nigerians know who and what we are, we will never find the solution to our problems.

Nigeria’s acceptance of the tag “resource-limited” drives it to beg for assistance even in areas of its highest capability, capacity and competence and where it has highly trained people. Like disease prevention and control.

Africa has since the 1960s experienced numerous outbreaks of diseases and has acquired significant expertise in disease prevention and control. An example is the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria, which was brought under control within three months with only 20 cases and eight deaths.

This was a disease that raged for three years and ravaged three countries: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It was reported in seven others with 28,600 cases and 11,326 deaths.

In Nigeria, the country coordinated response activities which were anchored on the participation of the community. The community was part of disease investigation, contact tracing, isolation of cases and adoption of infection, prevention and control interventions.

How can Nigeria mitigate the impact?

Nigeria must immediately provide emergency funds to cover the shortfall arising from the action of the US government. What Trump has done should have been anticipated, because he did the same things during his first term of office.

Nigeria must re-order its priorities, and provide funds to create and sustain an enabling environment for talented human resources to function effectively for disease control and prevention.

The country must prioritise disease prevention and control (in that order) through adequate and sustained funding of disease surveillance activities at all levels of governance.

Nigeria needs to decentralise disease surveillance, prevention and control by enabling states and local government areas to take responsibility. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention should coordinate state and local government areas activities, instead of acting as the controller of diseases in Nigeria.

– US health funding cuts: what Nigeria stands to lose
– https://theconversation.com/us-health-funding-cuts-what-nigeria-stands-to-lose-248921

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

During its 16th annual summit in Kazan, Russia, Brics – a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions – invited Nigeria and eight other countries to join it as “partner” countries. Nigeria formally accepted the invitation in January 2025. That invitation has generated questions about how Nigeria stands to benefit, especially when US president Donald Trump is threatening to sanction members of the group if they replace the US dollar as reserve currency. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa joined in 2010 and the bloc added four new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates) in 2023. In this interview, development economist Stephen Onyeiwu argues that Nigeria stands to gain from a Brics partnership, but would have to carefully balance its domestic interests with those of its western allies and Brics.

What does it mean to be a Brics ‘partner’ country?

The introduction of Brics partnership is an expansion mechanism designed to bring in more participants without giving them full membership. It is akin to “observer” status.

Brics partners can participate in special sessions of summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, as well as other high-level events. Partners can also contribute to the organisation’s official documents and policy statements.

But partners cannot host annual Brics summits or determine the venue. Neither can they select new members and partners.

How beneficial is Brics partnership to Nigeria?

The main benefit would be access to finance offered by Brics’ New Development Bank.

The New Development Bank was established as an alternative to western-dominated international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These institutions are sometimes used by the leading western countries to keep developing countries in line on global issues.

Some developing countries are reluctant to criticise western countries for fear of losing access to funding by western-backed international financial institutions.

Nigeria has been running a budget deficit of about 5% of GDP since 2019, and it needs funding to pay for the deficits. The New Development Bank could be an important source of funding for investment in Nigeria’s infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, and so on.

New Development Bank loans are also available in member countries’ local currencies. They don’t have to earn foreign exchange to repay the loans. This fosters exchange rate stability and promotes economic growth. The New Development Bank raises funds in member countries’ local currencies, and lends them to member countries.

Nigeria could use its Brics partnership to garner the group’s support in matters that affect Nigeria globally. For instance, there have been requests for African countries to be included as permanent members (without veto power) of the UN security council. South Africa and Nigeria have been touted as potential candidates. Should this issue be raised at the UN, Nigeria can count on the support of its Brics allies, which includes two permanent members (China and Russia) of the security council.

Mutual understanding and cooperation with other Brics members and partners might spill over into economic, trade and investment agreements. Friendly countries are more likely to trade with each other and invest in each other’s economy.

How can Nigeria maximise its status as a Brics partner?

Nigeria should use it to attract foreign direct investment in strategic sectors of the economy, such as infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and technology.

Some Brics members, like China, India, and the UAE, have investors that are seeking investment outlets abroad. Nigeria could use the bloc’s annual summits to showcase investment opportunities.

The global economy is transitioning into “frontier industries and technologies”, such as big data, artificial intelligence, solar, drones, gene editing, 3D printing, blockchains, Internet of Things (IoT), 5G, robotics and nanotechnology. China, India and Brazil are already well advanced in these technologies.

Nigeria should use its partnership with these countries to build capabilities in frontier industries and technologies. It could get favourable terms in the transfer of these technologies.

Nigeria seeks to diversify its economy from reliance on the export of hydrocarbons. But Nigerian producers have had a hard time accessing global markets. The country should negotiate trade deals that provide access to Brics markets, especially agricultural and agro-processed products, arts and crafts.

But Nigeria has to promote economic growth and structural transformation at home. If the Nigerian economy falters, it is unlikely the country will be invited to become a full member of Brics.

Would adding new members and partners reduce western dominance?

Brics has so far not been able to significantly change the dynamics of the international political economy. Adding new members and partners, while symbolic, will not act as an effective counterweight to the influence of the G7 and G20 groups of nations.

Most of the countries and partners in Brics are either allies of western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to western interests.

Egypt and the UAE, for instance, receive military aid from the United States. Ethiopia and Nigeria are top recipients of foreign aid in Africa, much of it from western-backed financial institutions.

The only outlier in the mix is Iran, whose membership was promoted by Russia. But Iran has no leverage to influence others in the bloc.

On balance, therefore, Brics will not be a threat to western countries.

Brics aspires to weaken the dominance of the US dollar for international transactions. Close to 90% of international trade transactions are conducted with the US dollar.

Brics countries plan to reduce dollar dominance by encouraging member countries to settle their trade and financial transactions using their domestic currencies. For instance, South African businesses could purchase Chinese goods using the South African rand, while the Chinese could do the same for South African goods using the Chinese yuan. The more members you have in Brics swapping their currencies, the less important the US dollar will be.

It is unlikely, however, that an increase in the number of Brics members and partners will weaken the dollar. Most will continue to have significant economic relationships with the west, including trade and foreign aid.

They will also continue to conduct business with many non-Brics countries, which also have economic relationships with the west. They will need the US dollar to transact with many other countries.

So increasing the number of Brics members and partners does not pose a threat to dollar dominance.

– Nigeria’s Brics partnership: economist outlines potential benefits
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-brics-partnership-economist-outlines-potential-benefits-248943

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mamokete Modiba, Researcher, Gauteng City-Region Observatory

The South African government declared a national disaster towards the end of 2024 in response to an outbreak of food-borne illnesses. The outbreak had led to the tragic deaths of over 20 children and hospitalisation of hundreds.

Investigations by the National Institute for Communicable Diseases attributed the outbreak to hazardous pesticides such as Terbufos and Aldicarb. The pesticides, used in agriculture, have infiltrated the informal market as unregulated “street pesticides” for rat control, resulting in food contamination.

In response, the government announced several measures. One was that all food handling outlets, including informal retailers known as spaza shops, had to register with their respective municipalities. It also introduced widespread inspection of these outlets for compliance with regulations and health standards.

The measures are a step in the right direction. However, based on our research work at the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) over the past decades, they fall short of what is required. In addition, certain aspects, such as mandatory registration and mass inspection of food outlets, may prove difficult to implement effectively.

The Gauteng City Region is a cluster of cities, towns and urban nodes that make up the economic heartland of South Africa. The Gauteng City-Region Observatory is a partnership between the Gauteng provincial government, the University of the Witwatersrand, the University of Johannesburg and Gauteng South African Local Government Association. It has been researching the development dynamics of the region since 2008, providing data-driven insights and strategic guidance to support sustainable development.

The government response to the outbreak of food-borne illnesses addresses the immediate crisis but does not address underlying factors affecting low-income settlements.

Research by GCRO has identified the underlying factors as poor infrastructure and services. Rat infestations stem from poor waste management. This is caused by inadequate public services, failing infrastructure and irregular waste collection.

Dumping, littering and burning waste worsen the public health and environmental risks, including disease transmission and pest infestations.

Based on this evidence, we conclude that the government’s response does not adequately address some of the root causes of the outbreak, due to insufficient understanding of the context. Addressing these systemic failures is not just a public health matter. It also highlights the challenges faced by these communities and emphasises the importance of supporting local economies.

Survey findings

The GCRO’s flagship Quality of Life Survey, conducted every two years since 2009, is one of South Africa’s largest social surveys. It measures various aspects such as Gauteng residents’ socio-economic dynamics, service delivery experiences, and satisfaction with government. It provides longitudinally comparable data to inform decision-making.

The survey covers various topics that have a bearing on the food-borne illnesses outbreak, like basic services, income sources and food security. According to the latest survey (2023/24), access to refuse removal and satisfaction with service delivery has declined in Gauteng.

In the 2023/24 survey, 74% of respondents reported weekly refuse removal, down from 83% in the 2020/21 period. Satisfaction with services dropped from 75% to 64% over the same period – a worrying trend since 2017/18. The survey also shows that over half (57%) of businesses in Gauteng are informal.

Household hunger has increased across ten years of the survey. More than one in ten households experience severe food insecurity: hunger, poor access to food and insufficient spending on nutritious food.

Measures to address the crisis

We now turn to the three government interventions:

Registration of spaza shops

All food handling outlets, including spaza shops, are required to register with their municipalities between November 2024 and February 2025. This is a step in the right direction, towards regulatory compliance and monitoring of the safety of goods being sold to the public. However, it might not be achievable, especially within the specified period.

There are minimum requirements for the registration of spaza shops. These include (re)zoning certificates or consent use, certificates of acceptability (health standards), approved building plans, registration with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, and tax clearance. However, many of these businesses operate informally and therefore lack the required documentation.

Any spaza shop that fails to register in time will be closed. This will affect livelihoods and food security, especially in low-income communities where these shops play a vital role.

Spaza shops are a way for many people to make an income, and they supply essential food items to local communities. Households buy from them for a variety of reasons: they are nearby and affordable, open for long hours and offer credit.

Inspection of food outlets

A campaign to inspect all food handling outlets, focusing on spaza shops and informal traders, is underway. Law enforcement is important to remove contaminated food from the market and prevent future outbreaks. But municipalities have limited capacity to conduct such widespread inspections and ensure compliance with health regulations and standards.

The outbreak was partly a result of municipalities’ inability to enforce the rules. If inspections had been regular and thorough, food contamination issues would have been picked up before the current crisis.

The focus on punitive measures, such as closing businesses and prosecuting owners, does not help them to register, reopen and comply. It might harm the informal economy, reflecting a broader trend of criminalising the poor.

Joint fund to support township and rural businesses

Government has set aside R500 million (US$26 million) to support township and rural enterprises, including spaza shops. The fund is intended to improve business infrastructure and build capacity.

But in our view, its eligibility criteria require reconsideration. To qualify, a business owner must be a South African citizen, their business must be registered in the municipality and they must have have valid tax registration. The majority of businesses in these settlements are informal and would not meet the requirements, so the criteria exclude many that need support.

Next steps

The government’s response to the food-borne illness outbreak focuses on the immediate crisis and related symptoms. It overlooks underlying structural factors. The formalisation and compliance of informal businesses may contribute to the solution but will not tackle the root causes.

These include essential infrastructure and services such as water, sanitation and waste management facilities.

– South Africa’s food poisoning crisis: the government’s response isn’t dealing with the real issues
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-food-poisoning-crisis-the-governments-response-isnt-dealing-with-the-real-issues-245951